You mentioned two examples. If I gave you another 10, would it make my assumption more correct?
That's exactly my point. If you carefully select the right dates and times you can show a direct correlation, and if you carefully select different dates and times, you can instead show an inverse correlation. My point is that there is only a weak direct correlation over large time scales (i.e. both price and hashrate/difficult trend upwards over time), but the price does not determine the difficulty nor vice versa
There has always been a limited supply of miners, so the difficulty is going to be constrained by the supply chain.
Mining has become more efficient (in terms of cost per hash) over time, so the difficulty will increase as more efficient miners come to market.
An economically rational market participant will keep their miners running as long as it is profitable to do so (if they lack capacity, they will sell their miner to another economically rational market participant who will do the same), and will turn off their miners once it is no longer profitable to use their equipment. One factor that influences if it is profitable to mine with a given miner is the value of the coin the miner mines. Similarly, if it goes from not being profitable, to being profitable to mine with specific equipment, an economically rational person will turn their equipment on.
So there are other factors that influence the difficulty, however, one factor is most definitely the price of bitcoin.
True! So, the computational cost AND the block rewards should be less than the transacted amount to incentivize cheating, right? (Excluding the market's upheaval)
I suppose it depends on whether the attacker controls 51% of the hashrate or not. If they do, and are guaranteed to eventually overcome the main chain, then they are guaranteed all those block rewards. If they control say 30-40%, and are just "trying their luck" so to speak, then there is the risk that they manage to mine several blocks but not enough to overcome the main chain, and then they lose all those rewards.
If an attacker has 40% of the network hashpower, they cannot maintain a 51% attack indefinitely. They may be able to periodically create a competing chain that is 6+ blocks deep, however, they won't be able to do that forever, and if the rest of the miners decide to not accept a 6 block reorg with competing transactions, the attacker's blockchain will eventually be not the blockchain with the most work.