They aren't backward compatible at all…it's just that they are designed to exploit some permissiveness in the validation rules of old clients…but the old clients aren't actually doing what they need to do with respect to validating these new kinds of transactions.
They wouldn't be validating them in any case. This backward compatibility allows them to keep working with transactions they
do recognize. The permissiveness being "exploited" (at least for BIP 12 and 17) was put there
expressly for this purpose.
It would be better for the old clients to reject these new transactions and for miners to upgrade and once there is general agreement that 70 or 80% of the mining power is ready to accept the new transactions, then set a date a month or two out when miners will start allowing them.
The change you're describing requires 100% of not just mining power, but also all users (including merchants who may be unable to upgrade for various reasons). The backward compatibility in BIP 12,16,17 allows upgrading the network with only a super-majority among miners' consensus.
P.S. It also occurs to me that as a "democratic money" that this process is exactly the way it should happen. Trying to exploit the permissiveness of old clients feels like it's subverting what should be an, albeit painful, but consensus building exercise.
This change is actually fully in line with "democratic money"; what Bitcoin is, at the core protocol, is in fact "
unanimous money".
I think that what it achieves is only a short-term solution, and will quickly need to be supplemented to be worth using in the long term - whereas /P2SH/ looks to me like a more complete option.
The only long-term benefit of BIP16 over BIP17 is that you can fit more multi-factor addresses into a block before the inevitable Bitcoin 2.0 upgrade is needed. If we do end up needing that much before Bitcoin 2.0, we can roll out something similar to BIP12/16 at that time, presumably after we've had many more months to consider the consequences.