Topic: Keyless encryption and passwordless authentication (Read 2887 times)

So, we have described that no package of information, or in any of the modes of operation, is equally encoded. For this purpose, a temporary virtual space has been created, which is always changing, always unpredictable in advance as it is, the variants of building this space infinite set.
This gives an important factor for encryption - unpredictability, multivariance, dependence on the processed information in its unit of time, in its moment of time, the so-called Logical Tunnel of Time.

The proposed technology of verification and passwordless authentication is possible only with its original paired system, only with the one which processed the same information and at the same time, and as we remember, in which even all the pauses, their time and their exact duration coincided - the same for both systems. It is an absolutely reliable system of infinite information ratchet, clinging to both information and time indicators of its existence.
In contrast to the double ratchet - the "mechanism" for creating new keys, based on the old ones, our technology creates a whole environment for understanding everything that happens, not just key information, the independent definition of all the rules transforming and configuring the entire system.
Our technique is therefore similar to the ratchet idea, but differs in that it works continuously, literally for every bit of information, infinitely long. It is probably the only possible variant of symmetric functioning of two encryption systems and the possibility of implementing the most keyless encryption technology in principle.   
It becomes clear why such a system is not afraid of interference, targeted attacks, or errors of randomly unknown origin. All these phenomena - direct the settings of both systems in different directions by definition, all that remains is to draw conclusions and take measures, to return the system to the moment when both systems had a symmetric setting, or in other words, the same Logical Tunnel of Time.   

Let us explain again what we mean when we talk about repeating a previously transmitted data packet.

This is a keyless system, so note that this and all other repetitions are never transmitted to the channel by the same cipher code to which the previously modified data packet, the one that is now being repeated, was transmitted.
Moreover, this is also not possible because of the relationship between the cipher code and the data packet counters.
The reason why repeated data packets differ from the original data packets is their processing in the new Logical Time Tunnel. All Logical Time Tunnels have strong feedback to the hash code of all past system events, i.e. it is some kind of derivative.
There is also a bitwise addition of the new code's XOR with a new disposable binary ribbon (a full analog of the "disposable notepad" to obtain the Vernam cipher) of the same length as the data packet.
Therefore, regardless of whether a new data packet is formed or the old one is repeated, the keyless encryption system is forced to do its job, always doing the same thing, always the same as with a completely new data packet, so it is of high quality.

As for our keyless encryption technology and at the same time, in fact, it performs the task of passwordless authentication, your usual passwords, keys, biometric identifiers - can successfully complement this encryption system, or even better - to fill with its content information part of the channel. There are no contradictions or prohibitions here.
Instead of filling the encrypted data packets with false information, the system will fill those data packets with information about your identifiers, any, in any combination.

But, unlike normal, password authentication, your identifiers will play a secondary role.  The primary role will be the data packet itself, the order in which it is formed, encrypted and transmitted. If it is properly formed, identified by the host in the current Logical Time Tunnel, then the transmitting party is already 100% identified. This confidence is given by the encryption itself, without compromise, without analysis, without vulnerability because there is no key.

What to do with the mismatch of secondary identification features, if this has happened, are passwords, biometric identifiers, decides the algorithm of system operation. There are many options, request a repeat, do not accept this data, send data for verification (the user has mixed up his password), refuse authentication - we do not care.
The keyless encryption system has successfully encrypted and decrypted any information that was given to it. Without a key, without compromises, over a closed communication channel.
The fact of identification of its data packet, combined with the fact that it was correctly decrypted, provided 100% primary and basic identification of its interlocutor.

Thus, fears that the password or keys were stolen have no basis in this concept of encryption and information transfer.

Similarly, fears of weak interference immunity of the system have the opposite sign, the system is so interference-resistant that leaves neither misinformation nor any modifications - no chance.
 
Conclusion. The very fact of successful operation, a closed communication channel organized by 2 (or more) users, would not have been possible in principle if the function of infiltration of interference into this communication channel had been possible.

Such communication channel either works and works only absolutely reliably, no modification is able to break it, or does not work at all, the middle between these modes is not possible on the principal level of keyless coding technology.
These are logical, quantum, black and white system states.
There is no gap between them.

-----------------------
It is not recommended to use any system by fingerprint.
Numerous studies have shown that this is the easiest barrier for a burglar.
The laziest ones make a "master fingerprint". This is the equivalent of a "master key" to door locks.
Statistics have shown that the "master fingerprint" opens 65% of all devices on which there is a lock by fingerprint.
Similarly, but not always exactly so, any system whose security is based on other biometric identifiers is very easy to crack.
All this was invented by marketing, use it for your health...

As for backup, it's protection against breaking your device, not against a cheater who went out hunting. And it's not just scammers who hunt your data, but governments and corporations as well. It's automatic.

On the contrary, in terms of security, the more copies, the easier it is to steal.

It's all a cat-and-mouse game. You need radical, global, new solutions.

What we've built for us and offered to use is, in most cases, a cleverly disguised trap.

And yes, I know that I'm in the absolute minority, with these views.

From open sources, we know that fundamentally new encryption systems, absolutely new, able to withstand quantum computers obtained even from another galaxy - already now a large number.
And in 2022, we will know the winner.

All modern systems except AES will go to the dump of history, and the threat of quantum computers will remain in the past.

And what will be left for us?
There will be an eternal threat of cryptoanalysis, mathematical hacking into new encryption systems.
Why is that?
Because there's speculation, and there's evidence.
And to date, the only cryptography that's proven reliable is Vernam's cipher.
This cryptography was invented back in the 19th century (not even in the 20th)!

And we will also have the eternal problems of all key systems:
- stealing keys and passwords;
- phishing attacks;
- spyware that steals information until it's encrypted;
- and other nasty things in the modern world.

No cryptographic system struggles with these problems, or even has the capability to do so.

These threats, as well as quantum threats, can be counteracted by a new technology of keyless encryption and passwordless authentication, based on the logic and geometry of virtual spaces rather than on mathematics.

And the variants of virtual spaces are infinite a priori.   

How do I link absolute sensitivity to any code modifications with interference immunity of a closed communication channel?

Will there be an effect of interruption of work because of insignificant hindrances, technical, natural origin?

On the one hand, the above mentioned features of keyless encoding technology do not tolerate any modifications.
On the other hand, all modifications are visible, observable, and therefore it is possible to develop algorithms of system behavior.
The principle of these algorithms' operation is aimed at correcting any error in code. If an error is detected in the information part of the data packet - the method of correction is a repeat of this data packet.

Thus, a keyless encryption system, any of its models, any version, should have a protocol governing the formation, sending and receiving of data packets.

It turns out that errors are always visible, all consequences are controlled, therefore from the point of view of noise resistance of such model of encryption, this system is steady against any quantity of errors, with possibility of recognition and correction.

What kind of encryption system can handle such a wide range of tasks?
All a key encryption system can afford is a hash sum verification of a message.
A keyless encryption system can afford to identify, verify, analyze and correct every received packet of data.   

It's farther away.

The main enemy of all these creative experiments, in the proposed model of encryption - is the effect of loop system.
By cycling of the system, we mean repetition of the state of the system, in any part of it.
Researches have shown that when the number of consecutive repetitions of the same algorithm is limited, this phenomenon becomes impossible in principle.
You should agree that a large number of elements in a large room is more difficult to put in order than to scatter around the room without order.
High entropy of chaotic movement, no matter what, is easier to achieve than low than the logical arrangement of all the elements.
It's harder to build than to break.
This is roughly the case in the proposed model of virtual space-world, the technology of keyless geometric encryption.
Fears that a very long silence of the user, which is replaced by the transfer of false information generated by the system itself - sooner or later the system will loop, also has no reason.
Let's remind that in this model there is no identical information, neither false nor user information, because the system is always "new".
In this regard, note that any information, and that which is produced by the system during the "silence", and that which is entered by the user for encryption, and that information which is repeated many times successively by the user - for the virtual space-time continuum will always be absolutely new information, because there are always new moments of time for the system and new numbers of sequence of events.
Thus, any data, even if it is constantly repeated, always differs from one another, always as new, so it always leads to new values of algorithms of system transformation.

Perhaps the attentive reader will have a question about how quickly the system will react to the modification?

If the modification is local, it will respond instantly in the command part of the data package.
If the modification is in the information part of the data package, then..:
- for data packet, in which false information is transmitted - instantly;
- for data packet, in which user information is transmitted - with delay.

Therefore, any decrypted user information is first assigned a status: "conditionally correct".
Then, if the following package is successfully received: "most likely correct".
And finally, when receiving the third data packet: "absolutely correct".

The data packet is only 304 - 516 bits, not the whole message.
So the user won't notice anything, he is doomed to always use only the information "absolutely correct".

The technical explanation of this checking scheme is about this:
1. The minimum value of time it takes to detect an information modification is the moment the cipher code hits the last and penultimate decryption round (7th and 8th rounds of encryption).
2. The maximum time it takes to detect a change even at the 1-bit level in the information portion of a data packet is equal to the time it takes to send the next 2 packets and receive the next 2 packets.

At this maximum time point, by default, a ban will be programmed to deny the decrypted information to the user.

A distinctive feature of the keyless encryption system, as mentioned above, is the mandatory detection of any modifications.

A normal encryption system does not guarantee anything like this.

If, in any conventional key system of encryption, today you encrypt the word "Hello" with key "A", get the code "B", then tomorrow, with key "A" the word "Hello" again will show code "B".

That's not possible in a keyless system.
If you encrypt the "Hello" word at this second, you will get the "C" code. If you encrypt the "Hello" word again without interruption, you will get any cipher, but not the "C" code. Not only that, you can't do that, even if you want to.

That's the difference between keyless ciphers and key ciphers.

How does a transmitting and receiving system know the encryption and decryption rules, in this case the word "Hello"?

Note that any encryption does not happen by itself, but at least:
1) at this point in time;
2) in a certain numerical order of account of events in the system itself

Important note: taking into account only the time factor is not enough. To be more precise, physical time plays a crucial role only at the start of a communication session and in the first verification processes of your "partner".  There is no need to think that the system just counts seconds, this model is not viable and has little use in practice.

The system doesn't care what word will be encrypted, the important thing is that the system knows exactly what the Logical Time Tunnel (LTT) is working, it is now formed.
This is the LTT that has been formed, no other. It was made not by the programmers, not by the developers of the technology, but by the system itself, and one moment before encryption of the word "Hello". It's very precise and as definite as possible, no probability, but it's absolutely unpredictable for "Eva".

Therefore, the same Logical Time Tunnel is formed for both systems, so the word "Hello" is first encrypted in it, and then decrypted in it too.

Important note: in fact, the word "Hello" is not ciphered, the vector is ciphered, the link pointing to the temporary analogues of the elements, the letters of the word "Hello". It is very important to understand!!! This is the main principle.

And most importantly, the next LTT can only be correctly generated when the transmitted information up to 1 bit coincides with the decrypted information. There are no modifications.
 
This is beautiful and very useful. It is so unexpected that without a key it is possible to exchange information more accurately than with a key, which seems an inexplicable turn.

This is a first look. It's the opposite of what happens inside.

Gradually, we'll take it apart, all in detail.
It'll be even more interesting from here, I think, of course. 

It is worth explaining that only the command part of the data packet is duplicated, which is from 8 to 20% of the capacity of the entire package.
The code containing the informational part of the package can be duplicated in the same way, but probably this makes no sense.

Command codes and codes duplicating these commands (logical repetitions of commands) are the same in size, but different in bit value.
They are not transmitted in clear text. Another round of encryption takes place.
The double of any command, like the command itself, must be decrypted, and only then check the inverse correspondence to the command of each bit.

Given the development of modern cryptanalysis, many of the capabilities of which are unknown to us, in this keyless encryption technology, after the bits are rearranged, a data packet (consisting of an information code, an instruction code and a code of duplicate commands) is encoded by another round of encryption - it is modulo 2 s disposable binary tape.

This one-time binary tape is obtained in the same geometric way that was described in previous posts. The model of internal geometric space is calculated in such a way that the maximum generation volume of one-time binary tapes occurring at the moment the space transformation is stopped is many orders of magnitude (!) Higher than the size of the information that needs to be encoded.

This binary random sequence is single and unique for each data packet. Therefore, as a result, in fact, we get a cipher similar to a cipher of the Vernam class.

Geometric encryption methods, in fact, do not encrypt information, unlike other cryptographic systems.

They set temporal correspondence of information intended for encoding - to internal virtual elements of the system.

The system then forms a reference to this selected element.

The link and only the link is digitized and encoded. It is transmitted through open communication channels.

The link itself does not contain any coded information. Therefore, to use cryptanalysis or brute force method to the code of a link is meaningless and useless.

These principles contain the essence of not only geometric encryption methods but also keyless encoding methods.

Moreover, such model allows to change easily the place of each bit in the data packet intended for transmission to the open communication channel.

This feature, this advantage allows you to easily hide code sections such as were described in the past post, namely:
000000000000000000000000001

Especially when there's a full reverse take of that code:
111111111111111111111111110

Diffusion of each digit of the total code made up of the two above - will give the resulting code that is not similar to its original components.

Moreover, the method of full bitwise diffusivity (permutation of bits) applied to any code summed up with its inverse variant - will always give a new code in which all bits will be arranged in pseudo-random order.
Moreover, the number of units and zeros will always be in equilibrium.

This is the most unpleasant model for cryptanalysis.

The code, which contains no coded information and is obtained without a key, is not afraid of cryptanalysis at all, nor of complete search, nor of finding the key, nor of quantum computers of any complexity.

A data packet is the basis for everything in a keyless system.
It has to be formed in a unique way.
Its task is to transmit not only the coded information, but also service information to control and synchronize symmetric states of systems in the communication channel.
For this purpose, commands are used. Many commands carrying "service" information are duplicated by a hidden addition to the main user information - information that is fake, but has a logical value for the system itself, which has accepted this package.  This is such "secret" correspondence between systems over the main coded information and commands encrypted in each data packet. We call them "character commands".
These character commands, in addition, will confirm the basic commands of the system.
But as we strive for maximum secrecy, all commands have their own full-bit duplicates. All the duplicate commands have the exact opposite value of the command bit. This is done to ensure that the number of bits "units" relative to bits "zeros" does not change regardless of the command code.
For example, a command has a code: 00000000000000000000000001
Then her take will be recorded:         11111111111111111111111110

This is done so that the cryptanalyst cannot analyze the appearance of a command in the packet by measuring the density of any (binary) values of all bits relative to the selected value (e.g. the number "1" relative to "0").

If you do it on conscience, you should do it well, without exceptions. 

Penetration and surveillance systems are developing.
We must consider their capabilities when developing encryption products.

Literally everything is being observed and analyzed:
- the level of power consumption;
- keystroke sounds (information is remotely taken off window panes - by laser);
- electromagnetic background of the monitor, allowing at a distance (about 300 meters) to determine the area of the mouse movement on the screen or move the active items "menu" windows;
- modulation of electromagnetic radiation at the points of mechanical contacts of electrical connectors (for example, a 3.5 jack from a headset inserted into the device, modulates the useful signal to the frequency of radiation of the device processor and successfully demodulates at a distance);
- removing information from the LED light bulb to signal system access to the PC hard drive (via a hidden spyware pre-installed on the PC. This is exactly what the Israeli intelligence agencies did with the help of a drone helicopter, which captures information through a window from the winchester LED at speeds of up to 6000 bits per second).


For these reasons, the system is designed in such a way that an external observer is not able to learn about the change in operating modes of our encryption system, through monitoring and analysis of power consumption. Unfortunately, this information can be obtained remotely by special means, and we take this into account.

So, the most unusual and most important thing is managing the encryption schemes of the information itself and the changing internal state of the system.

If such a "live" system is in a normal operating mode, it must be movable. Its natural state is mobility through transformation of its internal states. For this reason, in the normal working mode (and there are others), for the organization of continuous internal transformations, the system monitors the moments of information input and understands the moments when the information does not arrive. At these moments the system itself generates, necessarily encrypts all the rules, transmits data packets, this complete analogue of live information.

By default, "information" means data provided by the user, intended for encoding. The fact that the technology is in a state of "user talk" when the user is silent - to replace the "own talk", although it does not look familiar, but to ensure the secrecy in the channel - is necessary and useful.
Transformation of the system accompanied by information flows (including but not limited to) created by the system itself is mandatory.

Let's analyze what we hid, what we got, why these tricks?
 
1. Information about the "elephant", only we clearly knew that at this point, in this LTT, at this point of space will be exactly the "elephant";
2. Information about where and from where the "elephant" moved, a figure unknown to the outside observer.
Because the coordinates 42 and 33 are relative values, which depend not only on the actual location of the "elephant" in this LTT, but also on the starting point for this space in this LTT.
The starting point is a variable value for each stroke, for each element of "coded" information;
We haven't mentioned anywhere what exactly the value of 6 bits at this point in time in this LTT corresponds to the "elephant" in this LTT in D2!

Conclusion: "what figure", "where it was", "where it moved", all this in a single moment of time (more precisely in the period of time necessary for this operation with the selected single element) - no one knows, not even the developer of this software.

For the next "move", for the "encoding" of the next information element, another LTT will be selected, which will be used in a completely different GIS, with a different location of the "elephant" and all its neighbors in the past event, the past LTT.

Conclusion: Instead of encoding the information, we have digitized and encoded some undefined vector, some pointer, some reference - in some undefined reference system with an unspecified starting point of this coordinate system.

These are not clear questions for an external observer, and there is nothing to get stuck in the analysis because there is no key, there hasn't been and won't be.

Instead of coding and transfer of the information - we generate and encode "link" in variable space, on sense completely similar to an Internet link on a site in a network the Internet, but which lives one moment.

Does it make sense to decrypt the link, realizing that it does not contain the encoded information? It cannot contain encrypted information - by definition.

Thus, the function of the variable point of reference of the coordinate system allows us to get the coordinates of the displacement vector - different digit capacity. The minimum length of the reference code in bits will be when the initial datum point coincides with the coordinate system boundary or is inside the element system. If the initial datum exceeds the boundaries of the elements location field of the selected space area (enclave), the digit capacity of the vector, references, or more precisely their digital description, will be increased.

  The technology of geometric encryption has the possibility to work with the variable digit capacity of the output code relative to the input one. It turns out that any information will be transmitted by a cipher code of unknown length, with the digit capacity not defined for an external observer. And this makes it very difficult to cryptographically analyze the message.

The methodology of the geometric encryption method is based on the presence of a full-fledged separate virtuality, which operates in its own internal order. An obligatory attribute of such internal world - must be its own counter of time and events. This digital generator gives the system always new, never repeating digital values.  The external calendar time (it was written about it in detail earlier) counts (or receives data from the external environment) our astronomical calendar time, and the internal system calendar time (see posts before it) lives its internal life without common reference points with the external calendar time.
We need these conditions to provide the condition of "always new event" in the system regardless of whether the event is repeated, data for encoding is repeated or not. Both of these time calendars have the ability to be stopped for certain actions.
   
As already mentioned, the normal mode of operation is to transmit and receive data continuously, providing the external observer for analysis only one indicator available to him - the total amount of information exchange, which can only be possible in the observed period of time.

But this is not all troubles for the external observer. The matter is that the technology of vector-geometric encryption allows not encrypting at all the very information which needs to be encrypted and transmitted (and thus accepted and decrypted).

Again, it is a paradox. And again, at first glance, it is inexplicable!
It is only at first glance.

The matter is that in the offered model of encryption there is an organic possibility to use a method of "temporary correspondence" of internal elements of system - to elements of information intended for encoding.

It is such "temporary" contract which will quickly change for the new contract.

Let's imagine that two chess players sit down to play chess, but this is only a distraction. In fact, every move, every chess piece is a transfer of information corresponding to that piece. The moves are transmitted through open communication channels, but the true meaning of these actions remains behind the scenes.
If we look at the standard chessboard, then this model of space can accommodate 64 different elements, no more, this is the information capacity of this space.
Therefore, by the method of "temporary matching" we can assign logical matching to each element of this space (each piece) to any value of no more than 6 bits of information.

Then each "chess" move will mean passing one of the values of 6 bits of binary code.

But we cannot stop there either.
To describe a "chess move" we will not use direct instructions - on the corresponding chess piece, let it be a "bishop".

We will use the method of "reference", building a geometric vector and its digital description in binary code.
Instead of describing a move as "elephant D2 on B3", we will choose an initial reference point (and the initial reference point is not a constant, but a variable for each new move), e.g. a simplified case - the first corner of the chessboard, then D2 = 42, B3 = 33, and our move will be described (will be digitized) this way:  4233.
Further, only "4233" is encrypted in the rest of the encryption rounds.

Without going into detail, but using the same logic of the virtual world model described, which is the basis for geometric encryption methods, it is easy to extract pseudo-random digital data that can replace useful information when needed.

As already noted, normal operation of the system does not require the user to enter his or her own information in a mandatory and continuous manner. In moments of pause or long silence, the system does not do any pause in time - it fills them itself with fake information exchange. This "not real" information flow has an absolute pseudo-random character, obtained by a strictly geometrical method, which guarantees both the maximum level of "randomness" of such information and the ease of its extraction, without additional computational operations, from unused, free at this moment of time, space areas.

The key question remains in this keyless system:
 - how to receive reliable pseudo-random numerical sequence which entropy aspires to entropy of casual sizes? 

It is clear that any numerical sequence is easily transformed into a binary sequence of any length less than the maximum possible (less than its maximum information capacity).   

Again we return to our moving, dynamically changing, geometrical field of elements in which each element does not like constants, the same, neighbors.

To get a good pseudo-random sequence from this model is possible if each element is represented as a number temporarily located in some place of our space, space of Cartesian coordinates and to define an initial reference point in this space.

Now, in the obtained numerical shaped model, having at least 2 Cartesian coordinates, we can draw absolutely any functional curve, a chart of any function (the "X" axis is a set of values of the function arguments and the "Y" axis is a set of values of the function).

Which particular curve you will draw has no meaning. If we are sure of a random arrangement of elements of this system relative to each other.  All cells, through which the chart of the selected function passes - get to the sampling of the set of our numerical sequence.

 The value has only the maximum number of elements, through which the chart of the selected function will pass. We have to fulfill an important condition - the length of the derivative binary (measured in bits) sequence of the function defined by this graph must be no less than the encrypted numeric code (again, we measure in bits and perform the operation "exclude OR" to each bit).

Thus, in geometric cryptography, available methods and the ability to organize not only a fully closed channel, but also to implement a round of encryption, which uses disposable binary tapes, allowing to obtain a cipher similar to the ciphers of the Vernam class.

The symmetrical system eliminates the need to transmit disposable binary tapes over the communication channel. The information itself, or rather its derivatives, obtained from the current (and this is a variable) state of the system, both from GIS and LTT, gives the "key" to the same binary "keys" of any desired length.

And now it becomes even more clear why this system will see any modification of information, even at the level of one bit, why it is possible to fix the vector-geometric principles of encryption - an absolutely stable cipher of Vernam class.

Or this is the beginning of a new class of ciphers, a class of keyless ciphers, such ciphers in which each packet of encrypted data is encoded with its own set of "keys", a set that is not repeated in the future, but is absolutely clearly defined only by those systems that have organized their own closed channel. 

This is not the end of the miracles of the geometric model of encryption.

If we have our own chaos, with its own level of entropy, the pseudo-random state of space elements allows us to create numerical random sequences of any desired length.
And since the static state of GIS is very small in time (and by events in the system), these random numerical sequences are also one-time.

This is a complete analogy to disposable binary tapes that can apply the "exclude OR" operation to every bit of code.

And this is the Vernam class cipher, the only absolutely stable cipher, in the absolute sense of the word.

And this is a very loud request...
After all, to get a cipher similar to the Vernam class cipher is the maximum theoretical possibility of cryptography in general.

Yes, and most importantly, there is no need to exchange these "disposable binary tapes" between Alice and Bob.

And that was the only drawback of the Vernam class cipher, which left this encryption only in top secret diplomatic missions. 

Objectively speaking, the function of generating a "fake" information exchange by the system itself, which simulates the original information exchange, is not obligatory, in principle one could do without it.

Strictly speaking, it is an additional service for users which is so easy to do in this technology that one does not want to refuse it.
All the more so, as mentioned in the last post, the more new chaos relatively old, the better, and this feature helps to do it continuously.

Anyway, studies show that mixing "fake" information well masks useful information from an outside observer and does not allow to analyze the information picture in the communication channel.
Specifically:
1) who is currently transmitting and who is receiving the information;
2) who was receiving and who was transmitting information during the whole historical period of time after the start of using the system;
3) whether there was any fact of information exchange between two users (Alice and Bob) or they were "silent";
4) how much information was transmitted from Alice to Bob;
5) what volume of information was transferred from Bob to Alice;
6) what type of information was involved in the data exchange: voice content, media content, text content, streaming digital file in upload (or upload) mode, etc.

Therefore, organized by keyless encryption technology, its own channel of communication is a well closed channel, which does not give an outside observer any information about the events taking place in the channel, except counting the maximum possible information exchange between participants.