This whole thing is simple enough to fix. Release an updated version of the client that rejects blocks that were created by a host that refuses to process an excessive number of transactions. This will prevent abusive monopoly.
In other words: If a host is being too picky, ignore any blocks from that host and fork the chain in favor of a more friendly host who processes more of the unconfirmed transactions.
This would require the creation of a "jerk-detection algorithm", which would require analysis of several factors, including the value of the voluntary fee on each transaction, the number of transactions rejected, and statistical analysis of the distribution of those two factors.
The problem seems quite difficult to me.
The host could generate a large volume of dummy txns and these could carry arbitrarily large fees. The host mines all the fees anyway, so to him that fee-paying txns just transfer money between pockets. His willingness to pay fees will greatly exceed that of all other users. He could generate enough dummy txns to max out the txn size limit. If he does this, some txns will need to be excluded from each block in order for the blocks to be valid. How can anyone determine what the valid exclusions are if the accounts are anonymous?
The most general solution is create adequate incentives for a monopolist to not behave abusively (these are already in place to some degree, but proof-of-stake would improve them)
Another way of using incentives to mitigate this problem is to require destruction of some portion of the txn fee. I don't think anything greater than extremely small rates of destruction would be a satisfactory solution however because it imposes a tax on the user base.
Another solution is to remove the block size limit and perhaps you could require all txns to be included [not sure if this is technologically feasible]. However, presumably, the block size limit was included in the first place out of security concerns.
You could also create some algorithm to identify dummy accounts and real accounts. The problem is that the monopolist would also know the algorithm and would likely be able to game it unless incentives were put in place to make gaming costly (e.g. destruction of some coins used in txn fees). I don't think this will be satisfactory either.