Pages:
Author

Topic: Possible false alarm: MtGox break in (Read 15376 times)

hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 500
September 14, 2011, 03:05:07 AM
Wouldn't it be possible that some of the code injected in the forum during the attack included somthing that would do some nastiness if you had 'gox opened in another tab?

Yes, a CSRF attack, but if MtGox code is well written it should be protected against it, afaik.
hero member
Activity: 616
Merit: 500
Firstbits.com/1fg4i :)
September 14, 2011, 02:04:30 AM
Was this a mtgox session hijack from the forum hack?  Were you logged into mtgox when the forum hack occurred?



That would be interesting if it was related.
Wouldn't it be possible that some of the code injected in the forum during the attack included somthing that would do some nastiness if you had 'gox opened in another tab?
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 1036
September 14, 2011, 01:17:43 AM

Asking once again. Do you use a Yubikey on Mt.Gox?

As Ive said in the past, I do not believe that they improve security.

They do not prevent every kind of attack but they stop entire categories of attacks.  You are wrong on this one and should think about it a bit more.  

They stop entire categories of attacks which not everyone is especially prone to.  SSO is a nice to have and very worthwhile in a lot of cases, but it introduce yet another layer of expense and complexity.  I don't use one at my exchange but I am quite careful about my username, password, access methods, etc.

Most importantly, I do consider the funds I have at my exchange to be disposable.  I consider the risk from incompetence, dishonesty, and government intervention to put the assets I have at my exchange at risk more than my authentication being compromised.  A good number of people would be well advised to NOT follow suite here.


The yubikey is the "something you have" in two-factor authentication. Even if Diablo was successfully phished for his password by a fake email, the yubikey credentials would also be needed in order to log in. Then there is a second passkey in the yubikey needed to execute trades. The answer is, unless MtGox is still deeply hacked and PwNd from the inside and the cracker is going after $60 accounts first, the yubikey requirement would have prevented an attacker from logging in and executing trades or withdraws.

Mtgox should have audit logging, and be able to see when the IP logged in and if they used Diablo's login. Ideally a log of the last several logins and IPs should be shown on your user account page too - gmail can even do this. If the hackers used Diablo's username and password, and it is long and hard to crack as Diablo indicates, then it isn't MtGox's fault, as Diablo's credentials were obtained some other way.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1000
DiabloMiner author
September 13, 2011, 10:04:02 PM
Was this a mtgox session hijack from the forum hack?  Were you logged into mtgox when the forum hack occurred?



That would be interesting if it was related.
legendary
Activity: 4760
Merit: 1283
September 13, 2011, 06:55:18 PM

Asking once again. Do you use a Yubikey on Mt.Gox?

As Ive said in the past, I do not believe that they improve security.

They do not prevent every kind of attack but they stop entire categories of attacks.  You are wrong on this one and should think about it a bit more. 

They stop entire categories of attacks which not everyone is especially prone to.  SSO is a nice to have and very worthwhile in a lot of cases, but it introduce yet another layer of expense and complexity.  I don't use one at my exchange but I am quite careful about my username, password, access methods, etc.

Most importantly, I do consider the funds I have at my exchange to be disposable.  I consider the risk from incompetence, dishonesty, and government intervention to put the assets I have at my exchange at risk more than my authentication being compromised.  A good number of people would be well advised to NOT follow suite here.
newbie
Activity: 47
Merit: 0
September 13, 2011, 05:48:07 PM
Was this a mtgox session hijack from the forum hack?  Were you logged into mtgox when the forum hack occurred?

legendary
Activity: 1008
Merit: 1001
Let the chips fall where they may.
September 13, 2011, 10:49:48 AM
Is there actually a browser that will remember a certificate and complain if that cert is replaced with a different valid CA-signed cert?

There is a browser plug-in that will do that: Certificate Patrol.
legendary
Activity: 1386
Merit: 1004
September 13, 2011, 07:57:19 AM
-a third party is engaging in a cyberwar against bitcoin using man in the middle attacks.

After a lengthy conversation with MagicTux, unless it does turn up that mtgox has been hacked, neither of us can figure out what happened. Its obviously not me and I didn't fall for a phishing expedition, and Im pretty sure its not on his end. His description of security on the new post-hack mtgox is pretty decent. Its not perfect, but he has gone to great lengths to prevent a repeat.

Even if they dumped the password database, the passwords are sufficiently salted and hashed that it is extremely unlikely they grabbed my password first.

I also do not think it is likely the recent DigiNotar or Globalsign break ins have produced SSL certs to attack mtgox with (which WOULD explain this) because mtgox uses EV certs and as far as I know none of the fake certs were for EV, but DigiNotar and Globalsign both DO issue EV certs. Although I am not ruling this out.

DigiNotar knew about the break in for months, and I obviously have logged in since then.

Tux has replaced the missing BTC.

Asking once again. Do you use a Yubikey on Mt.Gox?

As Ive said in the past, I do not believe that they improve security.

They do not prevent every kind of attack but they stop entire categories of attacks.  You are wrong on this one and should think about it a bit more. 
full member
Activity: 406
Merit: 100
September 13, 2011, 07:52:14 AM
repeat with me, mtgox is not bitcoin

Not yet, they are trying to register it as a trademark though - have fun paying them license fees just to use the name!
Proof:
http://esearch.oami.europa.eu/copla/trademark/data/010103646

This is exactly what reputable and forthright companies would do. Roll Eyes
legendary
Activity: 1666
Merit: 1057
Marketing manager - GO MP
September 13, 2011, 07:51:32 AM
Probably radiation (Fukishima? Cosmic?) effected the ram, flipped a bit and the account ID that was being liquidated happen to be Diablo's (and others in the past since the Fukishima incident).
Possibly

http://xkcd.com/378/
full member
Activity: 182
Merit: 100
September 13, 2011, 07:43:04 AM
Probably radiation (Fukishima? Cosmic?) effected the ram, flipped a bit and the account ID that was being liquidated happen to be Diablo's (and others in the past since the Fukishima incident).
legendary
Activity: 2618
Merit: 1007
September 13, 2011, 06:10:34 AM
repeat with me, mtgox is not bitcoin

Not yet, they are trying to register it as a trademark though - have fun paying them license fees just to use the name!
Proof:
http://esearch.oami.europa.eu/copla/trademark/data/010103646
hero member
Activity: 630
Merit: 500
September 13, 2011, 05:11:30 AM
The problem is you DONT need to accept the cert since its signed by a CA. Thats why this was so dangerous. All you need is someone at Tux's ISP juping the traffic and bam

It shouldn't be that easy to be in the middle of the traffic like that. Unless you were using Tor or any similar kind of proxy. Were you?
legendary
Activity: 1148
Merit: 1001
Radix-The Decentralized Finance Protocol
September 13, 2011, 05:01:15 AM
It seems MtGox blocked about 2,000 accounts so that their trades still showed up but were not actually executed,

Yes, I read MagicalTux chat explanations. But I think the explanation is lacking. How does a user manage to create an order that does not get executed but still shows in the data? Is this normal at MtGox?

Without more information Im guessing it might be a bug more than a hack, but the explanation he has given is lacking (as you already said).

Quote
opperating with alededly stolen funds & Bitcoins with the intent to seriously disrupt the market, why wasn't there a MtGox warning that their data was going to be completely off - people make trading decisions based on this

What now happens to the funds & Btc now locked down at MtGox, how much is this worth, if they were stolen from MyBitCoin will they be expropriated & returned for additional refund to clients there

Far too little information comes out of MtGox about these constant shenanigans - I guess that the OP also gets a free MtGox Yubi key as well as his Btc back
donator
Activity: 3108
Merit: 1166
September 13, 2011, 04:46:40 AM
Sorry if this is a bit offtopic, but does anyone has a propper explanation of what happen at MtGox on Sunday with the ghost trades? The technical explanations Ive heard until now dont seem to make much sense.

It seems MtGox blocked about 2,000 accounts so that their trades still showed up but were not actually executed, opperating with alededly stolen funds & Bitcoins with the intent to seriously disrupt the market, why wasn't there a MtGox warning that their data was going to be completely off - people make trading decisions based on this

What now happens to the funds & Btc now locked down at MtGox, how much is this worth, if they were stolen from MyBitCoin will they be expropriated & returned for additional refund to clients there

Far too little information comes out of MtGox about these constant shenanigans - I guess that the OP also gets a free MtGox Yubi key as well as his Btc back
hero member
Activity: 686
Merit: 500
Wat
legendary
Activity: 1148
Merit: 1001
Radix-The Decentralized Finance Protocol
September 13, 2011, 03:35:41 AM
Sorry if this is a bit offtopic, but does anyone has a propper explanation of what happen at MtGox on Sunday with the ghost trades? The technical explanations Ive heard until now dont seem to make much sense.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1000
DiabloMiner author
September 13, 2011, 03:32:15 AM
It's possible with the recent security lapses at certificate authorities (a la comodohacker) that someone, for some period of time, was able to do a csrf / mitm attack, no?

This is what I implied earlier. It is, in fact, possible. Just very unlikely.
sr. member
Activity: 322
Merit: 251
September 13, 2011, 03:30:34 AM
It's possible with the recent security lapses at certificate authorities (a la comodohacker) that someone, for some period of time, was able to do a csrf / mitm attack, no?

[Edit: Should have read 3 posts further, I guess I'll leave my original reply, lol.]
mrb
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 1028
September 13, 2011, 03:24:45 AM
Mozilla is considering pinning keys on first site access. So the only way to MITM false certs is during the first access (which makes it same to ssh's flaw on server fingerprint (aka ~/.ssh/known_hosts)).

I would love it  Kiss The only way to provide this sort of pinning with any browser is to delete all trusted CAs before browsing any HTTPS site.
Pages:
Jump to: