Topic: Ledger Recovery - Send your (encrypted) recovery phrase to 3rd parties entities - page 10. (Read 5423 times)

But the post says you can see it being used in Ledger Live, which is open source. A search of Ledger's GitHub provides zero matches for "gimme_da_seed".

Yeah, Ledger put a method in their firmware like gimme_da_keys then allowed software (ledger live) to call gimme_da_keys. I can confirm that current Trezor firmware has no gimme_da_keys methods, or anything like that. So even if some software were to try to ask firmware for the keys, firmware isn't listening for any key requests, so won't respond.

*Note: it is hard to verify exactly whether it is true that they really named the method as such, because Ledger firmware is closed source and it's possible that obfuscation of exported function names is being used by the libraries.

If this is true, Ledger's "hardware" wallet is now - once attached to a computer - literally less secure than a hot Electrum wallet on the same computer.

I'm going to make the educated guess that Ledgers developers are a bunch of juveniles because there's no way you're a senior engineer and you get away with this stunt especially after a PR storm.

*Note: it is hard to verify exactly whether it is true that they really named the method as such, because Ledger firmware is closed source and it's possible that obfuscation of exported function names is being used by the libraries.

(...)When you think about it (Ledger Recover) there's nothing wrong with it. It doesn't change the security.

(...)It's our rule to have convictions and to push the industry forward.

4.6 No retrieval of Private Keys. The only existing backup is with you. Ledger operates non-custodial services, which means that we do not store, nor do we have access to your Crypto Assets nor your Private Keys. Ledger does not have access to or store passwords, 24-word Recovery Phrase, Private Keys, passphrases, transaction history, PIN, or other credentials associated with your use of the Services. We are not in a position to help you retrieve your credentials. You are solely responsible for remembering, storing, and keeping your credentials in a secure location, away from prying eyes. Any third party with knowledge of one or more of your 24-word Recovery Phrase or PIN can gain control of the Private Keys associated with your Ledger Device or of the 24-word Recovery Phrase, and therefore steal your Crypto Assets, without any possibility for you or Ledger to retrieve them.

Just the opposite.  In order to enable the "Ledger Recover" feature, Ledger, did, indeed, write a gimme_da_seed function directly into firmware.  It is clear because you can see Ledger Live, which is open sources, using the seed and sending off to the Ledger Recover servers.

Both Ledger Live and Ledger Firmware handle your complete seed, and prepare it for transport off of the device.  The seed is encrypted, and Ledger has promised that the number of people who can decrypt the seed are small.

What's more, I don't think Ledger supports downgrades.  You MUST upgrade to the gimme_da_seed firmware, and once upgraded, I don't think you can downgrade.  But like I said, they promise it is encrypted.

Trezor prone to physical hack since we basically cannot verify of the Trezor we receive is genuine

EVERYTHING shipped by a third party is prone to physical attacks.  Ledger wrote the book on supply chain attacks.  There was a huge rash of compromised Ledgers sold on Amazon about 4 years ago.  Made a huge stink.  Lots of users were duped.

Ledger and Trezor are equally hardened and equally vulnerable via supply chain.  I'd put more trust in Trezor since you can upgrade, downgrade and independently flash the firmware and bootloader.  Very hard to sustain a "fake" firmware if you have to emulate all those actions without detection.

They probably did just that, and they are hoping that everything will calm down and people will gradually forget about this issue.
It could be possible they are working on open sourcing partially, but I think now it's to late for that and it wont be genuine.
I don't trust ledger and their ''car'' is going down the hill.

~snip

Or did they just a slap some random bullshit timeline together with no intention of sticking even to the bare minimum?

I also disliked the "Attach to PIN" feature, and I've spoken before about why I don't think people should use it. As you say it reduces the security of your passphrase to a simple PIN, and it also means that your passphrase is stored on the device rather than wiped after use when using a temporary passphrase.

Apparently the shards aren't encrypted at all, despite Ledger previously stating this. It's literally just Shamir's. So there is no decryption key to be stored on the device or by Ledger themselves

During the process, the secure channel uses an ephemeral symmetric key to securely transport the fragments.

https://youtu.be/M3VjQUcyZSY?t=1285 - Apparently the shards aren't encrypted at all, despite Ledger previously stating this. It's literally just Shamir's. So there is no decryption key to be stored on the device or by Ledger themselves, making it even easier than thought to compromise the set up.

During the process, the secure channel uses an ephemeral symmetric key to securely transport the fragments.

Public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography, is the field of cryptographic systems that use pairs of related keys. Each key pair consists of a public key and a corresponding private key. Key pairs are generated with cryptographic algorithms based on mathematical problems termed one-way functions. Security of public-key cryptography depends on keeping the private key secret; the public key can be openly distributed without compromising security.

In a public-key encryption system, anyone with a public key can encrypt a message, yielding a ciphertext, but only those who know the corresponding private key can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the original message.

Would your private data be sent to the seed storage partners who all have to make their own judgement, or would Ledger just say: "this guy needs to recover his Ledger, send the seed"?

Let me guess: they haven't shared the contracts yet?

there is nothing stopping Ledger turning to these two partners and asking them to hand over their shards as well.

Gauthier replies that the other companies wouldn't have to comply, and that Ledger would be happy to open source their legal contracts with these companies to prove as such.

Wait, they previously announced a government could subpoeana them. I'm guessing all of them will cooperate when the government of one country subphoeanas them, so the different countries don't matter.

Additionally, each fragment backup provider uses a hardened, tamper-resistant server called a Hardware Security Module (HSM) to securely store these encrypted fragments.

I've just found this[1] video