It is NOT secure to use hardware wallets (and it never was) - page 3.

HCP

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Quote from: Kogs on April 17, 2018, 04:33:18 AM

I've read this medium article, but I'm a bit confused about the second part (Funding & redeeming).

In the first part the author is doing everything right to keep everything on the offline laptop.
But then he suggests to copy the wallet.dat to an online computer?

For me this makes no sense. Why doing all those secure steps before to create a cold wallet and then just copy the wallet.dat to an online PC?
With this step the cold wallet instantly turn into a hot wallet. So what is the point here?
It does not matter for me, that the passphrase was never used so far.

In my understanding a cold wallet never touches a PC which is connected to any network.

He tries to justify his methodology here:

Quote from: hao2067755834 on April 17, 2018, 05:37:03 AM

Hardware wallets are good for storing large amounts of unused money.

Among other things...

Quote

Hardware wallet system also exists the possibility of virus, cause your wallet to be invaded!

No. As far as I'm aware, you can only flash the full firmware, which will effectively wipe the device... and unrecognised firmware should be flagged during the bootup sequence of the hardware wallet to indicate to the user that the device is not running officially signed firmware.

Quote

If the hardware wallet is lost or damaged it will be difficult to repair!

While you may not be able to repair the device, you can recover your funds by using your "seed mnemonic" (aka backup words) and importing it into BIP39/BIP44 compatible wallets for the coins you need to recover.

hao2067755834

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Unibright Token Launch - 10th April 2018

Hardware wallets are good for storing large amounts of unused money.

Hardware wallet system also exists the possibility of virus, cause your wallet to be invaded!

If the hardware wallet is lost or damaged it will be difficult to repair!

Kogs

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Quote from: AGD on April 17, 2018, 03:03:58 AM

Online wallet is a bad choice. Use Bitcoin Core on an offline machine.

edit: https://medium.com/@tednobs/how-to-create-a-secure-bitcoin-cold-wallet-82f82be4bfa

I've read this medium article, but I'm a bit confused about the second part (Funding & redeeming).

In the first part the author is doing everything right to keep everything on the offline laptop.
But then he suggests to copy the wallet.dat to an online computer?

For me this makes no sense. Why doing all those secure steps before to create a cold wallet and then just copy the wallet.dat to an online PC?
With this step the cold wallet instantly turn into a hot wallet. So what is the point here?
It does not matter for me, that the passphrase was never used so far.

In my understanding a cold wallet never touches a PC which is connected to any network.

I would only agree with the described way if the author would change one point and add one point.

1) The wallet.dat on the usb-drive should not be verified on any online PC. Only copy the wallet.dat on the online PC whenever you want to spend the coins.
2) Whenever you spend something from this wallet.dat, always spent EVERYTHING and then never use this wallet.dat again. Create a new one.

Commie

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There's an old saying, what was built by one man can always be broken by another one. There's no such thing as absolute security.

AGD

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Keeper of the Private Key

Quote from: vnh8888 on April 16, 2018, 05:48:40 PM

I thought that using those hardware wallets is the most secure way of storing Bitcoins but now I am doubting, i guess i will keep my BTC on my online wallets with a password that i put on a safe place. But still i am planning to buy a ledger nano to try myself the security of that hardware wallet.

Online wallet is a bad choice. Use Bitcoin Core on an offline machine.

edit: https://medium.com/@tednobs/how-to-create-a-secure-bitcoin-cold-wallet-82f82be4bfa

vnh8888

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I thought that using those hardware wallets is the most secure way of storing Bitcoins but now I am doubting, i guess i will keep my BTC on my online wallets with a password that i put on a safe place. But still i am planning to buy a ledger nano to try myself the security of that hardware wallet.

HodlingCrypto

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Quote from: linhphieudb on April 15, 2018, 03:27:33 AM

Do I intend to store the ERC20 token on the TREZO wallet? Is your information secure? . If not cold wallet. Where should we store it? is feeling puzzled Sad

OMG

You can always go to MyEtherWallet.com and generate a new wallet. You will be given a private key which you can later use for accessing your wallet. The best thing about it that you can do it even while being offline so there is less risk that some kind of malware steals your key. After you save your private key, you can encrypt it using for example VeraCrypt and store it on multiple external drives. Hardware wallets are much more convenient because all you have to do is to plug in a hardware wallet your computer and use it with MEW. I use my TREZOR One for small amounts of cryptocurrencies in case I needed to spend them immediately.

cellard

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Quote from: Carlton Banks on April 05, 2018, 11:16:43 AM

Quote from: Karartma1 on April 05, 2018, 09:16:38 AM

If that's the case what can we do then? What kind of microprocessor is your machine using? I mean f*c*ing intel is everywhere! I am about to change my old 2010 laptop (amd)? Do you have any suggestions?

1. Keep that AMD laptop

Best advice right now is to keep pre-2013 AMD and (I think) pre-2007 Intel hardware (which in a stroke of irony are not receiving patches for those kernel memory access exploits that made the news for Intel recently).

Alternative options to Intel/AMD (which are all compromises of some kind, and all involve more computing skills than x86 platforms):

ARM chips (not open designs or fully user controllable, & ARM are beginning to introduce anti-features similar to those that Intel and AMD have, so careful research needed)
IBM POWER chips (which are expensive, & not well supported, but the platform is fully user controllable AFAIK)
RISC V chips (which are expensive, immature, & not at all widely used, although the design is more open than IBM POWER, and like POWER, whole tech platform is user controllable)

Intel and Microsoft are slowly turning the whole Wintel concept into something closer to owning a Nintendo console than using a proper computer. Using some kind of Unix style operating system on non-Intel hardware will be the only option, eventually.

As you pointed, the purism laptops quoted by the other user do not fully get rid of ME, but as far as I know, the old Thinkpads which have Libreboot installed (which require a change in hardware, except the x60 which can be easily flashed) get rid of it at the highest level possible. I think this is as best as it gets. A t400 is still a decent laptop, specially with an SSD, it should do the job to run a Bitcoin node. I don't see any other option as realistic, I think this is as good as it gets?

I may buy one but I will not do Bitcoin stuff on it, I just want a spare laptop and I would like to try this one, but if I was running a node or wanted to use a laptop as cold storage, why not use one of these? seems pretty solid, I think it's the best we have so far. You could get two: use one as a node, and use the other as a hardware wallet in which you sign transactions, the put them in the node with a QR code to broadcast them, to avoid USB's risks (this one of course must not have wifi cards or anything else)

Karartma1

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Quote from: Spendulus on April 13, 2018, 10:51:37 PM

Quote from: bob123 on April 13, 2018, 06:28:11 AM

Quote from: hwBPKH on April 12, 2018, 01:48:11 PM

snip

Of course a USB could be accessed by an offline air gapped PC. And a hardware wallet could by design have it's records regenerated on a PC if the key word set were known.

A bad actor or government actor could exert influence on a hardware wallet company, say by causing certain items to be included in an update of the hardware wallet. This is at least in my opinion, a long term risk worth mulling over.

What is your solution to that long term problem? I am puzzling myself to find the best possible way to store a few bitcoins long term and, as of today, I have no solution for that. If I look for security, in case I die, nobody will ever be able to recover my coins (until bitcoin cryptographic security is broken). I supposed that leaving a trezor behind could have been that solution but right now I don't think that is a viable option.

linhphieudb

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Do I intend to store the ERC20 token on the TREZO wallet? Is your information secure? . If not cold wallet. Where should we store it? is feeling puzzled Sad

OMG

Coin-Keeper

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And please don't forget; NO hardware wallets I am aware of store your (BIP improved) passphrases if you use them. This means that even if someone gets your entire seed and would somehow know your hardware wallet PIN, they still get zero coins! During a physical hack you can't recover something that isn't there - namely the needed passphrases. Not even a subject for debate if you understand that the hardware wallet and the needed passphrases are not kept together.

onurgozupek

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In #Bitcoin me trust

Trusting any wallet (desktop, mobile, paper) 100% is most users' problem. First and foremost do not trust anything or anyone 100% in crypto world. Hardware wallets are insecure for me too. You have one seed and multiple altcoins connected to that same seed. If you loose your seed you are in the risk of loosing all your funds. Do not do that. If your crypto wealth is important do not store multiple crypto currencies in one wallet. On the other hand, you have to secure your seed and wallet separately. So it doesn't have much advantage compared to desktop or mobile wallet besides not being connected to the internet 7/24

thecodebear

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I think paper wallets are the best for cold storage.

Two keys ideas for paper wallets:
1. you write down multiple copies and store them in different secure places so you have redundancy and you don't lose your coins if something happens in one of those locations.
2. keep it secure even from physical theft by making some simple change to the private key that you remember. Your own simple encryption that is super easy to remember, like change the a couple characters by some amount. Then if a paper wallet were to get stolen the thief would have no chance of accessing the coins because only you know that you changed the key and only you know how you changed it. This could even help with #1 because then you could safely keep a copy of the paper wallet at say your family's house as a backup copy but you would know that nobody but you could ever access your coins using what is on that paper wallet.

So maybe you store a paper wallet in your house, one hidden in your car, one at your family's house, you could even store it on a usb stick or computer and it would be entirely secure since you changed the key. So you get redundancy from loss plus nobody can access your coins even if they get a hold of one of the places where you store your self-encrypted key.

Spendulus

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Quote from: bob123 on April 13, 2018, 06:28:11 AM

Quote from: hwBPKH on April 12, 2018, 01:48:11 PM

you can use software to encrypt a usb flash to make a cheap hardware wallet

Not at all.
A hardware wallet is NOT simply an encrypted storage for your private keys.

A hardware wallet lets you access your private keys within an 'airgapped' environment.
You can use it even on an infected pc, without your private keys getting compromised.
It is made for secured storage AND convinient daily usage.

An encrypted USB on the other hand can only store your private keys encrypted.
And the moment you plug it into an pc which might be compromised and decrypt it, your private keys are exposed to theft.

While an encrypted thumb drive is a good way to store a backup (additional backup; not as the only backup) it is not comparable to a hardware wallet at all.

That's fairly accurate. The USB is perfectly good except at the point of access by another machine, while the hardware wallet is by design intended to be good in all cases.

"Access" by another machine of the hardware wallet keys is not possible.

Of course a USB could be accessed by an offline air gapped PC. And a hardware wallet could by design have it's records regenerated on a PC if the key word set were known.

A bad actor or government actor could exert influence on a hardware wallet company, say by causing certain items to be included in an update of the hardware wallet. This is at least in my opinion, a long term risk worth mulling over.

bob123

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Quote from: hwBPKH on April 12, 2018, 01:48:11 PM

you can use software to encrypt a usb flash to make a cheap hardware wallet

Not at all.
A hardware wallet is NOT simply an encrypted storage for your private keys.

A hardware wallet lets you access your private keys within an 'airgapped' environment.
You can use it even on an infected pc, without your private keys getting compromised.
It is made for secured storage AND convinient daily usage.

An encrypted USB on the other hand can only store your private keys encrypted.
And the moment you plug it into an pc which might be compromised and decrypt it, your private keys are exposed to theft.

While an encrypted thumb drive is a good way to store a backup (additional backup; not as the only backup) it is not comparable to a hardware wallet at all.

nokati

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Quote from: manchester93 on April 12, 2018, 01:53:31 AM

Quote from: bob123 on April 10, 2018, 03:08:41 AM

And you are also right with the USB drive being the attack vector which would probably be the first one abused.
And it is indeed independent from your network adapters.

But there are other possibilities to transfer your unsigned TX to your offline machine and move your signed TX to your online pc.
The simpliest would probably be witht he help of two webcams:

Create unsigned TX on online pc
Display QR code of this TX
Scan the QR code with webcam connected to your offline machine
Sign the TX
Display the QR code of the signed TX
Scan this QR code with your webcam connected to your online PC
Broadcast transaction

Note that to be on the safe side, you should NOT connect your webcam to an online PC after connecting it to your offline storage.
This attack vector (flashing webcam firmware with malicious version) is pretty unlikely.. but it also does exist.

Thanks, I hadn't considered using a setup with photos/QR codes. Interesting. Definitely seems more secure than a thumb drive (although I think a thumb drive attack on an offline/encrypted wallet has got to be a really sophisticated and targeted attack).

That's the best and most secure way. Not the easiest way but when its about some hard Bitcoins, you don't want any risk. That's why we choose this method over usb like many other hardware wallets. Production is not ready but we are working hard to get it out soon:
https://www.digisafeguard.com

hwBPKH

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it is better than your have none
you can use software to encrypt a usb flash to make a cheap hardware wallet

bob123

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Quote from: manchester93 on April 12, 2018, 01:53:31 AM

Thanks, I hadn't considered using a setup with photos/QR codes. Interesting. Definitely seems more secure than a thumb drive (although I think a thumb drive attack on an offline/encrypted wallet has got to be a really sophisticated and targeted attack).

It is true that such an attack is really really unprobable.
But i think this does not really always have to be a targeted attack.

IMO there is definetely a possibility of a malware (in this case: virus) which does spread itself onto thumb drives targeting offline storages without being directly targeted.

Sure, this sounds more like paranoia and won't happen to 99.9% of the people, but the possibility does exist (even though a very small chance of happening).

manchester93

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Quote from: bob123 on April 10, 2018, 03:08:41 AM

And you are also right with the USB drive being the attack vector which would probably be the first one abused.
And it is indeed independent from your network adapters.

But there are other possibilities to transfer your unsigned TX to your offline machine and move your signed TX to your online pc.
The simpliest would probably be witht he help of two webcams:

Create unsigned TX on online pc
Display QR code of this TX
Scan the QR code with webcam connected to your offline machine
Sign the TX
Display the QR code of the signed TX
Scan this QR code with your webcam connected to your online PC
Broadcast transaction

Note that to be on the safe side, you should NOT connect your webcam to an online PC after connecting it to your offline storage.
This attack vector (flashing webcam firmware with malicious version) is pretty unlikely.. but it also does exist.

Thanks, I hadn't considered using a setup with photos/QR codes. Interesting. Definitely seems more secure than a thumb drive (although I think a thumb drive attack on an offline/encrypted wallet has got to be a really sophisticated and targeted attack).

Spendulus

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Quote from: manchester93 on April 10, 2018, 01:59:31 AM

Quote from: Spendulus on April 09, 2018, 10:55:17 PM

Don't just disable the networking, break or remove the adapter. Then you have a machine that can only be interfaced with through the USB or other ports.

But how do you actually do that? You need to do it physically?

I've been using an offline wallet to sign for a while, but I just disabled network adapters. I figured it was kinda bullshit....

Not at all.

Say the machine is one of those that have a little slide switch on the side, for wireless on or off. Stages in disabling wireless are:

1) software disable
2) slide the switch
3) tape the switch over in the off position
4) glue the switch one position
5) take the slide switch out (requires removing the cover)
6) take the computer's wireless card out

Topic: It is NOT secure to use hardware wallets (and it never was) - page 3. (Read 2228 times)