The only argument was that someone said that I didn't understand the principles. "you're wrong because he said you're wrong".
You really should go back and read the answers you've been given in this thread again. You seem to have missed all the times you have been corrected.
I haven't been. There has not been a single technical argument here, where mine is taken step by step and shown how things work differently than what I say. In fact, the onus of proof is on the claim that, contrary to what Satoshi said, contrary to what Gavin said, contrary to what I'm saying, non-mining nodes "do keep miners in check".
In as far as an argument has been presented, it goes even against itself: the so-called UASF threat.
What needs to be demonstrated, in order to deny my claim "non-mining nodes don't influence the functioning of the system" ? One needs to consider two different cases, one where non-mining nodes WANT something, and act, and one,
all else equal, they DON'T act, and show that it makes a difference.
First example: "non mining nodes keep miners in check". Note that we are NOT arguing how "exchanges keep miners in check" or how "other miners keep miners in check".
So we agree that all miners, and all exchanges, act together, and that it is the sole presence of a lot of non-mining nodes, that keeps them in check. If this can be argued, you won. Non-mining nodes keep miners in check in that case.
A: there are not many non-mining nodes. All miners, and all exchanges, have decided upon a protocol change. They do so. The protocol change happens.
B: a lot of non-mining full nodes don't want this protocol change. Tell me how they prevent it ? Suppose that out of the 10 000 non-mining nodes, 9000 of them are opposed to this protocol change. What happens ? Miners apply the protocol change. 9000 nodes do not agree, and don't accept the N+1 block. They wait for ever. The "good" N+1 block never arrives. They don't transmit the "bad" N+x blocks.
Users, initially connecting to these nodes, don't see their transactions. They look for other nodes, until they stumble on one of the 1000 agreeing nodes, on an exchange node, or on a miner node. They see that the chain is way further now, and they can see that the other nodes fell behind and stopped at N. They disconnect from them, and connect to the updating minority of nodes (from miners, exchanges, and a few enthusiasts).
==> the large majority of non mining nodes, not agreeing with the protocol change, didn't keep the miners in check, did they ?
B-bis: suppose that 9990 nodes are opposed, but suppose that miners and exchanges, agreeing on the protocol change, "sybil" and install 200000 new nodes. Now, the "node count" in favour of the protocol change is huge. What is that small minority complaining ? They are disconnected from the network, because they fall behind.
==> the large initial majority of non mining nodes can be sybiled away. They didn't, after all, keep the miners in check, did they ?
Conclusion case 1: whatever the non-mining nodes do, if miners and exchanges have agreed upon a protocol change, that protocol change happens, all else equal.
Second example: nodes want a protocol change, miners and exchanges want to keep the old protocolThis is the UASF.
A) only a small minority of non-mining nodes wants the protocol change. No miner makes their blocks, so they stop.
B) 9000 out of 10 000 non mining nodes want the protocol change. They stop their old client (so they remove themselves from the network) and they install the new client, that doesn't find new blocks according to their desires. They fall behind while the miners continue to make the old chain. ==> same scenario as 1 B.
But suppose that somehow, I'm wrong here. Suppose that a large majority of non-mining nodes COULD impose a protocol change.
C) now, imagine that none of the honest non-mining nodes wants a protocol change, but evil Joe does. He makes a UASF node, and launches 200000 of them. He has now clear UASF majority on the node network. In as much as UASF could work (it doesn't, see 2.B, but suppose), then just any evil Joe can impose a protocol change with a sybil attack with UASF nodes.
QED.