A simple collision would not gain you very much. You would need a collision with an already used address or otherwise you would not be able to cause any harm or profit anything from it. This is why the Birthday attack does not help you here.
Since such threads pop up every once in a while: I always find it funny how people tend to overestimate the probability of some extremely rare event.
Good points, but it's not so much the worry about a rare event, but about whether someone can, with sufficient devoition and accessible means,
cause the event. If people just generate keys as needed, that's no big deal; the question, rather, is how much damage someone can do if they deliberately generate as many keys as possible, optimizing the hardware/software specifically for this application.
Some further related worries:
1) The collision calculations assume effectively random selection of addresses. If there's any correlation between how bitcoin clients choose addresses, the collision probability is much higher. How does the main client ensure high-quality randomness?
2) Is every value from 0 to 2^160 really usable as an ECDSA public key? I mean, with RSA, you can't just pick any ol' 4096-bit number as your public key modulus: it has to be the product of two "big", "high-quality", "compatible" semi-primes (though I don't know how much this collapses the keyspace). Can I securely use 1 as much bitcoin public key?
3) Aren't these keypairs the same as those used in any application of 160-bit ECDSA? Meaning that any user of a 160-bit ECDSA keypair -- not just those who use it for bitcoin -- represents a potential collision? Meaning that we have to worry not just about Bitcoiners using up the keyspace, but Bitcoiners plus every other user of that signature algorithm that's 160-bit?