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Topic: Portable Bitcoin Security, Backup & Privacy toolkit. (Read 6164 times)

full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100

If you don't know what it is, why the eff are you defending it so vehemently?

Try cutting the length of your password in half and see what you get in Password Haystacks. Try cutting it down to seven characters.

How about: first an attacker hits you with a wrench to get the password to your Mt. Gox account, then she hits you again to get the password to your IronKey, then she takes all your Bitcoinage! Seems like it would work to me. BTW, do you memorize your 20-char random Mt. Gox password? Or do you use a password manager or write it down or something?

I just don't trust Mt. Gox's security and I'm not sure I'd personally want to become dependent on an expensive flash drive, especially when there are free tools that are just as (if not more) secure.

I wasn't aware that they didn't have any password policies in place, but . I see them doing a decent job lately.  If it happens again.. well now.. thats a different story.

No, actually they aren't; I made an account the other day as a test with the word "feline" for a password (!). My guess is they will be hacked again. They haven't talked about having an audit done for additional SQL injection vulnerabilities, have they?

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Truecrypt is susceptible to a memory dump attack.. whether container or drive, it doesn't matter.

So is the data on your IronKey once you start using it.

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I think truecrypt is a decent solution, and I have had experience with it all the way back to its roots in the scramdisk... The biggest killer for me is the inability to use it on a computer that is properly secured without specific preinstallation of truecrypt by a system administrator.

Yeah, well, if you're really security conscious, you 1) shouldn't use Windows and 2) shouldn't use any machine you don't have admin rights to.

But I agree that is a nice feature the IronKey has over TrueCrypt.

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The wrench attack is far fetched.. and the likelihood of its occurrence is low.. Its much more likely that small devices like this could be misplaced.

Yes, it is, for now, but as crypto-money gets more popular and widely used and understood, the $5 wrench attack becomes more likely. I predict we'll see it happen.

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I greatly simplified my password example to "123.Bitcoin.456" and assuming it was attacked at the rate of 100,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take nearly 1.5 million centuries to perform an exhaustive search, a secure password does not preclude the ability to be memorized.
[/qoute]

Okay, so you have reduced it to 15 characters. That's a good length for a password (for now). Congratulations, you're safe from brute-force keyspace searching. (Again, most people don't bother to make a password that long so this doesn't have anything to do with Mt. Gox's secruity.) However, that particular password is actually relatively weak because it's very susceptible to a dictionary attack. I'd guess it'd probably take more like 1.5 hours than 1.5 million centuries to crack.


Thats kind of the point, 123.Bitcoin.456, is NOT vulnerable to a dictionary attack... since its padded..  I'll concede that 1.5 million centuries was to perform an exhaustive search of the whole character space that password occupies, but since the password begins with the "1" character, you could divide 1.5 million centuries by the 95 which represents the number of character alphabet you would need to search, and you are down to (approximately) 150,000 Centuries... but that still assumes you would be brute forcing the password at 100trillion guesses per second.  100 trillion guesses per second would require a distributed attack of 10x the size of the total computational power of the bitcoin network as it stands today. 1.5 hours. well.. come on. do you believe that?  You do understand that to perform a "Dictionary Attack" that the exact string "123.Bitcoin.456" would have to pre-exist in the dictionary you are using to brute force with, substrings are useless...   I'm not sure Moore's Law still even applies in todays world, but if it does, it would still take 500 years for technology to be 150,000 times more powerful than it is today.. and that still would take that massive password cracking array a whole century... The user of that password would be DEAD before it is cracked. 

As far as the comments on having the data unencrypted in memory once any storage device is unlocked.. yes, of course, there is absolutely no way to avoid something that is software from being present in your computers memory.. thats the risk no matter what.  I was referring to the encryption keys that secure the data itself inside of the truecrypt container.  Whats really cool about the Ironkey, is the fact that the encryption keys are located in hardware, and the application that accepts the password, communicates directly to that chip.. the password you enter, the encryption keys, etc. Never enter the system ram, can never be copied into the hibernation file, or page/swap files of the computer you are using.  A lost ironkey can't even have its data copied in the encrypted form from the drive... its safe. The comment that truecrypt is just as secure, if not more secure is just wrong.  I hope you see that. Its very secure, but just as secure... or more secure isn't correct.

Of course Windows isn't secure, lol.. especially when it has been used by people who are not security aware..  and sometimes not even secure when used by those kind of people... Windows is a toy.  Doesn't mean I don't use it... but I also have specific computers for specific purposes.  A couple linux systems and a couple of macs...  I tend not to discriminate...

I 100% agree with your comments of the safest computers are those you administer.. but the fact remains that there will be times it is nice to just hop on a computer and send some bitcoins and do some trades... as safely as possible... The safest way would be the Live BootCD techniques mentioned by other posts..  Another smart thing would be to not put all of your eggs in one basket, especially with bitcoins.

Hey... I hope you aren't taking any of this personal.. I just enjoy having these kind of technology / security discussions, as I'm sure you do too..


newbie
Activity: 40
Merit: 0

If you don't know what it is, why the eff are you defending it so vehemently?

Try cutting the length of your password in half and see what you get in Password Haystacks. Try cutting it down to seven characters.

How about: first an attacker hits you with a wrench to get the password to your Mt. Gox account, then she hits you again to get the password to your IronKey, then she takes all your Bitcoinage! Seems like it would work to me. BTW, do you memorize your 20-char random Mt. Gox password? Or do you use a password manager or write it down or something?

I just don't trust Mt. Gox's security and I'm not sure I'd personally want to become dependent on an expensive flash drive, especially when there are free tools that are just as (if not more) secure.

I wasn't aware that they didn't have any password policies in place, but . I see them doing a decent job lately.  If it happens again.. well now.. thats a different story.

No, actually they aren't; I made an account the other day as a test with the word "feline" for a password (!). My guess is they will be hacked again. They haven't talked about having an audit done for additional SQL injection vulnerabilities, have they?

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Truecrypt is susceptible to a memory dump attack.. whether container or drive, it doesn't matter.

So is the data on your IronKey once you start using it.

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I think truecrypt is a decent solution, and I have had experience with it all the way back to its roots in the scramdisk... The biggest killer for me is the inability to use it on a computer that is properly secured without specific preinstallation of truecrypt by a system administrator.

Yeah, well, if you're really security conscious, you 1) shouldn't use Windows and 2) shouldn't use any machine you don't have admin rights to.

But I agree that is a nice feature the IronKey has over TrueCrypt.

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The wrench attack is far fetched.. and the likelihood of its occurrence is low.. Its much more likely that small devices like this could be misplaced.

Yes, it is, for now, but as crypto-money gets more popular and widely used and understood, the $5 wrench attack becomes more likely. I predict we'll see it happen.

Quote
I greatly simplified my password example to "123.Bitcoin.456" and assuming it was attacked at the rate of 100,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take nearly 1.5 million centuries to perform an exhaustive search, a secure password does not preclude the ability to be memorized.
[/qoute]

Okay, so you have reduced it to 15 characters. That's a good length for a password (for now). Congratulations, you're safe from brute-force keyspace searching. (Again, most people don't bother to make a password that long so this doesn't have anything to do with Mt. Gox's secruity.) However, that particular password is actually relatively weak because it's very susceptible to a dictionary attack. I'd guess it'd probably take more like 1.5 hours than 1.5 million centuries to crack.
full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100

If you don't know what it is, why the eff are you defending it so vehemently?

Try cutting the length of your password in half and see what you get in Password Haystacks. Try cutting it down to seven characters.

How about: first an attacker hits you with a wrench to get the password to your Mt. Gox account, then she hits you again to get the password to your IronKey, then she takes all your Bitcoinage! Seems like it would work to me. BTW, do you memorize your 20-char random Mt. Gox password? Or do you use a password manager or write it down or something?


I just don't trust Mt. Gox's security and I'm not sure I'd personally want to become dependent on an expensive flash drive, especially when there are free tools that are just as (if not more) secure.


No hostility, nor feelings hurt... only the feelings of reality were hurt.

I wasn't aware that they didn't have any password policies in place, but . I see them doing a decent job lately.  If it happens again.. well now.. thats a different story.  I have adjusted my trading habits since the attack... at no time will I keep more money in ANY account than I am unable to withdraw in one shot.  I feel more comfortable with someone I already know well, than dealing with unknowns.

Truecrypt is susceptible to a memory dump attack.. whether container or drive, it doesn't matter.  I think truecrypt is a decent solution, and I have had experience with it all the way back to its roots in the scramdisk... The biggest killer for me is the inability to use it on a computer that is properly secured without specific preinstallation of truecrypt by a system administrator.  These were real stumbling blocks I found when implementing it for a government agency in a secure network...  On the first day of the trial the fact that you couldn't mount the data on secured computers was the final nail in the coffin, the memory dump attacks is an interesting sidenote.  This experience is what causes me to call into the question its usefulness and convenience when roaming outside of your realm of administration.

The Kingston Locker+ thumb drive seems to be an actual viable equivalent to Ironkeys if you don't require access from a linux computer.

In the past week I have used my Ironkey on Windows 7 (64) and XP (32), Mac OS/X Leopard (32) & Snow Leopard (64), and 2 linux installs (32 & 64), which total 6 distict platforms.  I was able to do this without any complicated preplanned configuration by just inserting the drive and double clicking an icon.

The wrench attack is far fetched.. and the likelihood of its occurrence is low.. Its much more likely that small devices like this could be misplaced.  Worrying about women who carry wrenches as being a serious security vector, is like worrying that the Coyote from road runner will spike my cola with earthquake pills.... much more likely to happen in a comic strip than real life.

I greatly simplified my password example to "123.Bitcoin.456" and assuming it was attacked at the rate of 100,000,000,000,000 guesses per second, it would still take nearly 1.5 million centuries to perform an exhaustive search, a secure password does not preclude the ability to be memorized.

I guess security is in the eye of the beholder.



newbie
Activity: 40
Merit: 0

Yeah, I'm not real hot on Mt. Gox's Yubikeys, which costs like $30 and are only usable with Mt. Gox (my understanding; someone please correct me if I'm wrong). I'm not sure I actually trust Gox to implement multi-factor auth correctly, or any type of security (I don't like their new password hashing scheme, for example, which still seems lacking).

Yawn, for real though?!  I read about some script kiddie saying what they are doing isn't secure, so it must not be..

Back up your claims with some facts and figures son... you'll get more respect.


Woah, whoa... where's all this hostility coming from? I didn't mean to hurt your feelings, man.

For $45 you can get two Yubikeys and a year's subscription to the LastPass service directly from Yubico:

https://store.yubico.com/store/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=13&osCsid=580ed7bb4272de9a5e6ad19b2b8c0166

That seems like a better way to go because you can use your key as a second factor with all the exchanges, and other sites as well. LastPass is a pretty good password vault too. Plus, you get two keys that can be programmed to be identical. You want a second Yubikey (or at least, I do) in case a key gets lost or damaged.

My Yubikey was free.

Yes, because you were affected by the hack, right? Everyone else hoping for a sloppy modicum of security has to pay $30.

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While LastPass is a great password management service that can generate, store and automatically submit complex passwords for many sites, believing that this is a viable replacement for a site specific multi-factor authentication system is just flat out incorrect advice to give.  The fact that you are storing passwords in LastPass, and using the Yubikey to access them does not stop anyone from compromising any account if password has been compromised.  You understand the difference, right?  In your scenario the Yubikey is used as a secondary factor for LastPass.


Yes, I understand the difference. I guess what I meant to say is that I don't trust Mt. Gox to implement multi-factor auth correctly. You might be more secure using your own Yubikey and password manager, and trading on another exchange that takes security more seriously.

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You are just repeating what you think is true .. because thats what someone else wrote.

False.

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How would the attacker be able to mount an attack by getting access to both my ironkey & yubikey? (The other drive you see is empty, its a tool.)  Did you just make that up hoping no one would call you on it?  The $5 wrench attack would NEVER work as an attack vector against the Yubikey or Ironkey.. HOW!?! The ONLY way he would get any of my Bitcoins would be if my car was broken down, and he used the wrench to help get it going, I would give him a few coin, and say THANKS!!

How about: first an attacker hits you with a wrench to get the password to your Mt. Gox account, then she hits you again to get the password to your IronKey, then she takes all your Bitcoinage! Seems like it would work to me. BTW, do you memorize your 20-char random Mt. Gox password? Or do you use a password manager or write it down or something?

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Question..  Have you actually attempted using TrueCrypt as a roaming data security solution for any period of time with any level of convienience?  

Yeah, I have -- for years. It works great.

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You do realize that a truecrypt drive is pretty easy to get into, right?...

I use a Truecrypt container not a drive. But anyway, that's false.

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Do you truely believe that sprinkling your wallet.dat all over the interwebs might just be the best approach to keeping your wallet.dat available and secure?. If any one of those files gets uncovered and decrypted you might find that those efforts were all in vain.  Remember the bitcoin community has a higher level of knowledge & capability in that area.

Yes, I think it's a good approach. I don't think either of those things is likely at all.

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What implementations of paper based storage of bitcoins have you explored?  What is wrong with paperback?  I found it to have high levels of resilience against damage, highly recoverable, and additionally it was configurable with strong FIPS-197 compliant AES encryption via a configurable password.  Check it out (http://www.ollydbg.de/Paperbak/index.html) or does this not live up to your security standards either!?!   Here is a nice sample to print and scan back in.. the password is "bitcoin"  http://www.mediafire.com/?yks2s9251yfvywy

The only paper-based ones I've looked at print out the private keys to your bitcoins in the clear or as QR codes. I wasn't aware of Paperback. It looks good. I'll definitely take a close look. Thanks for the tip.

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Well anyway... If you think I'm wrong you can tell me again.. I really don't mind, it helps me learn.  

No, I don't think you're wrong. Ironkey looks like a great product. I just don't trust Mt. Gox's security and I'm not sure I'd personally want to become dependent on an expensive flash drive, especially when there are free tools that are just as (if not more) secure.

full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100
I believe I donated a little over a hundred. I wanted to help out the server as much as I could. I had no idea how much I was really giving you! Man, if I had those bitcoins again, I could finally buy myself the open pandora I've wanted for so many years! And then I found out that you already have that too! Why do you have everything I want!?

Would you twist that knife a little harder please..  Grin

I have the Pandora Console, Pandora Case, Stylus, Extra Battery, Battery Carrying Case, & AC Power Adapter, it works 100%, both nubs work perfectly, and it holds its charge forever (something like 10 hours of use).. I just put that stuff in the cart and it came to $624 shipped...

If you really still want one, but can't justify their asking price, you can take mine for 1/2 of that.

I'd be honored and happy if it went to you.
legendary
Activity: 882
Merit: 1001
Take my advice and use a better password than "Poop"
Um... I'll be right back. I'm just going to go change my password.

I KNEW IT!!!!  Damn and all this time the riches of Ryland could have been mine.

Oh wait... maybe they already are, didn't you send me like 80 bitcoins when they were worth like 69 cents?   Cheesy
I believe I donated a little over a hundred. I wanted to help out the server as much as I could. I had no idea how much I was really giving you! Man, if I had those bitcoins again, I could finally buy myself the open pandora I've wanted for so many years! And then I found out that you already have that too! Why do you have everything I want!?
full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100
Take my advice and use a better password than "Poop"
Um... I'll be right back. I'm just going to go change my password.

I KNEW IT!!!!  Damn and all this time the riches of Ryland could have been mine.

Oh wait... maybe they already are, didn't you send me like 80 bitcoins when they were worth like 69 cents?   Cheesy
legendary
Activity: 882
Merit: 1001
Take my advice and use a better password than "Poop"
Um... I'll be right back. I'm just going to go change my password.
full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100
WARNING WARNING  TL;DR Material Ahead..  Proceed at your own peril!


Yeah, I'm not real hot on Mt. Gox's Yubikeys, which costs like $30 and are only usable with Mt. Gox (my understanding; someone please correct me if I'm wrong). I'm not sure I actually trust Gox to implement multi-factor auth correctly, or any type of security (I don't like their new password hashing scheme, for example, which still seems lacking).

Yawn, for real though?!  I read about some script kiddie saying what they are doing isn't secure, so it must not be..

Back up your claims with some facts and figures son... you'll get more respect.


My original MT.Gox password was "R8YC2txHc1RWtScewxid" and is listed in its MD5+Salt format in the hack DB as "$1$9W57ShSS$H37Nb7ik2PUf2WY/p/OEl.)"

Lets try that with a multi-iteration triple salt.. lets see what we get...(Honestly I don't know what that is, but I'll try, lol)

mkpasswd -m sha-512 R8YC2txHc1RWtScewxid   <- This will produce a random 128bits of salt which will be used for the next 3 iterations, combined with the 512bit hashed output of my original gox password...

Produces this output "$6$86Ev9OHO/tSQ/NsH$dadWFKTBwRv7hzHDE721AWlALB14RggRquYrJwYm5XrKzYjSdPduedhlPQe.68Pdn6gDDrBAyYgVbizCxY72O."

Now we use that random salt to apply a secondary SHA-512 to that with this command  

mkpasswd -m sha-512 dadWFKTBwRv7hzHDE721AWlALB14RggRquYrJwYm5XrKzYjSdPduedhlPQe.68Pdn6gDDrBAyYgVbiz CxY72O. 86Ev9OHO/tSQ/NsH

Produces this output "$6$86Ev9OHO/tSQ/NsH$NbFEw6ToZrAnGai3kVDp1GbqY5iX7o0zu41iMelKnbjBvR/xUMAbxQ3Zk3egojw8GxXUlzGVTyCBT7NhKbLyE."

Now for the final iteration of SHA-512 using the same salt one last time...

mkpasswd -m sha-512 NbFEw6ToZrAnGai3kVDp1GbqY5iX7o0zu41iMelKnbjBvR/xUMAbxQ3Zk3egojw8GxXUlzGVTyCBT7NhKbLyE 86Ev9OHO/tSQ/NsH


Produces this output "$6$86Ev9OHO/tSQ/NsH$BBh.ljcEs8wqAWtpm1CAsoCpuAKXVPh8WJaTsr/H9o8uPXD9Qa5vDyHZkIhHWtoRSm.qLQkmJ7qXcDrsSbtJ90"

Yeah.. good luck with that.. even though its considered a speedier hash in comparison to bcrypt, its still 100% NON REVERSABLE, it has a HUGE output which is for all intents and purposes completely collisionless.  

I used Steve Gibsons "Password Haystacks" tool to do some sample calculations on what would be required to crack my current MT.Gox password.



OMGWTFBBQ.. you are right.. My MT.Gox account is terribly terribly insecure.. what will I ever do now!?!?! Oh noes, and I gave away its length too!! I'm a goner!

Just because some group of guys say bcrypt is better, doesn't automatically make SHA-512 insecure today...  Take my advice and use a better password than "Poop" or "123456".. Take advantage of that LastPast you have to generate something wicked..

And don't be critical of people who MIGHT know more than you.. you sound like you are trying to make everyone else's words your own.

For $45 you can get two Yubikeys and a year's subscription to the LastPass service directly from Yubico:

https://store.yubico.com/store/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=13&osCsid=580ed7bb4272de9a5e6ad19b2b8c0166

That seems like a better way to go because you can use your key as a second factor with all the exchanges, and other sites as well. LastPass is a pretty good password vault too. Plus, you get two keys that can be programmed to be identical. You want a second Yubikey (or at least, I do) in case a key gets lost or damaged.

My Yubikey was free.


While LastPass is a great password management service that can generate, store and automatically submit complex passwords for many sites, believing that this is a viable replacement for a site specific multi-factor authentication system is just flat out incorrect advice to give.  The fact that you are storing passwords in LastPass, and using the Yubikey to access them does not stop anyone from compromising any account if password has been compromised.  You understand the difference, right?  In your scenario the Yubikey is used as a secondary factor for LastPass.


No offense intended to the OP, but I feel it's kind of a bad idea to keep both your Yubikey and your flash drive with your wallet.dat on the same keychain, because if someone steals it not only are you locked out of Mt. Gox (at least temporarily), but it makes it easier for the thief to mount an attack. You're also probably more vulnerable to the $5 wrench attack: http://xkcd.com/538/ Having a super "military strength" crypto flash drive kinda signals you have something secret and potentially valuable in your pocket. I'd prefer to have an unassuming flash drive with a hidden Truecrypt volume on it: http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume or something equivalent.

Same sentiments here in hoping that no offense is taken.. I don't think you are trying to intentionally trying to mislead people into making poor security decisions, but I do think you havent fully thought through everything you said.

You are just repeating what you think is true .. because thats what someone else wrote.

How would the attacker be able to mount an attack by getting access to both my ironkey & yubikey? (The other drive you see is empty, its a tool.)  Did you just make that up hoping no one would call you on it?  The $5 wrench attack would NEVER work as an attack vector against the Yubikey or Ironkey.. HOW!?! The ONLY way he would get any of my Bitcoins would be if my car was broken down, and he used the wrench to help get it going, I would give him a few coin, and say THANKS!!

Question..  Have you actually attempted using TrueCrypt as a roaming data security solution for any period of time with any level of convienience?  

My experience was that mounting a TrueCrypt volume requires the same level of system access that enable the components that modern rootkits use to be completely undetectable, stuff like TDSS, Aleureon, and newer more sophisticated EVIL EVIL PROGRAMS capable of interacting with the kernel of an operating system, and its those undetectable things that will eat both your USB drive AND your bitcoins alive. munch munch munch.. burp.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=non-admin-users

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=truecrypt-portable

You do realize that a truecrypt drive is pretty easy to get into, right?... If I got my hands on it, I could copy it, and recompile your truecrypt with a version that sends me your password, or return it with a virus or utility program could pull the keys right out of a systems RAM any time its mounted.  If it sent those keys back to me, I could then mount the copy I made right before I returned your drive!! cake.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=unencrypted-data-in-ram

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=paging-file

http://www.lostpassword.com/hdd-decryption.htm

Considering one has to have net access to send and confirm Bitcoin transactions anyway, it might be best to just keep several copies of your wallet.dat encrypted and sprinkled around the interwebs in secret locations. For long term storage, e.g.: in safety deposit box or under the bed, I do not trust magnetic media. I do however like the idea of storage on paper, but I haven't seem a really good implementation of that yet.

Just my .02 BTC.

Do you truely believe that sprinkling your wallet.dat all over the interwebs might just be the best approach to keeping your wallet.dat available and secure?. If any one of those files gets uncovered and decrypted you might find that those efforts were all in vain.  Remember the bitcoin community has a higher level of knowledge & capability in that area.

What implementations of paper based storage of bitcoins have you explored?  What is wrong with paperback?  I found it to have high levels of resilience against damage, highly recoverable, and additionally it was configurable with strong FIPS-197 compliant AES encryption via a configurable password.  Check it out (http://www.ollydbg.de/Paperbak/index.html) or does this not live up to your security standards either!?!   Here is a nice sample to print and scan back in.. the password is "bitcoin"  http://www.mediafire.com/?yks2s9251yfvywy

Well anyway... If you think I'm wrong you can tell me again.. I really don't mind, it helps me learn.    The ONLY weakness I can perceive would be the act of using your bitcoins on a foreign computer, ever, which is an unavoidable weakness... The ironkey will allow you to run a portable VM like tinylinux, or ubuntu even if you have the space.

If you are looking to buy something a little less expensive.. that Kingston Locker+ posted by the previous poster is the closest thing yet I have seen to an Ironkey for such a low cost.. its a schweet deal for the money!! it uses the same techniques, minus a few features, and no linux support, Not recommeded for VM usage.
full member
Activity: 150
Merit: 100
how secure is the hardware, what happens if i try to open it. is flash memory embedded inside a plastic casing that cant be opened, easily anyway.

edit: they showed it.

edit2: seems a bit pricy, this drive is a lot cheaper, but im sure its not as secure http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6J-Dh8gQeo

http://www.newegg.com/Product/Product.aspx?Item=N82E16820139060
I don't think it destroys the data after x amount of attempts either, so it is likely viable to brute force. if you use a strong password, you should have a few days to make the wallet worthless so, idk use at your own risk, and only buy the ironkey if you are paranoid.

That looks like a viable alternative to the Ironkey based upon the dollar/security ratio.

Pros: Similar functionality to the Ironkey products line of products, Swivel cap can't be lost while the Ironkey one can, Cost is WAY less than Ironke

Cons: No Linux Support, Build Quality is Lower than Ironkey, Swivel cap design's often are more fragile than standard USB caps, Lower quality flash storage non-suitable for Virtual Machine usage, No built in Secure Backup System to secure the data in an encrypted format on your drive, Not Waterproof, won't survive your washing machine or other abuses, Previous models of Kingston secure flash drives have been hacked.

However.. for the cost its hard to argue.  The performance / quality of flash memory seems very similar to the D200 series of Ironkey products.
sr. member
Activity: 350
Merit: 251
how secure is the hardware, what happens if i try to open it. is flash memory embedded inside a plastic casing that cant be opened, easily anyway.

edit: they showed it.

edit2: seems a bit pricy, this drive is a lot cheaper, but im sure its not as secure http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6J-Dh8gQeo

http://www.newegg.com/Product/Product.aspx?Item=N82E16820139060
I don't think it destroys the data after x amount of attempts either, so it is likely viable to brute force. if you use a strong password, you should have a few days to make the wallet worthless so, idk use at your own risk, and only buy the ironkey if you are paranoid.
newbie
Activity: 40
Merit: 0
I haven't had a chance to look into the Yubikey all that much. Mt Gox says that the yubi they send you is useable with their service only but is that the case for most such keys or could a standard yubikey be used to auth to multiple sites?

Yeah, I'm not real hot on Mt. Gox's Yubikeys, which costs like $30 and are only usable with Mt. Gox (my understanding; someone please correct me if I'm wrong). I'm not sure I actually trust Gox to implement multi-factor auth correctly, or any type of security (I don't like their new password hashing scheme, for example, which still seems lacking).

For $45 you can get two Yubikeys and a year's subscription to the LastPass service directly from Yubico:

https://store.yubico.com/store/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=13&osCsid=580ed7bb4272de9a5e6ad19b2b8c0166

That seems like a better way to go because you can use your key as a second factor with all the exchanges, and other sites as well. LastPass is a pretty good password vault too. Plus, you get two keys that can be programmed to be identical. You want a second Yubikey (or at least, I do) in case a key gets lost or damaged.

No offense intended to the OP, but I feel it's kind of a bad idea to keep both your Yubikey and your flash drive with your wallet.dat on the same keychain, because if someone steals it not only are you locked out of Mt. Gox (at least temporarily), but it makes it easier for the thief to mount an attack. You're also probably more vulnerable to the $5 wrench attack: http://xkcd.com/538/ Having a super "military strength" crypto flash drive kinda signals you have something secret and potentially valuable in your pocket. I'd prefer to have an unassuming flash drive with a hidden Truecrypt volume on it: http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume or something equivalent.

Considering one has to have net access to send and confirm Bitcoin transactions anyway, it might be best to just keep several copies of your wallet.dat encrypted and sprinkled around the interwebs in secret locations. For long term storage, e.g.: in safety deposit box or under the bed, I do not trust magnetic media. I do however like the idea of storage on paper, but I haven't seem a really good implementation of that yet.

Just my .02 BTC.
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I assume everyone has a computer and would think to plug it in and see what is on it.  (I always do, if its not empty, I'll try to find some kind of info on it to return it to its rightful owner.)

I wouldn't normally engrave anything on my electronics because I think its tacky, but in this case I'm going to... As soon as I get to my friends gift shop, I'll get the outer body of my Ironkey engraved with my contact information.

You may not want to do this. I read somewhere that it is a common strategy for snoops to drop malware-loaded thumb-drives in corporate parking lots with the hope that someone plugs it into a machine - instantly infecting the machine.



That's good advice .. and true.. I've actually heard of people doing this..

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"How do you eat an elephant? One bit at a time..."
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I assume everyone has a computer and would think to plug it in and see what is on it.  (I always do, if its not empty, I'll try to find some kind of info on it to return it to its rightful owner.)

I wouldn't normally engrave anything on my electronics because I think its tacky, but in this case I'm going to... As soon as I get to my friends gift shop, I'll get the outer body of my Ironkey engraved with my contact information.

You may not want to do this. I read somewhere that it is a common strategy for snoops to drop malware-loaded thumb-drives in corporate parking lots with the hope that someone plugs it into a machine - instantly infecting the machine.

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I haven't had a chance to look into the Yubikey all that much. Mt Gox says that the yubi they send you is useable with their service only but is that the case for most such keys or could a standard yubikey be used to auth to multiple sites?
Same question. I already have my IronKey, though, and I'm very happy with it.

If you were to purchase a factory fresh Yubikey directly from the company it would have the standard AES key that Yubico's public auth server uses..  If you wanted to use a service that utilizes Yubico's own in house authentication server then would need to retain that default private key.

Also... Yubikeys are shipped with a default password so that if you want to reprogram them for your own server using Yubico's tools you can do it, and then assign your own password which would be required for further reprogramming of the keys.  Once you remove the factory private key it can't be recovered, that particular yubikey is now only usable on your own private authentication server.

There was some discussion at one point whether or not it would be possible to write malware to reprogram the Yubikey's functionality since they all have the same reprogramming password initially.. for example, the early Yubikey firmware had the ability to actually launch a URL by programming it with a series of control characters.  In more recent firmware this option to launch a URL is no longer is possible.  

I believe the most secure configuration possible with a Yubikey is when a service provider DOES reprogram the internal AES key, and runs their own local auth server.. This not only makes their keys unique, but also removes ANY possibilities of rogue software reprogramming the keys because the programming password has been customized as part of the customization process.

The Ordering Process.

After ordering your Yubikey your order will be processed and a specific key will be associated with your MT.GOX account.. once that is done you will notice that once you do your normal authentication you will get presented with a page asking you to authenticate with your assigned Yubikey...  You are able to skip over the Yubikey portion of the authentication by just hitting the submit button until your Yubikey arrives.

The Yubikey will arrive via EMS Japan Post (Express).. My Yubikey shipped on 7/11 and arrived today 7/13.

Once you use the Yubikey to provide the first OTP it will then become a requirement as part of your authentication process for logins, and withdraws.

To generate the OTP which is required after you enter your existing name and password you press the button for about 1/2 second.

To generate the password which is required for the withdraw process, you need to hold down the button for 3 seconds.

If you LOSE YOUR YUBIKEY, you will NOT be able to access the funds in your account until you receive a replacement..

DON'T LOSE THE YUBIKEY!
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SECURITY BREACH! I can now copy both of your keys. Can't wait to see inside the secret lair.

Haha.. yeah.. nope... if you look closely I actually shopped the keys in gimp with the clone tool and re-arranged the teeth.. and blurred the codes on the Yubikey..  ;-)

Nice Idea though.. I'm glad I knew you would say that.

legendary
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I haven't had a chance to look into the Yubikey all that much. Mt Gox says that the yubi they send you is useable with their service only but is that the case for most such keys or could a standard yubikey be used to auth to multiple sites?
Same question. I already have my IronKey, though, and I'm very happy with it.
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SECURITY BREACH! I can now copy both of your keys. Can't wait to see inside the secret lair.
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"How do you eat an elephant? One bit at a time..."
Thanks for sharing this!
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I don't like that idea of it self-wiping after 10 failed attempts! Other than that it looks pretty neat.


Thats the point of the built in secure backup software.. you can dump the contents of the flash drive to your computer, fully encrypted, so that if it does somehow get lost or wiped, you can easily restore it back to the drive.

The default mode of the Ironkey is to completely destroy itself, rendering the unit worthless if stolen, this is to deter theft of ironkeys.. I know for a fact that the "Basic" edition of the ironkey allows you to change the mode to allow the ironkey to be reinitialized.

By limiting the number of attempts to guess the password you defeat any brute force attack. Feel free to use an easier password, because the fact is.. There is only 10 attempts.. period.

The other feature, which beats something like a truecrypt encrypted USB drive is the fact that you can use the Ironkey on nearly any computer or os, without the need to have root or administrator access to install any encryption software.  This has always been the one factor that had limited something like a truecrypt USB thumb drive from being universally accessible on any computer.. which limits truecrypt's usefulness as a truly portable bitcoin wallet solution.
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