NEVER been cracked and it will most likely not be in our lifetimes.
Also the workfactor to break one of your 90 bit keys is less than 2^90 the moment two of your keys have been used... If your scheme were widely used, it would be much easier to find one at random. It may also turn out that your RNG is less uniform than believed and after careful analysis doesn't require a 2^90 search to match even a single key.
Your scheme also only generates a single address, so users are stuck reusing it, compromising their privacy.
In general symmetric cryptography applications 128 bits has arisen as a general standard. Is 128 meaningfully better than 90? Is it meaningfully better than 120? Meaningfully better than 65? Part of the purpose of having a standard size is so that you don't have to constantly engage in a complicated tradeoff discussion: you just demand that everything is 128 bits.
Is 128 bits more to memorize than 90? Yes. But relying on memorizing keys which can never be recovered via any other means is already skating on thin ice. People are used to it being possible to recover access if you forget— though sometimes with great effort. Crypto is different. Memory is just reliable enough for its unreliability to be surprising, especially since you don't remember all that you've forgotten by definition.
Of course, once you're up to that size you could just use the scheme electrum uses (or the one that it will use). Of course, the implementation isn't 1024 bytes— but neither is yours: The dictionary is an utterly essential part of the implementation.