That means that a software should not mark 888 as a good choice, because while random, it is not secure. So there exists a subset of numbers that are not secure but are random. Is it wrong to think that if we excluded that subset, we'd have better security? Seems to me like the problem lies how to do it, and not on if it's wise to do it.
The chances of your wallets selecting those subset of numbers is astronomically low. You have 2^256 to choose from, I highly doubt you would ever get any address anywhere near those that were already tried. It would be a massive waste of resources to keep those indexes and limiting the pool of numbers wouldn't be that ideal either.
What I'm hearing is, the only way you can tell me, if this is a "quality" seed or not, is if you are told what generated it.
If it was a CSPNG that created it, then it's sufficiently random/unpatterned.
If I created it, then by way of natural human cognitive bias, there must be/highly likely to be some pattern that is more guessable by some computer program.
Yep, that is correct. Cognitively, the human brain works by associating events together through a part of their memory. If a human were to think of a certain string of phrases, chances are the phrases appeared somewhere before and they chose that specific string based on some form of recollection. You can possibly prove it, if you were to scrape all the data there is on the internet, it might be inconclusive because they aren't exhaustive.
But there's no way a computer program can ever tell if it's indeed quality or not based on the list itself. We just *know* that if a human created it, it's certainly insufficient and if a CSPNG SW program created it, it is positively sufficient.
The former is generally true but the latter would depend on the quality of the source of entropy (are they deterministic or stochastic processes?), the way the entropy is processed and how it gets used. Desktop wallets generally use entropy given by /dev/random (which by itself uses multiple sources of entropy -> debiasing before initializing the CSPRNG) , sometimes XORed with other random data and this is more than sufficient for our uses. There are flawed implementations out there, but so long as it has been rigorously tested and correctly implemented, it will be secure.
If what I've stated above correctly represents the consensus on this topic (albeit in a simplistic way), the logic of this still eludes me. If there is agreement among the geniuses in the world that study this stuff for a living that this is indeed the case, then I guess I will just add it to one many of life's mysteries to me. I'm new to this board, I hope I didn't immediately embarrass myself for asking the question!
It was a pretty fruitful discussion! My initial venture into cryptography was filled with question like these as well, glad that you're bringing these topics up to discuss!