Topic: Is it time for transparent and probvably-not-fractional-reserve exchange? (Read 1690 times)

This is the choice

Thought that'd be the choice taken.

Carry on.

CryptoPanda,

Please don't feed the trolls.

 

Me narrowing it down to poker doesn't mean that I no longer include anything casino related, poker is just an easy one to choose.

If you feel like backing up your statement with a response to my question, let me know.

Or just continue with petty ad hominem, whatever.

You said that no bitcoin CASINO can compare to audited ones, now we are narrowing down to just poker? So the rest can compare?
I'm not saying they compare, i'm saying they are much better.

It's actually obvious for anyone that's not ignorant, however, i have no interested to open your eyes to the obvious. Just tink a little about it. No need to answer again.

Because poker is a hard game to make provably fair using Bitcoin. Name one. You don't have to do my research for me, it's for you. You're saying Bitcoin gambling sites compare in security/fairness to major gambling sites, the burden of proof is on you, not me.

Of course I can see the advantage of it, I can see the advantage of being able to fly by clicking my heels together, it doesn't mean I can do it.

Self audit ? I guess BP had such one before they spoil ocean. I think people should watch themselves and stop placing all of money on exchanges, instead just money they want trade with. Not to mention cold wallets etc.

It is free market and being best exchange is profitable because people will trust them, trust them with they money and coins. Soon we shall have such giants while some fail exchanges would still appear and fall

You might want to take a look at NXT's multi-sig asset exchange that is going to be implemented in the next couple of weeks.

So regular audits for you is better than being able to verify every spin in real time?


why it should be poker? just search for provably fair bitcoin casino/blackjack/poker/slot/whatever
I'm not going to do your research for you. As said all those can be verified that are fair in real time, you don't have to trust unknown party that does 2 audits per year

It's whole different magnitude of provable fairness, why you can't see the advantage of it?

That's why you do regular audits.

Ok, name a Bitcoin poker site that has the security and verifiable proof of fairness of a licensed Western gambling site.

Doesn't matter how you call it, you have to trust 3rd party, not yourself.
And you have to trust that nothing changes since they audited.

Isn't much better to be right there in front of your eyes, the proof that every spin/draw is fair?
Say Hello to the innovation.......

No, it's called an independent, qualified auditor. Excluding certain games like Satoshi dice.

Great! That looks like very interesting project, i'll look it up closer!

So you are comparing sites where some central authority says you are fair (lobbying, bribery, interests) so you have to TRUST that authority and sites where every visitor can see for himself that it's fair (through the magic of math and hashing)?
I know which one I would choose.

Lol, I've yet to see a Bitcoin gambling site that even comes close to the provably fair requirements major gambling sites adhere to.

Well, an exchange like this already exists: https://bitalo.com/why_bitalo/


First off: All Bitalo wallets are P2SH 2-of-2 multisignature wallets. One key belongs to the user (we never see it), the other one belongs to Bitalo (user never sees it). Now to tackle the problems above:

1) Bitalo, its employees or even server providers cannot move Bitcoins, because they only have one of two keys required for signing a spending transaction
2) A backup "lock time" transaction is signed after every wallet action, so even if Bitalo loses the keys, after "lock time" expires you can claim your Bitcoins (note that this is a feature that we're testing and not deployed yet, but will do very soon)
3) See no. 1. Attacker can only steal one of two private keys required to sign a transaction. To successfully steal Bitcoin an attacker would need to compromise *both* our servers and user's computer to steal both keys. Even then he can only steal from this one specific user, not all of them.

So what you end up is a wallet which you can inspect personally at any given time to see that you Bitcoins are still intact. You can just fire your favorite blockchain explorer, or even a watch-only desktop client and check it!

Oh, and you don't have to take my word for it. Just go to the site and inspect the code. Or ask someone to do so if you don't have the knowledge. The javascript code that creates and signs transactions is open, uncompressed, ready to be inspected.

And if that doesn't sound any trustworthy, you can actually look-up "Bitalo Aktiengesellschaft" to see that we are a real company registered in Germany as AG (like Inc. in the US) with 75.000 EUR founding capital, so we're definately won't risk doing anything stupid.

On 2. weren't there some idiots who run a service on amazon cloud and didn't write their private keys to disk and when session went down all of the keys were lost...

I don't think it was exchange, but online wallet anyway...

I've read something about open and contract based transactions. It's all theoretically possible but none has been implemented yet.
I guess we are just in the beginning of an exciting technology. Very in the beginning.

I remember reading somewhere about the possibility of constructing Bitcoin transactions that are triggered by (i.e. pay upon the occurrence of) specified events.

Is fully contingent funding possible, with regular "settlements"?

Something like this:

1. Trader commits funds by broadcasting an irrevocable contingent “funding” transaction (which will be triggered by the broadcast of a corresponding “settlement” transaction by the exchange, perhaps within a specified period of time (or else the transaction times out))

2. Trading period (i.e. off blockchain transactions)
 
3. Settlement*:
o Trader's various trades during the trading period are netted to determine the settlement amount due
o The exchange broadcasts an irrevocable contingent “settlement” transaction for the settlement amount (which itself will be triggered by the actual receipt of bitcoins under the corresponding irrevocable contingent “funding” transaction in 1 above)
o The irrevocable contingent “funding” transaction is triggered (by the broadcast of the irrevocable contingent “settlement” transaction) - the exchange receives the funding amount
o The irrevocable contingent “settlement” transaction is triggered (by the receipt of funds) - the trader receives the settlement amount

*These steps assume a trading loss - steps can be dispensed with if the trading account balance increases or does not change.

Settlements at fixed times during the day might mean brief trading downtime but if the "funding" and "settlement" transactions fail, for whatever reason, the effected traders only lose a few hours of trading, not their bitcoins (and the exchange misses out on the trading fees).

Traders could set up auto funding rules depending on how often settlements take place.

I suppose an attacker could adjust settlement amounts to zero and then steal bitcoins from the exchange, but that would presumably be on an account by account basis and with a very limited window of opportunity.

Thoughts? Any of this possible?

I was thinking along those lines but what do we do with the trades fiat<>btc that users often do several times per day. Many BTC will change hands number of times through the day.