I wonder if even BBQcoin would consider such a fun experiment to be their kind of fun..
Consider the politics too! Whose shill / sockpuppet are you!?!?! How much are the Bit-enders paying you to incite this attack upon the Lite-enders' currency? Don't you know that incitement to riot is a crime?
Well this is why I'm perfect for the job: it's already clear to many (if not all) that I am hell-bent on destroying Bitcoin and likely any other crypto-coin.
But wait! Maybe we can hoist the bit-enders by their own petard! Suppose LiTeCoin actually did volunteer itself as the "victim" chain for this little "experiment" and ended up scaling up to massively Googillianesque scales, becoming so valuable and so huge that not only does it lure the Fortune 100 into adopting it but also only the most technologically pre-prepared of the Fortune 100 could even begin to consider hosting its gigapetabytes of UTXOs let alone its petapetabytes of actual blockchain? Wouldn't it have "won"? Wouldn't that show the bit-enders a thing or two about who is really the most super, most-dooper, most uber uber-chain of them all?!?!
Maybe the only real question here is, are the bit-enders scaredy-cats, that they would hand over such an opportunity to prove a chain's uberness to some other chain instead of jumping at the opportunity to prove their own uberness by making their own test-net chain more valuable than any altchain could ever hope or dream of becoming?
Ha. I remember a discussion I had with someone on IRC awhile back where we were joking that we should port SatoshiDice to one of the alt-coins to kill it in a flood of spam: "Of course, we couldn't just run bots, we'd have to let anyone make real bets. We could even fund the effort from the profit generated! In fact, it might kickstart the alt-coin's adoption, raise the price, and before long we'll be implementing off-chain transactions to ensure we don't kill our golden goose!"
They'd need to move to bitcoin v0.8 first and then hard fork otherwise it's pointless as it would hit the BDB limit.
Of course. An easy task probably given that there aren't many differences between Litecoin and Bitcoin technologically.
It isn't the miners who decide. It is the economic majority who will buy the miner's coins that decides.
Re-read my post. I'm well aware the economic majority argument and wrote it specifically to demonstrate how it doesn't always apply.
While we're at it consider how database protection laws (IE "copywrite-like" for databases) could apply to blockchains. Keeping a UTXO set will be very expensive, so it's easy to see how full nodes with that data will want to find some way to be paid to maintain it. Directly paying for access is one option for instance, but the other is for miners to offer free access. For the latter scenario even if the miners don't ask for exclusivity contracts in return, IE you agree to only send your transactions to this mining pool, there are good reasons for a miner to try to ensure that no-one can do a whole-sale copy of their UTXO database, as allowing that, even if paid for, allows for competitors to start up. Violating those agreements can be seen as violating database protection laws in jurisdictions where they exist, in addition to violating the contracts themselves. (note the very similar concepts outlined in the "red balloons" paper)
The transactions included with each block form another source of UTXO data, albeit a source that requires one to stay online constantly. Now you have yet another perverse incentive: if a competitor experiences some downtime for whatever reason you have no reason to want to give them the UTXO data that allows them to start mining again. Of course, they have the option of trying to pay for it, but ultimately the mining pool as a business has to ask the question "Do you accept $x from a competitor, when if you don't accept the payment they may be forced out of business?"
Finally when you create a block you do have an incentive to distribute the transactions associated with that block so as to allow your competitors to build upon that block. But your incentive is for only >50% of the hashing power to have that data, because it's that >50% who will inevitably create a longer chain. Of course, including measurement errors and variance you'll want to target a higher percentage, but the point is miners have incentives to ask other miners for proof they control a certain amount of hashing power, and just not bother relying solved blocks to players who only control a tiny amount of hashing power. Again when the number of miners is sufficiently small this can all be done as legal agreements backed by contract law and database protection laws.
tl;dr: A rational miner has a incentive to deliberately withhold transaction and UTXO data when the cost of maintaining that data is high and the overall number of miners low, and that incentive perversely leads to even further centralization.