Topic: Is this a plausible theory for a network spam attack? (Read 1468 times)
Maybe some people they will disagree with me but delays in the transactions not only make people angry but all of bitcoin users they remember to speak about the debate of blocksize and scalability. We can see that the acceptance of segwit is about 25 percent from last November and nothing shows that something could be changed in the recent future. Therefore, it seems to me that someone or a group of people try to remind all of us, that is, devs miners and normal users that something must be done because network can be overloaded very easy with many problems in everyday circulation of bitcoin.
1. Be a large miner.
2. Collude with other top miners to attack the network with spam/high fee transactions.
3. Solve blocks and return their own transaction fees.
4. Rake in the legitimate ultra high fee transactions first from users who desperately need confirmations during an attack.
5. Profit???
6. Rinse and repeat.
2. Collude with other top miners to attack the network with spam/high fee transactions.
3. Solve blocks and return their own transaction fees.
4. Rake in the legitimate ultra high fee transactions first from users who desperately need confirmations during an attack.
5. Profit???
6. Rinse and repeat.
maybe that's one of the reasons, but I think there is a lot of other reasons. I think, most of the mining Bitcoin miners are ethical, they will not because the immediate profits that do wrong. why do you think they could use unethical tactics to make a profit? I find your thinking is completely wrong
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
The 49% cannot use their SHA256 ASICs in that scenario anyway, because of the 51% using theirs to attack. A 51% attacker won't just fork the chain for 1 block and then retire to their lair, cackling like Dr Evil, they will continue to fork ANY chain using the same hashing algo, meaning all ASICs for that hash algo are written off for all except the attacker.
it make sense, but you can't simply rebuild a peta farm in few days out of thin air, where are all the money to invest in it?
you think the network would remian unoperative for months because they need to build new asic for a new algorithm, which will be in any case susceptible to another 51%(by gpu if not asic) because the total hash would be very low....
Well, considering you previously believed that keeping SHA256 ASICs once a 51% attacker has made themselves known, I'm not that surprised that you believe that changing the PoW algorithm can only mean rebuilding the entire mining infrastructure with only an instant to do it.
because i believe that those remaining at "49%" with their asic would simply create their own bitcoin fork instead of changing all their equipment for something that might not work anyway for the reason stated above
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
The 49% cannot use their SHA256 ASICs in that scenario anyway, because of the 51% using theirs to attack. A 51% attacker won't just fork the chain for 1 block and then retire to their lair, cackling like Dr Evil, they will continue to fork ANY chain using the same hashing algo, meaning all ASICs for that hash algo are written off for all except the attacker.
it make sense, but you can't simply rebuild a peta farm in few days out of thin air, where are all the money to invest in it?
you think the network would remian unoperative for months because they need to build new asic for a new algorithm, which will be in any case susceptible to another 51%(by gpu if not asic) because the total hash would be very low....
Well, considering you previously believed that keeping SHA256 ASICs once a 51% attacker has made themselves known, I'm not that surprised that you believe that changing the PoW algorithm can only mean rebuilding the entire mining infrastructure with only an instant to do it.
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
The 49% cannot use their SHA256 ASICs in that scenario anyway, because of the 51% using theirs to attack. A 51% attacker won't just fork the chain for 1 block and then retire to their lair, cackling like Dr Evil, they will continue to fork ANY chain using the same hashing algo, meaning all ASICs for that hash algo are written off for all except the attacker.
it make sense, but you can't simply rebuild a peta farm in few days out of thin air, where are all the money to invest in it?
you think the network would remian unoperative for months because they need to build new asic for a new algorithm, which will be in any case susceptible to another 51%(by gpu if not asic) because the total hash would be very low....
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
If someone pulls off a successful 51% attack, it means the network is vulnerable to a 51% attack. That means the coins are going to be worthless... for everyone. Of course there will be consensus for a mining algorithm hard fork. Even if there wasn't consensus, there will be a contentious hard fork, and the fork which can be 51% attacked over and over again is going to be worthless.
the coins will not be worthless immediately, you think all the investors that bough at this range, would dump everything in no time and losing their investment?
the reversed tansaction coins would be dumped but it's not a huge loss actually, he can't create a dumping more dangerous than those hackers in the past who stoled hundred of thousand of bitcoin
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
The 49% cannot use their SHA256 ASICs in that scenario anyway, because of the 51% using theirs to attack. A 51% attacker won't just fork the chain for 1 block and then retire to their lair, cackling like Dr Evil, they will continue to fork ANY chain using the same hashing algo, meaning all ASICs for that hash algo are written off for all except the attacker.
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
If someone pulls off a successful 51% attack, it means the network is vulnerable to a 51% attack. That means the coins are going to be worthless... for everyone. Of course there will be consensus for a mining algorithm hard fork. Even if there wasn't consensus, there will be a contentious hard fork, and the fork which can be 51% attacked over and over again is going to be worthless.
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
how can users simply swap to a different algorithm when it require an hard fork, and there will be never a consensu for this?
if the 51% of nthe net decide for a 51% and the remaining not, i doubt those 49% are going to agree to lose all their asic sha256 for a new algorithm
If they mine only their own tx's to cancel out the cost, they would eventually run out of money. Mining is expensive and they have to make a income to make their mining operation sustainable. An attack like this will only decrease their profits and give other miners the opportunity to surpass them.
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
well, this is mostly a theory and like many other theories it may not be 100% correct. but did you read what i said above?
it is not worthless attack. lets say a miner injects 40,000 spam transactions out there. it will cost it about $8000 (40000 * $0.2), the miner needs to mine 4.7 blocks to compensate the cost ($8000 / $1700)
here is a chart to look at: https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees
you may want to check this topic: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/mother-of-all-spam-attacks-on-bitcoin-network-proof-1776143 not all the transactions have high fees, there are many with small fee of 20 s/b which makes the cost a lot less.
Agreed, but the $0.2 cents miner fees is not their primary expense, they still need to add the cost of the electricity to hash the blocks. So if the cost of everything else is calculated with the cost of their own
These miners also have other expenses to operate. < Cooling / employee salaries etc. >
I think the people behind these spam attacks, might just be someone that needs SegWit / LN and this is not the miners.
lets pretend the miners are doing it.
they would not lose a penny
think about it.
the block they produce containing transactions THEY create. means they get their fee's back.
they dont even need to relay their own transactions to other pools. they just add them only to their own blocks that way other pools who solve blocks inbetween dont nab the fee's, because they dont get them pre block solution..
by having a pool fill its own blocks with its own tx's. when getting accepted/confirmed leaves other pools tx's left in their mempools. causing a back log.
along with blockstreams fee average mechanism then pushes the fee estimation up, which makes everyones tx's more expensive
they would not lose a penny
think about it.
the block they produce containing transactions THEY create. means they get their fee's back.
they dont even need to relay their own transactions to other pools. they just add them only to their own blocks that way other pools who solve blocks inbetween dont nab the fee's, because they dont get them pre block solution..
by having a pool fill its own blocks with its own tx's. when getting accepted/confirmed leaves other pools tx's left in their mempools. causing a back log.
along with blockstreams fee average mechanism then pushes the fee estimation up, which makes everyones tx's more expensive
Again, this "attack" benefits the pools/miners who aren't involved far, far more than those "mining their own fees".
Non-colluding miners get blocks full of real, fee paying transactions. Wow, they love this "attack".
Colluding miners get blocks composed of some real, fee paying transactions and some home brewed transactions with fees going back to themselves. Meaning, they get less real income from real, fee paying transactions.
Do this "attack" long enough and the other miners will simply render your hash rate irrelevant as they have more profit to buy more hardware.
I suggest you follow your own advice and "think about it". I won't even mention what happens when one of the colluding miner's blocks is orphaned and their "fee to themselves" transactions are known to the entire network.
lets pretend the miners are doing it.
they would not lose a penny
think about it.
the block they produce containing transactions THEY create. means they get their fee's back.
they dont even need to relay their own transactions to other pools. they just add them only to their own blocks that way other pools who solve blocks inbetween dont nab the fee's, because they dont get them pre block solution..
by having a pool fill its own blocks with its own tx's. when getting accepted/confirmed leaves other pools tx's left in their mempools. causing a back log.
along with blockstreams fee average mechanism then pushes the fee estimation up, which makes everyones tx's more expensive
they would not lose a penny
think about it.
the block they produce containing transactions THEY create. means they get their fee's back.
they dont even need to relay their own transactions to other pools. they just add them only to their own blocks that way other pools who solve blocks inbetween dont nab the fee's, because they dont get them pre block solution..
by having a pool fill its own blocks with its own tx's. when getting accepted/confirmed leaves other pools tx's left in their mempools. causing a back log.
along with blockstreams fee average mechanism then pushes the fee estimation up, which makes everyones tx's more expensive
considering the miners are making about 2 or 3 times more profit compared to before you can make that assumption that a miner or groups of them are doing this.
but some things don't match in my opinion.
if it was miners they wouldn't have spammed the hell out of it (it is 90K to 100K transactions today) while only 10K is more than enough to cause a fee war and increase their revenue and keep the cost to a minimum.
also the time this nonsense started and times when it goes up matches mostly with debate over block size and that can not be a coincidence.
and also as a miner you must be really super greedy to want more fees because the block reward and the price is giving them more than enough to cover their costs and give them a huge profit on top.
but some things don't match in my opinion.
if it was miners they wouldn't have spammed the hell out of it (it is 90K to 100K transactions today) while only 10K is more than enough to cause a fee war and increase their revenue and keep the cost to a minimum.
also the time this nonsense started and times when it goes up matches mostly with debate over block size and that can not be a coincidence.
and also as a miner you must be really super greedy to want more fees because the block reward and the price is giving them more than enough to cover their costs and give them a huge profit on top.
For this to work, you would have to have close to 100% of the miners colluding with you. If not...
The blocks that are not mined by the colluding miners would be full of high fee paying transactions that are all legitimate transactions in the eyes of the non-colluding miner. While the blocks mined by colluding miners are partially full of legitimate high fee paying transactions and partially full of transactions crafted by the colluding pools to increase the overall transaction fees.
Therefor, non-colluding miners would be earning more per block as all of the fees in their blocks are actual income. The colluding miners would be earning less per block because some of the fees in their blocks are just their own money being returned to them.
Eventually the non-colluding miners would be able to purchase more hardware with their greater profit and slowly erode the colluding miners percentage of the network.
The blocks that are not mined by the colluding miners would be full of high fee paying transactions that are all legitimate transactions in the eyes of the non-colluding miner. While the blocks mined by colluding miners are partially full of legitimate high fee paying transactions and partially full of transactions crafted by the colluding pools to increase the overall transaction fees.
Therefor, non-colluding miners would be earning more per block as all of the fees in their blocks are actual income. The colluding miners would be earning less per block because some of the fees in their blocks are just their own money being returned to them.
Eventually the non-colluding miners would be able to purchase more hardware with their greater profit and slowly erode the colluding miners percentage of the network.
yeah, to do such thing, it needs big power including most miners. I also thought that it should be planned by some people, but it is too fast to conclude it. however, some points you mention can be possibilities of this attack.
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply
swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive
hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
You assumption that mining pool has its own hardware.swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive
hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
The 51-attack would cost nothing for the pool admins if they do not have their own hashpower.
Possible but unlikely. You will have a hard time to get all on board. And if one of the miners that is not on board mines a block, he will get your money, so you make a loss. Besides that how much would the pools have to chip in? All the same amount? According to hashpower? Like i said possible but unlikely.
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
A 51% attack is a once-off basically. If you do it successfully, the users will simply swap to a different mining algorithm which will render all of the attacker's expensive hardware worthless, so you had better make bank.
Looking for less disruptive, sustainable ways to earn extra is therefore more sensible.
That said, this particular "attack" is pointless for the reasons I mentioned above.
at that point isn't better for them to just attack the network with 51%? i see no sense here
and i repeat fees currently are not giving much to the miners, solving a block only add 0.5 btc in transaction to it and unless there is a farm that is constantly solving all block which isn't true, is not making much in the end from fee
the biggest pool for example has 17% of the entire network, which result in 12 btc in fee by solving 17% of the 144 block per day, 12 btc is not even another block, so it's like they are mining 1 more block per day...
and that is a pool not a farm, a farm would be far less than that...
edit... it's 19 btc now because the average fee increased to 40k satoshi, still a very little amount compared to what they earn
and i repeat fees currently are not giving much to the miners, solving a block only add 0.5 btc in transaction to it and unless there is a farm that is constantly solving all block which isn't true, is not making much in the end from fee
the biggest pool for example has 17% of the entire network, which result in 12 btc in fee by solving 17% of the 144 block per day, 12 btc is not even another block, so it's like they are mining 1 more block per day...
and that is a pool not a farm, a farm would be far less than that...
edit... it's 19 btc now because the average fee increased to 40k satoshi, still a very little amount compared to what they earn
1. Be a large miner.
2. Collude with other top miners
This is enough for making profit. No need to play child games with fees. 2. Collude with other top miners
If they mine only their own tx's to cancel out the cost, they would eventually run out of money. Mining is expensive and they have to make a income to make their mining operation sustainable. An attack like this will only decrease their profits and give other miners the opportunity to surpass them.
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
well, this is mostly a theory and like many other theories it may not be 100% correct. but did you read what i said above?
it is not worthless attack. lets say a miner injects 40,000 spam transactions out there. it will cost it about $8000 (40000 * $0.2), the miner needs to mine 4.7 blocks to compensate the cost ($8000 / $1700)
here is a chart to look at: https://blockchain.info/charts/transaction-fees
you may want to check this topic: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/mother-of-all-spam-attacks-on-bitcoin-network-proof-1776143 not all the transactions have high fees, there are many with small fee of 20 s/b which makes the cost a lot less.
If they mine only their own tx's to cancel out the cost, they would eventually run out of money. Mining is expensive and they have to make a income to make their mining operation sustainable. An attack like this will only decrease their profits and give other miners the opportunity to surpass them.
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
A lot of the profits are spend on expanding the operation to accommodate for difficulty increases, so they will lose a lot of money, if they spend it on worthless attacks like this. ^hmmmmmmm^
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