Topic: Incorporating the p2pool concept into Bitcoin - page 3. (Read 17470 times)

Not sure if I'm missing something but is this not the crux point ?

You HAVE to make the miners increase their individual difficulty. By giving them an incentive to do so. By paying them more for doing so..


Maybe more than 1% would be required to make sure that miners DEFINITELY went for it but if you could get the miners to try and get 1 block in every N shares, rather than N shares in every N, the longer the chain the lower the difficulty.

If N was 1024, the successful miner would set his difficulty to 1024 times normal difficulty, so as to get 1 share ONLY at the highest difficulty possible, thereby increasing his revenue. (As long as he still got 1 share in every N, otherwise he would choose a lower extra difficulty). As 1 share at 1024 times difficulty is worth more than 1024 shares at 1 times difficulty.

This would make the chain 1024 times easier to mine on ?

If N was higher, the difficulty would again be made lower - but ONLY if the miners increase their own difficulty to match (And get paid accordingly).

What i am unsure about is HOW MUCH MORE to give the miner for increasing his difficulty ?

If you give too little the miners just won't go for it, but if you give too much, then this will give the large pools X% more and they can give this straight to their users, and attract more users, etc etc.. and they will grow even bigger..   

Maybe a market driven mechanism. Not sure how..

Right, each share has a difficulty associated with it.

It isn't a fixed number of shares that are paid out.  It is 3 block's worth of shares.  Shares are never kept more than 3 days, so if the pool finds very few block, your share can fall off the end of the chain before 3 blocks reward.


Right, but not a fixed number of shares.  It is the most recent shares equal to 3 blocks worth of difficulty.


No, again, the difficulty is determined by the rate at which the shares are generated.  Increasing the number of shares included in the system would just increase the length of time the sharechain has to be kept.

It would also mean that miners get paid more often for each share, but paid a smaller amount.


No, it wouldn't.

Once again, difficulty is determined by the average share rate. 

Ignoring the fact that miners can artificially increase their difficulty target, if you want one share every 30 seconds, then each share has to "cost" 30 seconds worth of hashing.

The share difficulty must be (p2pool hashing fraction) * (bitcoin difficulty) * (share target rate) / (600 seconds).  That is the number of hashes performed by p2pool in the target window.


Right.  They would get a smaller payout but be paid out for more blocks to compensate.

However, the total payout per share would be the same.


Well, it depends on what they are controlling their mining with.  They might not have a disk, but 500MB isn't that large.

There is a pool of shares. It is currently comprised of 17500 shares in total. The owner of each share has it ranked according to how far each share exceeded the difficulty.

So every block found is divided into 17500 unequal rewards, and those nodes with more than one share receive the sum of those rewards to their address.

If the number of shares is increased to more than 17500, the difficulty per share would have to drop by a divisor of the factor of increase in that total number in order to target the same interval.


Your suggestion is to attain this increase in the pool of available shares by increasing the shares available within the current 72 hour window that the pool currently operates over, e.g. 35000 shares with a 15 second target difficulty (I don't think this can work with the majority of ASICs out there right now, forrestv changed the target from 10secs/24hours to 30secs/72hours to accommodate them)

My suggestion is to extend the 72 hour window, and maintain the 30 second difficulty target. This would decrease the difficulty target. It would increase the length of time that a new miner would need to build up a full coterie of shares. It would also increase the size of the sharechain on the disks of the mining nodes. My rationale for this is that the current sharechain is ~500 MB on disk, and that the miners are more likely to be lacking hashing power than they are to be lacking disk space.

I think many people just want to get the most profit out of their miner.
I am in for the long run but early december I had a chance of getting a miner and all I think about was how can I roi as soon as possible and not about enhancing bitcoin security.
There need to be an incentive for bitcoin decentralization. Cheaper miner with p2pool contract for example if the manufacturers are willing, or plug and hash p2pool miner for people who is not tech-savvy. Manufacturers could play a role in the decentralization of bitcoin, and they should, they are getting a lot of money from the success of bitcoin.

For the short term, I think convincing miners into going to smaller pool is a priority before p2pool matures either through incentives or education of bitcoin security. ghash.io already has 1/3 of the global hashrate and it looks like it is still growing by comparing 24hr chart with 4 days chart https://blockchain.info/pools

I question how much ASIC miners should be freaking out about variance. If you just sank $20k into an expensive machine, why can't you tolerate getting rewarded once a day or once a week? As long as the size of that reward is fair, it seems like anyone who can afford the hardware should be able to afford the buffer for electricity costs as well. No?

Perhaps.


Not really. 

If you increase the length of the share chain, then 1 share pays out over a longer time.

If I hit a share, then I get paid out 10 times less every time p2pool hits a block.  However, my share remains active for 10 times longer.

The value of each share is exactly the same as before.  My variance for finding a share is exactly the same as before.

What changes is that I now have to wait 10 times longer to actually get paid for that share.

With 2 blocks per day and the sharechain running for 30 blocks, it would take 15 days for a constant miner to get their expected output.

There could be a psychological effect though.  If a miner remained at a constant output, after the 15 days, they would have lower day to day variance.


Difficulty would be completely unaffected under your scheme.  Difficulty is used to prevent spamming of the sharechain.  It gets set so that there is 1 share every approximately 30 second.

You're missing my point. If there were more shares available over a longer period of time, the necessary difficulty per share could be reduced corresponding to the increase in the number of shares. You cite faster shares as the heart of the problem, but making more shares available is the problem, speeding up the interval between them is just one way of increasing the available shares (and reducing the difficulty by a commensurate amount)

There is a bounty for improving P2Pool which was languishing at about 2 BTC (but that has been drawn down a few days ago).
Advancement of Decentralized Mining - Vital to Bitcoin Network Security

I agree it would be nice to see it in the reference client. The importance of decentralized mining outweighs the argument that the reference client should be focused toward the protocol.

hmm, good point.

Yes instead of 1 share approx every 30 sec we would get N shares every 30s, where N is the number of network nodes.

Okay, so let's adjust it to every 10 minutes.   Now we get N shares every 10 mins.   If 10000 nodes, that is 16.66 shares/sec.   Yeah, still too high.    Every 60 minutes with 10k nodes gives us 2.77 shares/sec.    still high.

Here's a random thought for scaling to any number of nodes.  What if the shares diminished with propogation distance?    Let's say for example that for each node your shares pass through, 20% is removed.  So it would travel at most 5 hops in any direction.  If the block is found by a node outside your circle, you wouldn't get any credit.  Possibly the number of hops could vary automatically based on the number of shares being received every X seconds.   I've no idea what the best values would be, but that's the general idea.

I'm not sure how branching chains would work.  Can you elaborate?

That is way to low a difficulty.  If there are 1000 nodes and each node produces shares every 30 seconds, then you get 33 shares per second.

A better target would be something like one share every 60 minutes.  However, even that gives a high share rate if there are enough nodes.

The current system ensures that there is one share every 30 seconds.

Maybe having branching chains would help.  You could have 10 chains, and every so often sync all 10.

If I understand correctly, p2pool currently uses a single difficulty for the entire pool.  The difficulty changes to target the 30 second share time, but changes for everyone.  And it is presently so high that non asic devices are effectively useless anymore, and even some older asics.  ( It used to be 10 second target, but was adjusted up to 30 secs to work better with BFL asics. )

What if instead the p2pool difficulty was unique to each node, based on its avg hash power, with a goal of 30 seconds per share?

So then the node would report to its peers the difficulty along with each share.  The peer can easily validate that the shares exceed the difficulty.  When a block is found, the total hashing input will be the sum of (difficulty * number of shares ) from each node.  So each node would be rewarded based on its percentage of the total.

Wouldn't this allow slower devices to participate?

I haven't looked deeply into p2pool, so most likely I'm neglecting something obvious.  In that case, please educate me.

Edit: so far the biggest obstacle I see is that if we had tens or hundreds of thousands of peers contributing to a block, then the block reward transaction could become HUGE. 

Would Satoshi turn in his anonymous grave - figuratively speaking? Just a reminder:

"We have proposed a system for electronic transactions without relying on trust. We started with the usual framework of coins made from digital signatures, which provides strong control of
ownership, but is incomplete without a way to prevent double-spending. To solve this, we proposed a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power. The network is robust in its unstructured simplicity. Nodes work all at once with little coordination. They do not need to be identified, since messages are not routed to any particular place and only need to be delivered on a best effort basis. Nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone. They vote with their CPU power....."

* A system that does not rely on trust.
* "the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending"
* "Unstructured simplicity"
*etc.

The fact that ASICs have enabled the security of the network is offset, IMHO, by market driven behaviour pushing people to seek greater market efficiencies in order to maximise profit. Nothing wrong with that, except that bitcoin seemed to have been partly founded on the solution to the double-spending, which was proposed to be resolved by a true and unstructured p2p CPU system.

I would have said forcing small miners out qualifies as a Gorden Gekko moment, n'est-ce pas?

I don't think the length of the sharechain really matters that much.

As long as the pool hits multiple blocks for each share, the payout per share has reasonably low variance.

P2pool is 3 blocks or 3 days, whichever is shorter.  It hits blocks about 2-3 times a day, so the 3 day rule never kicks in.

The problem is the share difficulty.  If it takes days for miners to actually hit shares, then that gives high variance.

Faster shares means lower difficulty per share.  However, there is a limit to how fast the shares can be due to network latency.

Why not increase the length of the sharechain? (and maintain 30 second per share, to increase the overall number of shares). I can't think of any serious drawbacks to this, the current design covers 3 days of shares right now.

The problem is that you need a way to decrease the share difficulty.  P2pool is 2%? of the total hashing power and already there are complaints about how high the share difficulty is.

If p2pool was 100% of the network hash rate, then share difficulty would be 20X times lower than the main network (since it has a 30 second share rate).  That is an improvement, but almost as bad.  If large miners set their difficulty higher, then it would help.

The bottom line is that you need some way to increase the rate at which shares happen.

On the GHOST thread, there is a suggestion to have multiple headers referenced so that orphans are included.  This allows the block rate to be increased, but (at least in theory) not reducing network security.

Under the GHOST system, orphans add to the security of the network, but the miners aren't directly rewarded.

Ah ha! This is exactly the kind of thing we need - a no-brainer setup. Heck, there's even a little business here for someone: sell computers pre-configured for mining that boot right into it. If they were done properly, we could and should recommend them on the website.

By "properly" I would mean that they ideally don't require much setup beyond simply plugging into the wall, switching on, and plugging mining hardware in. So, self configuring. The base OS should be minimal (good to avoid the machine getting hacked), and ideally it'd have a way to with user confirmation upgrade the software components automatically. For instance, when a new Bitcoin Core or a new P2Pool is out, the screen should display information about what the upgrade changes and require the user to explicitly accept (i.e. not auto-driven by the seller of the machine).

I think the arguments about whether P2Pool will be competitive in future can be put to one side for now. It's all rather speculative and one thing we can be sure of, if it doesn't grow and become easier/more popular the details of network propagation in future won't matter  - nobody will be using it anyway! There's a step one and a step two here

If the eventual goal is to have a chain where small and large players can mine together, maybe a very small change would suffice.

What if Bitcoin (or an alt-coin) used a PPLNS (Pay Per Last N Shares) system BY DEFAULT ?

P2Pool is effectively a decentralised PPLNS system ?

So - basically the last 512 blocks, or whatever, are used and payouts are made to all the miners for those blocks, every block, proportionally to the hashing power they put in. AND miners can increase their individual difficulty, like p2pool, and still be correctly paid for the work they put in. This removes the incentive to win EVERY SINGLE BLOCK. One block every 512 will make sure you are constantly being paid.

This way you could have as many as 512, or whatever, miners/minining pools running and everyone would still get their fair share. BUT if one of the miners broke down for a bit, it would have a minimal affect on the actual chain.

I would also say, that to make sure the rationale miner increases his difficulty, and his variance, to allow other miners on the chain, they get 1% more payout if they use difficulty x 512, or whatever..

This way the successful miner will try to get 1 block every 512, but as hard a block as possible. Thus maximising revenue.

This still does not fix the 51% attack, neither does P2Pool, but it does allow many more miners onto the chain.

And - no extra Bandwidth/Memory requirements. (in BTC's case - just a HERD HARD FORK Haha!)

Which is why I said "well-run" and went on to talk about how the design advantage that p2pool currently has by forwarding txids rather than transactions won't last forever.

Speaking of bundles, p2pcoin (in my sig) is a complete bitcoin/namecoin/p2pool system.  I think it may be too fat for a bootable CD with the latest release, but you can put it on a USB stick, or serve it with PXE.  You can configure it locally if you have storage, or serve configuration to a farm with DNS and HTTP.  It uses bfgminer, so it should handle most miners, and can be configured to fall back to other local p2pcoin nodes, or to public pools.  Oh, and if you have enough RAM, you can run the whole thing (including bitcoind and namecoind) entirely out of tmpfs, which is crazy fast.

Except that, in practice, it has a lower empirical orphan rate. The design currently has a communications advantage.

The smallest mining device that I'm aware of that you can currently buy which is within a factor of ten of the best $/GH devices (e.g. remotely competitive at all) costs about $2000.  Why is a ~$2 bottom of the end cellphone/stb microprocessor your target device for controlling thousands of dollars of hardware? Doesn't this seem more than a little ridiculous?  Especially when the consequence is an abdication of control which undermines the security assumptions of the Bitcoin system and which— if exploited— could leave your hardware and the Bitcoin previously produced by it worthless?