A reasonable encryption strategy is to be able to decrypt with a password of at least 12 (more like 15 - 20) characters for access that lasts a few minutes, or a much longer password (40 characters or more) for access that lasts an hour or two. If we assume that the hacker grabbed a copy of enough information to be able to start an exhaustive search for the password, LBC knows how long we can expect his search to go on before he finds it.
If his search is ever successful, what data will be compromised?
Is there a list of BTC addresses that LBC can provide to miners, asking them to filter out transactions from them until further notice?
A protocol for that kind of lock would be nice. I would honor it if I were mining. Just a simple request "please lock this BTC addy until further notice," signed with the address would do. It could be broadcast in any transaction and thereby get to all miners.
Ahh, of course if it could be unlocked with a signature from the same address, it would be kind of useless. But suppose it had to be unlocked with a signature from the same address that locked it? So the attacker would need that external address' private key too.
Hopefully they used a tiered architecture and kept most of their important data on different servers than the web server. They did say they kept their wallets on a different server, so I would hope that they kept their transactional systems and databases on a separate non-internet facing server as well. The web server is usually the first point of that is attacked, so you shouldn't be keeping anything there except the web programs to render and display the web pages and maybe some transient data. If his search is ever successful, what data will be compromised?
Is there a list of BTC addresses that LBC can provide to miners, asking them to filter out transactions from them until further notice?
A protocol for that kind of lock would be nice. I would honor it if I were mining. Just a simple request "please lock this BTC addy until further notice," signed with the address would do. It could be broadcast in any transaction and thereby get to all miners.
Ahh, of course if it could be unlocked with a signature from the same address, it would be kind of useless. But suppose it had to be unlocked with a signature from the same address that locked it? So the attacker would need that external address' private key too.
