Smartphones are now at 50% penetration in the U.S. (with 2/3rd of all new phones sold being smartphones as well):
- http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-smartphone-penetration-2012-3
What I am concerned with is "the Linode problem". All these mobiles are managed devices. They can be fully controlled by someone other than the owner of the device. Yes, they are managed by the carrier but possibly that carrier has people that cannot be trusted or, just as bad, has people who don't maintain secure systems themselves such as what reportedly is what happened at Linode.
The importance is thiis. An attack that defrauds M-Pesa's customers en mass means Safaricom figures out at some point that there's a problem, halts all affected systems to prevent further losses, and in the end eats some, most or all of the customer's losses. A similar attack through the managed services of the mobile network to steal bitcoins from mobiles means just that the individual mobile user alone loses out. Just like how Linode disavowed any responsibility to Slush, Bitcoinica, etc. for the tens of thousands of bitcoins lost, Safaricom would likely maintain the same position.
So, this is a fundamental question -- is the practice of storing bitcoin private keys on the mobile something that exposes it to too much risk to where it shouldn't even be considered? i.e., bitcoin apps for mobile need to be under the same model that mobile banking (like M-Pesa) uses?
could the problem be solved with cold storage? like a thumbdrive with a wallet.dat file and some level of encryption? A thumb drive could make a great vault for someone store their wealth cheaply and with a relatively high level of security in a third world country.