No, for nascent shitcoins there's no debate. Because the incentives to attack those chains would potentially be MORE compared to the cost of attacking it.
Every cryptocurrency is potentially profitable to attack, because there might be people benefiting from reversing transactions, or destroying the network altogether. There may be in bitcoin. Sure, there are legitimate users, and sure there's an order of magnitude greater incentive to protect the network, but there might be an equivalently potential incentive to attack it. 
Topic: risk of centralization of bitcoin. - page 2. (Read 530 times)
No organization engages in any behavior that does not benefit it. And if that behavior is too costly, why would they do it?
It may not be the "organization" itself that does something damaging to itself willingly. They may be forced into it which is always a risk. For example we know MARA pool which is located in United States is a pool that complies with what US regime dictates and actively censors transactions that they are ordered to. Imagine if MARA pool had a much bigger hashrate or multiple pools were located in one jurisdiction complying with what the dictatorships tell them to do... 
Your point is well-made. Concentrating mining power is a red flag. What if a few large guys cheat? 51% assault, etc. Fearsome, huh? That's like poking your hand in a swarm. You may get honey or stung, but it won't be fun. The Bitcoin community won't rest. People are considering protocol tweaks to discourage centralization. Heard of P2Pool? The power is distributed in this decentralised mining pool that anyone can join. The proof-of-work model's hardware dependence is also being debated, but that's another issue
The 51% attack will never be executed on Bitcoin network, not in million years as there will never be any organization which will be able to get a control of 51% Bitcoin mining hashpower.
And it's not just the challenge of obtaining the hashpower to do it. It's also about the game theory and incentivisation. There's always a greater incentive to secure the network than there is to attack it. If you invested money in all that hardware, you'd find it far more lucrative to use your ASICs to gain block rewards and tx fees than to destroy the network and have a bunch of expensive space-heaters.
No organization engages in any behavior that does not benefit it. And if that behavior is too costly, why would they do it? And you wouldn't go the other way if it gives you more return to benefit from it. I've never worried about that, and that question will be asked from time to time, and we'll never see it happen.
The idea of such an attack goes against the logic of bitcoin and what it wants to do. Probably, while it was originally designed, the possibility of such an attack was considered today, and it was calculated that the thought of this attack would become more difficult day by day.
The 51% attack will never be executed on Bitcoin network, not in million years as there will never be any organization which will be able to get a control of 51% Bitcoin mining hashpower.
And it's not just the challenge of obtaining the hashpower to do it. It's also about the game theory and incentivisation. There's always a greater incentive to secure the network than there is to attack it. If you invested money in all that hardware, you'd find it far more lucrative to use your ASICs to gain block rewards and tx fees than to destroy the network and have a bunch of expensive space-heaters.
What where those "other cryptocurrencies"?
Ethereum classic, Bitcoin Gold, Verge, Feathercoin, Litecoin Cash, probably more.
I believe 51% attacks towards those networks would require the attacker considerably less resources than they would if they attacked a POW giant such as Bitcoin.
Obviously, but it's a matter of numbers from that point on. You could argue that no sane person would attack the other cryptocurrencies either, but they were attacked. This is evidence that the game theory is only partially correct. It's correct as long as the incentives to protect are greater than to attack; you can't be 100% certain that will last forever.
No, for nascent shitcoins there's no debate. Because the incentives to attack those chains would potentially be MORE compared to the cost of attacking it. Why be honest if attacking it gives more incentives? In Bitcoin, if it pays more to be honest, then there's no point in attacking it.
The game theory fully works.
what are the potential ethical issues and challenges arising from the increasing centralization of mining power and wealth in very few dominant mining pools in the Bitcoin network and what can the bitcoin community do? what measures can be taken to maintain decentralization of the network while addressing these concerns?
like the risk of 51% attack when big pools have more power, etc.
If a 51% is successfully carried out, the miner could have the ability to modify the blockchains' history. In this event, it would render the entire validity of Bitcoin as questionable. This would have a monumental effect on Bitcoin, as the fact that its data has been maintained since its inception is one of the things that make it so valuable in so many ways; use-case, technology, trust in concept strength. These value propositions being weakened or questioned would not be good for Bitcoin.
Though on a lighter note, the likelihood of this happening? Unlikely. When was the last time 51% of the world's power pushed all of their efforts in order to gain collective control? It's one thing to have the idea, but achieving it is much different. If it were to be If it were to ever be achieved at this point, then some countries who might not get along will have to get along, peace might be somewhat restored in the world. That would be a good sacrifice for Bitcoin to lose its credibility - but even then, I don't think it would just go away. Better solutions will exist and Bitcoin will have served its purpose of achieving a balance between people and power...
...
...
that is, if the other 49% don't start a war over the effect that 51% had over the changes to Bitcoin's ledger.
So to conduct a 51% attack right now you need, what?
- 51% dominance over resources being put toward Bitcoin
- A political plan that would not cause war OR an arsenal ready for the retaliation of effected countries (unless suicide is on the table, I don't think Russia or the USA have this kind of power, or they would have pursued already).
Computing probability of the above ... ... ... 1%. I'd have said 0%, though the 1% is needed for insurance on my opinion
What where those "other cryptocurrencies"?
Ethereum classic, Bitcoin Gold, Verge, Feathercoin, Litecoin Cash, probably more.I believe 51% attacks towards those networks would require the attacker considerably less resources than they would if they attacked a POW giant such as Bitcoin.
Obviously, but it's a matter of numbers from that point on. You could argue that no sane person would attack the other cryptocurrencies either, but they were attacked. This is evidence that the game theory is only partially correct. It's correct as long as the incentives to protect are greater than to attack; you can't be 100% certain that will last forever. You were right that based on the last 6 months has rate distribution then Foundry USA 31.61%(8,375 mined blocks) and AntPool 21.24%(5,626 mined blocks) but in the last 2 years distribution AntPool 15.79%(25,178 mined blocks) and Foundry USA 7.50%(11,957 mined blocks)
Sure, but present is what matters, and at the moment only 2-3 pools dominate. 
but it was way back when the hash rates were low compared to now.
Yes, but even now, there are like two pools which produce most of the work; Foundry USA and Antpool; 52.04% of the total hashrate there. That isn't progress.https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/charts/pools-timeseries
And the reason for this in my opinion is mainly due to the restrictions from Chinese government for bitcoin mining operations so the miners were moved to where they can make money. So I just assume he mining landscape is dynamic and can change over time.
But the fact is the there is no incentive to the miners if they become malicious
How can you be so certain? The numerous 51% attacks in other such cryptocurrencies should have already convinced you that the game theory is only partly correct. but it was way back when the hash rates were low compared to now.
Yes, but even now, there are like two pools which produce most of the work; Foundry USA and Antpool; 52.04% of the total hashrate there. That isn't progress.But the fact is the there is no incentive to the miners if they become malicious
How can you be so certain? The numerous 51% attacks in other such cryptocurrencies should have already convinced you that the game theory is only partly correct.
What where those "other cryptocurrencies"? Nascent POW shitcoins? I believe 51% attacks towards those networks would require the attacker considerably less resources than they would if they attacked a POW giant such as Bitcoin. Would Foundry USA and Antpool really risk everything just to attempt a double spend?
but it was way back when the hash rates were low compared to now.
Yes, but even now, there are like two pools which produce most of the work; Foundry USA and Antpool; 52.04% of the total hashrate there. That isn't progress.But the fact is the there is no incentive to the miners if they become malicious
How can you be so certain? The numerous 51% attacks in other such cryptocurrencies should have already convinced you that the game theory is only partly correct. 
That's true. But i expect some miners consider if pool use hashrate for malicious purpose, that pool might might cheat on them as well.
Definitely. Pools are rational actors as well, as much as the miners and they would gain more in the long term by being honest. This is the presumption that miners make and are thus unwilling to switch pools even if it nears 51%. Besides, a good bulk of the hashrate for the pools are associated with large farms, which could very well be given a discount for choosing their pools over the others. I wouldn't say it's already too late since the damage could be reduced if miner switch to different pool. Certain attack such as 51% require some time and could be stopped/slowed before it specific amount of block re-org.
Yeah, but it's not like there are other option which offer both decentralization and combining miners hashrate. And with 5% of Monero miner use P2Pool, it shows it's not bad idea attempt to revive P2Pool (for Bitcoin).
Depends on how easy it is to detect, but generally it would go undetected until real harm is done and the inertia for miners to switch pool would only gain traction then. P2Pool is okay, but there is definitely a good reason why it isn't used. Namely how much variance affects payout, favours small pools, etc. Yeah, but it's not like there are other option which offer both decentralization and combining miners hashrate. And with 5% of Monero miner use P2Pool, it shows it's not bad idea attempt to revive P2Pool (for Bitcoin).
The 51% attack will never be executed on Bitcoin network, not in million years as there will never be any organization which will be able to get a control of 51% Bitcoin mining hashpower.
I mean, that's a very arrogant stance to have. First of all, there has been a time in history when a pool owned more than 50% of the hashrate. It quickly tried to get rid of it, and did, but there was. Second, why will it never be executed? What makes you so sure that there will never be an incentive to attack the network? How come other cryptos have been attacked?Deepbit in 2011 - https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/deepbit-at-about-49-26656
BTCGuild in 2013 - https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/danger-51-attack-possibility-152296
GHash.IO in 2014 - https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/2014-06-09-ghash-nears-51-apples-change-of-heart-facebook-approves-a-dogec-645056
There are the times that mining pools had over 51% hashrate but they never turned into malicious ones but it proves that 51% is not impossible at all but it was way back when the hash rates were low compared to now. But the fact is the there is no incentive to the miners if they become malicious but have to keep operating it buy burning billions to keep the attack on the network which makes it no one really would do that with the motive of money.
In short, i would suggest these idea which could majorly reduce risk of ms-use of hashrate by pool,
1. Revive P2Pool which is decentralized pool.
2. Encourage miner to keep up-to-date with Bitcoin news and prepare switch to different pool anytime in case certain mining pool doing something malicious.
Miners don't really care, at least the large ones. I've had a small farm at one point in time and switching pools took a good amount of time, especially if the webui isn't very intuitive. They probably don't want to have to deal with the hassle of going into every one of the machines and changing the pools for no good reason.1. Revive P2Pool which is decentralized pool.
2. Encourage miner to keep up-to-date with Bitcoin news and prepare switch to different pool anytime in case certain mining pool doing something malicious.
That's true. But i expect some miners consider if pool use hashrate for malicious purpose, that pool might might cheat on them as well.
If anything malicious can be detected, it is already too late.
I wouldn't say it's already too late since the damage could be reduced if miner switch to different pool. Certain attack such as 51% require some time and could be stopped/slowed before it specific amount of block re-org.
P2Pool is just not really that good.
Yeah, but it's not like there are other option which offer both decentralization and combining miners hashrate. And with 5% of Monero miner use P2Pool, it shows it's not bad idea attempt to revive P2Pool (for Bitcoin).
what are the potential ethical issues and challenges arising from the increasing centralization of mining power and wealth in very few dominant mining pools in the Bitcoin network and what can the bitcoin community do? what measures can be taken to maintain decentralization of the network while addressing these concerns?
like the risk of 51% attack when big pools have more power, etc.
They could try, but network participants are incentivized to be honest. If an entity gains 51% of the hashing power and decides to censor "some transactions" or do some double spends, don't you think that it's merely wasting the resources spent on the network? Because the community, given a live or die situation, could actually come into consensus to hard fork the network and exclude the bad miner.
Contrastingly, if the bad actors mined honestly instead, they would be rewarded in Bitcoin.
I wouldn't say they don't care, instead they probably see the risk as being small enough to neglect, which is not wrong either the risk is not the biggest. But if that chances and they feel the threat as being big enough that can damage their "investment" they do care and specially the big ones because they have more at stake. If you think about it, a successful attack on bitcoin will harm those who have more money invested in bitcoin and bitcoin mining.
In fact we saw how much miners care when they feel the risk rising about 7 years ago when ghash.io grew too big that they controlled more than 50% of the hashrate. Miners did make the effort and started switching pool and left their service to reduce the risk.
The timing matters too, and BTCGuild adopted more of a preemptive approach as compared to Ghash.io which only released statements after crossing the threshold. As much as I can remember, they didn't really end up adopting any measures to dissuade miners from mining on their pool and miners had to leave willingly. The key reason for people to leave was mainly the fact that there was a bout of DDOS attack with tons of downtime shortly thereafter. Correct me if I'm wrong though.In fact we saw how much miners care when they feel the risk rising about 7 years ago when ghash.io grew too big that they controlled more than 50% of the hashrate. Miners did make the effort and started switching pool and left their service to reduce the risk.
Pools and miners should care, but it felt like miners were still joining and increasing the hashrate at GHash.io during that period of time and the switching of pools in response to that threat wasn't particularly significant or was just plain slow.
The 51% attack will never be executed on Bitcoin network, not in million years as there will never be any organization which will be able to get a control of 51% Bitcoin mining hashpower.
I mean, that's a very arrogant stance to have. First of all, there has been a time in history when a pool owned more than 50% of the hashrate. It quickly tried to get rid of it, and did, but there was. Second, why will it never be executed? What makes you so sure that there will never be an incentive to attack the network? How come other cryptos have been attacked? Miners don't really care, at least the large ones.
I wouldn't say they don't care, instead they probably see the risk as being small enough to neglect, which is not wrong either the risk is not the biggest. But if that chances and they feel the threat as being big enough that can damage their "investment" they do care and specially the big ones because they have more at stake. If you think about it, a successful attack on bitcoin will harm those who have more money invested in bitcoin and bitcoin mining.In fact we saw how much miners care when they feel the risk rising about 7 years ago when ghash.io grew too big that they controlled more than 50% of the hashrate. Miners did make the effort and started switching pool and left their service to reduce the risk.
The 51% attack will never be executed on Bitcoin network, not in million years as there will never be any organization which will be able to get a control of 51% Bitcoin mining hashpower. There is no need of halting the process and anyone thinking about doing that is simply wasting their time in my honest opinion. Also, their resources. And even if the mining pool decide to do an attack on the Bitcoin network, they will simply lose their business and revenue. So nah, not possible.
As for centralisation, it is also possible, but we can see that it is distributed across, from US to Asia and even to some remote region in Russia and Europe. So again, it is present, but not seeing that it will disrupt the ecosystem.
It is still not ideal as mentioned above. I believe others already said it better, but you don't want to make miners concentrated in one or two countries. I think some people are trying to discourage this by encouraging miners to move to other countries, but that is not ideal since every miner's condition is different. At the end of the day, they are doing that for profit. I guess the worst scenario would be a huge decrease in hash rate and then a period of slow confirmation if something terrible happened to miners due to regulation. Jump to: