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Topic: Quantum Computing and Bitcoin - page 3. (Read 1122 times)

full member
Activity: 135
Merit: 178
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November 25, 2018, 04:51:56 AM
#9
I think if we are at the point in technology that a QC can be made that can break SHA256 in a relatively trivial manner

Wrong; quantum computers need to run for 2^80 steps to find a private key mapping to a given 160 bit public key. That will remain infeasible for decades to come.

however the threat of QC is 51% attack, not directly breaking the key-pairs but while cryptographers think in probability space (2^80) of breaking something secure (in theory), there are Cryptanalysis methods out there to find shortcuts (in practice) and decrease the steps they need to pass:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis

the most important point of failure that I see in asymmetric encryption is running a Random Function in key generation stage. providing real randomness is one of the hardest problems that I ever seen - because what you think is random at first sight, in fact carries a hidden pattern inside. so most of the time random number generation is where Cryptanalysis begin their job from.
legendary
Activity: 1000
Merit: 1120
November 25, 2018, 03:34:35 AM
#8
I think if we are at the point in technology that a QC can be made that can break SHA256 in a relatively trivial manner

Wrong; quantum computers need to run for 2^80 steps to find a private key mapping to a given 160 bit public key. That will remain infeasible for decades to come.
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1828
November 25, 2018, 02:04:16 AM
#7
ECDSA/secp256k1 is quantum-resistance as long as it's public key isn't known, which means users should be fine as long as they never re-use their Bitcoin address and Quantum computer isn't fast enough to find out it's private key before the transaction got confirmed/fully propagated to all nodes.

But there are proposal to use cryptographic signature which is quantum resistant, even though AFAIK there's huge trade-off such as far larger signature size and longer verification time.

I think if we are at the point in technology that a QC can be made that can break SHA256 in a relatively trivial manner, "ordinary computers" and network technology will be at the point that a larger signature size wouldn't be a problem either. Or are we still going to be fretting that someone's raspberry pi that they bought in 2009 should still be able to run a full node while only connecting with a 56K modem?
legendary
Activity: 2870
Merit: 7490
Crypto Swap Exchange
November 25, 2018, 01:43:07 AM
#6
ECDSA/secp256k1 is quantum-resistance as long as it's public key isn't known, which means users should be fine as long as they never re-use their Bitcoin address and Quantum computer isn't fast enough to find out it's private key before the transaction got confirmed/fully propagated to all nodes.

But there are proposal to use cryptographic signature which is quantum resistant, even though AFAIK there's huge trade-off such as far larger signature size and longer verification time.
jr. member
Activity: 118
Merit: 3
November 24, 2018, 08:35:23 PM
#5
I
If Quantum Computing is released into the wild and starts to attack bitcoin , what measures would we see to mitigate these attacks?

Hope some miners can also get a quantum computer to compete with mining and switch to an algorithm for the keys that would take the QC longer than it's expected Quantum decoherence time by a factor of billions upon billions.

What if the government controls the Quantum computer , and there isn't anyone to fight back? Would that spell the end of Bitcoin? And if there is , would it be necessary to move to QC resistant cryptography?

Back to the drawing board. If any entity gets control of 51% of the mining and there is no way to wrest back control, then Bitcoin is insecure and virtually worthless.

if this did happen and bitcoin did bring down the banks , so there is no "currency" system , i wonder what would come next.
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1828
November 24, 2018, 08:26:20 PM
#4
I
If Quantum Computing is released into the wild and starts to attack bitcoin , what measures would we see to mitigate these attacks?

Hope some miners can also get a quantum computer to compete with mining and switch to an algorithm for the keys that would take the QC longer than it's expected Quantum decoherence time by a factor of billions upon billions.

What if the government controls the Quantum computer , and there isn't anyone to fight back? Would that spell the end of Bitcoin? And if there is , would it be necessary to move to QC resistant cryptography?

Back to the drawing board. If any entity gets control of 51% of the mining and there is no way to wrest back control, then Bitcoin is insecure and virtually worthless.
jr. member
Activity: 118
Merit: 3
November 24, 2018, 08:18:15 PM
#3
I
If Quantum Computing is released into the wild and starts to attack bitcoin , what measures would we see to mitigate these attacks?

Hope some miners can also get a quantum computer to compete with mining and switch to an algorithm for the keys that would take the QC longer than it's expected Quantum decoherence time by a factor of billions upon billions.

What if the government controls the Quantum computer , and there isn't anyone to fight back? Would that spell the end of Bitcoin? And if there is , would it be necessary to move to QC resistant cryptography?
legendary
Activity: 1806
Merit: 1828
November 24, 2018, 08:09:56 PM
#2
Hope some miners can also get a quantum computer to compete with mining and switch to an algorithm for the keys that would take the QC longer than it's expected Quantum decoherence time by a factor of billions upon billions.
jr. member
Activity: 118
Merit: 3
November 24, 2018, 07:50:01 PM
#1
If Quantum Computing is released into the wild and starts to attack bitcoin , what measures would we see to mitigate these attacks?
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