Topic: Russia retreats from Syria (Read 3258 times)
I think its a good decision from Russia.other countries forces should also retreat from Syria.If they really want to do something good for the people of Syria,they should support their government morally and financially,and make them strong enough to sought this problem out on their own.
The Russian jets are still bombing the ISIS and Al Nusra positions in Eastern and Northern Syria. Russia reduced the size of its contingent, and that is it. There was no "retreat" or withdrawal.
C'mon, author of this nonsense is a member of AKP, most likely. What else would you expect from IS lover?Yeah... the Turks are pretty much pissed at Russia right now. Their wet dream of establishing the "Greater Turania" is now in tatters, after the Russians chased out Turkmen barbarians from Latakia and Idlib. The Azeris are getting their asses kicked by the Armenians. The so called "Turkic" Central Asian countries are shifting away from the orbit of Ankara. The only good news for Erdoğan is his blooming romance with Angela Merkel.
The Russian jets are still bombing the ISIS and Al Nusra positions in Eastern and Northern Syria. Russia reduced the size of its contingent, and that is it. There was no "retreat" or withdrawal.
C'mon, author of this nonsense is a member of AKP, most likely. What else would you expect from IS lover? 
The Syrian Civil War: An Interim Balance Sheet
By Prof. Efraim InbarApril 6, 2016Syria War Homs
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 338, April 6, 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The desire of the international community to end the Syrian civil war is offset by the inability of any individual party to enforce its preferred solution. The conflict, which is likely to continue for some time, has solidified the centrality of Russia and Iran in regional affairs. Israel’s options are limited.
Intensified diplomatic efforts by the international community to put an end to the civil war in Syria are unlikely to reach a political long-term arrangement before the warring parties are exhausted by the conflict. It is often weariness that brings armed conflicts to a close, rather than a promising political solution offered by a disinterested mediator or international conference.
Significantly, no protagonist seems to have overwhelming power to enforce its preferred solution. The Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, tried to unseat Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the ally of Shiite Iran, but displayed weakness that was exploited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. Even American aid to the Sunni rebels was ineffective. The much feared Islamic State (IS), born as a result of the disintegration of Iraq and Syria, was not strong enough to tackle the Assad regime successfully. The Russian military intervention was able to strengthen Assad's grip over parts of Syria, but was not enough to restore his rule over the entire country.
This means that Syria will remain divided among several warring factions for some time to come. The fractured country will continue to be an arena in which local chiefs will try to expand their areas of control and in which outsiders will compete for influence. Fluidity and ambiguity will continue to characterize the arena.
This equivocal situation is producing winners and losers, but it is Iran that is emerging with the upper hand. Assad is still in power, which means Tehran retains its clout in Damascus, a former capital of an Arab empire. Damascus is also the linchpin to Beirut, where the Shiite Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, exercises effective power. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has amplified the threat perception of IS in the West, making Iran a potential ally in western attempts to curb radical Sunni Islamists. Such perceptions also help Iran strengthen its control over Iraq. Iran has been successful in preserving the Shiite corridor, a key objective in its quest for hegemony in the Middle East and for projecting force further away.
Russia emerged as a beneficiary of the lingering Syrian crisis even before its military intervention in September 2015. It was successful in providing the diplomatic mechanism that enabled Obama to renege on his ultimatum against Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and has effectively defended the Assad regime at international fora. The Russian intervention on Assad's behalf also signaled that Moscow is a reliable ally, a message that resonates well among the political elites of the Middle East and beyond.
In addition, Russia preserved its strategic assets on the Syrian coast in the eastern Mediterranean after investing for years in the build-up of its Mediterranean flotilla. Russia, a large energy producer with global interests, has also maintained the exploration rights to the potential gas findings along the Syrian coast—a part of the rich Levant Basin.
In contrast, the Syrian turmoil provided plenty of proof that the US, under Obama, is not adept at dealing with Middle East realities. One early example was the Obama administration's initial inclination to try to engage foes, such as Syria (and Iran). A defining moment of American weakness was the retreat from threats to use force against Assad for crossing the chemical weapons red line (August 2012).
The American campaign against IS has provided additional evidence about the retreat of American power in the Middle East. In August 2014, after a confused and long decision-making process, the US concluded that the territorial conquests of IS are evolving into a significant threat to American interests and ordered its air force to raid installations of IS in Syria (and Iraq). Unfortunately, the gap between the goals and the capabilities of the US and its allies bolstered IS's dual message about the weakness of the decadent West and its own invincibility. By the beginning of 2016, the war against IS appeared stalemated. The US failed to induce local actors to cooperate effectively against it, and the limited air campaign has been insufficient.
In contrast, it was Russian air support that secured a victory for Assad against IS (the March 2016 conquest of Palmyra). The Russian intervention underscored American passivity even as it elicited dismissive statements by Obama, who called it a quagmire for Russian forces and absolved himself of the need to take any action. Obama did not specify how he would respond to Russian aircraft targeting US-supported rebel factions in the civil war other than to underline that the US would not directly confront Moscow. The tacit expectation that Syria would turn into a Vietnam or Afghanistan experience for Russia turned out to be unfounded.
Turkey appears to be at a loss after several years of futile support for Syrian rebels. The destabilization of Syria has underscored Turkey's long porous border, which exposes the country to terrorist attacks. At the same time, the influx of a multitude of refugees fleeing the mayhem has exacted an economic price on Ankara. Turkey’s crucial support for IS has been gradually revealed, the full diplomatic cost of which remains to be seen.
While Turkey has shown itself ready to confront Iran by proxies in Syria, underscoring the Sunni-Shiite fault lines and the regional Persian-Turkish rivalry, that readiness may well precipitate Iranian support for Kurdish militias, which constitutes a national security threat. Turkey also miscalculated in November 2015 by shooting down a Russian fighter, an action that triggered a deterioration in Turkey's strategic position by reviving the Ottoman-Russian historical enmity.
In addition, Turkey's Syrian policy has had the unintended consequence of empowering the most virulently anti-Turkish Kurdish elements. These Kurds have achieved a measure of autonomy in several regions in northern Syria, and have earned some Western support thanks to their effectiveness against IS. Still, the limited self-rule the Kurds have established, and the international attention they have attracted to their cause, will not be enough for state-building. For them to achieve full autonomy, they will have to overcome internal discord and their lack of territorial contiguity.
Israel continues to be a spectator as the Syrian tragedy unfolds, with occasional pinpoint interventions when immediate national security interests are at stake. The disappearance of the Syrian military threat to Israel is not, of course, inimical to its interests. But the entrenchment of Iran in Damascus, with substantial Russian help, constitutes a critical national security threat to Israel, because it strengthens the radical axis led by Iran in a Middle East from which the US has largely retreated. The possibility of opening a new front on the Golan Heights is a secondary issue that also needs the attention of the Israeli military.
The Syrian arena provides Israel with diplomatic opportunities to nourish relationships with reluctant actors. Jerusalem must work under the assumption that Syria cannot easily be fixed and that conflict is likely to continue. Israel’s interactions within its strategic environment are inherently limited. The use of force, often inevitable in our neighborhood, must be carefully calibrated in light of domestic and international constraints.
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/syrian-civil-war-interim-balance-sheet/
By Prof. Efraim InbarApril 6, 2016Syria War Homs
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 338, April 6, 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The desire of the international community to end the Syrian civil war is offset by the inability of any individual party to enforce its preferred solution. The conflict, which is likely to continue for some time, has solidified the centrality of Russia and Iran in regional affairs. Israel’s options are limited.
Intensified diplomatic efforts by the international community to put an end to the civil war in Syria are unlikely to reach a political long-term arrangement before the warring parties are exhausted by the conflict. It is often weariness that brings armed conflicts to a close, rather than a promising political solution offered by a disinterested mediator or international conference.
Significantly, no protagonist seems to have overwhelming power to enforce its preferred solution. The Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, tried to unseat Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the ally of Shiite Iran, but displayed weakness that was exploited by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah. Even American aid to the Sunni rebels was ineffective. The much feared Islamic State (IS), born as a result of the disintegration of Iraq and Syria, was not strong enough to tackle the Assad regime successfully. The Russian military intervention was able to strengthen Assad's grip over parts of Syria, but was not enough to restore his rule over the entire country.
This means that Syria will remain divided among several warring factions for some time to come. The fractured country will continue to be an arena in which local chiefs will try to expand their areas of control and in which outsiders will compete for influence. Fluidity and ambiguity will continue to characterize the arena.
This equivocal situation is producing winners and losers, but it is Iran that is emerging with the upper hand. Assad is still in power, which means Tehran retains its clout in Damascus, a former capital of an Arab empire. Damascus is also the linchpin to Beirut, where the Shiite Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, exercises effective power. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has amplified the threat perception of IS in the West, making Iran a potential ally in western attempts to curb radical Sunni Islamists. Such perceptions also help Iran strengthen its control over Iraq. Iran has been successful in preserving the Shiite corridor, a key objective in its quest for hegemony in the Middle East and for projecting force further away.
Russia emerged as a beneficiary of the lingering Syrian crisis even before its military intervention in September 2015. It was successful in providing the diplomatic mechanism that enabled Obama to renege on his ultimatum against Assad’s use of chemical weapons, and has effectively defended the Assad regime at international fora. The Russian intervention on Assad's behalf also signaled that Moscow is a reliable ally, a message that resonates well among the political elites of the Middle East and beyond.
In addition, Russia preserved its strategic assets on the Syrian coast in the eastern Mediterranean after investing for years in the build-up of its Mediterranean flotilla. Russia, a large energy producer with global interests, has also maintained the exploration rights to the potential gas findings along the Syrian coast—a part of the rich Levant Basin.
In contrast, the Syrian turmoil provided plenty of proof that the US, under Obama, is not adept at dealing with Middle East realities. One early example was the Obama administration's initial inclination to try to engage foes, such as Syria (and Iran). A defining moment of American weakness was the retreat from threats to use force against Assad for crossing the chemical weapons red line (August 2012).
The American campaign against IS has provided additional evidence about the retreat of American power in the Middle East. In August 2014, after a confused and long decision-making process, the US concluded that the territorial conquests of IS are evolving into a significant threat to American interests and ordered its air force to raid installations of IS in Syria (and Iraq). Unfortunately, the gap between the goals and the capabilities of the US and its allies bolstered IS's dual message about the weakness of the decadent West and its own invincibility. By the beginning of 2016, the war against IS appeared stalemated. The US failed to induce local actors to cooperate effectively against it, and the limited air campaign has been insufficient.
In contrast, it was Russian air support that secured a victory for Assad against IS (the March 2016 conquest of Palmyra). The Russian intervention underscored American passivity even as it elicited dismissive statements by Obama, who called it a quagmire for Russian forces and absolved himself of the need to take any action. Obama did not specify how he would respond to Russian aircraft targeting US-supported rebel factions in the civil war other than to underline that the US would not directly confront Moscow. The tacit expectation that Syria would turn into a Vietnam or Afghanistan experience for Russia turned out to be unfounded.
Turkey appears to be at a loss after several years of futile support for Syrian rebels. The destabilization of Syria has underscored Turkey's long porous border, which exposes the country to terrorist attacks. At the same time, the influx of a multitude of refugees fleeing the mayhem has exacted an economic price on Ankara. Turkey’s crucial support for IS has been gradually revealed, the full diplomatic cost of which remains to be seen.
While Turkey has shown itself ready to confront Iran by proxies in Syria, underscoring the Sunni-Shiite fault lines and the regional Persian-Turkish rivalry, that readiness may well precipitate Iranian support for Kurdish militias, which constitutes a national security threat. Turkey also miscalculated in November 2015 by shooting down a Russian fighter, an action that triggered a deterioration in Turkey's strategic position by reviving the Ottoman-Russian historical enmity.
In addition, Turkey's Syrian policy has had the unintended consequence of empowering the most virulently anti-Turkish Kurdish elements. These Kurds have achieved a measure of autonomy in several regions in northern Syria, and have earned some Western support thanks to their effectiveness against IS. Still, the limited self-rule the Kurds have established, and the international attention they have attracted to their cause, will not be enough for state-building. For them to achieve full autonomy, they will have to overcome internal discord and their lack of territorial contiguity.
Israel continues to be a spectator as the Syrian tragedy unfolds, with occasional pinpoint interventions when immediate national security interests are at stake. The disappearance of the Syrian military threat to Israel is not, of course, inimical to its interests. But the entrenchment of Iran in Damascus, with substantial Russian help, constitutes a critical national security threat to Israel, because it strengthens the radical axis led by Iran in a Middle East from which the US has largely retreated. The possibility of opening a new front on the Golan Heights is a secondary issue that also needs the attention of the Israeli military.
The Syrian arena provides Israel with diplomatic opportunities to nourish relationships with reluctant actors. Jerusalem must work under the assumption that Syria cannot easily be fixed and that conflict is likely to continue. Israel’s interactions within its strategic environment are inherently limited. The use of force, often inevitable in our neighborhood, must be carefully calibrated in light of domestic and international constraints.
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, is professor emeritus of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family
http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/syrian-civil-war-interim-balance-sheet/
The Russian jets are still bombing the ISIS and Al Nusra positions in Eastern and Northern Syria. Russia reduced the size of its contingent, and that is it. There was no "retreat" or withdrawal. The Russians have reduced their role in Syria. On the other hand, they have requested Iran, Hezbollah, Syrian regime, and Iraqi Shiite militia to take a more pro-active role in the fighting.
Tactical retreat. It still has a big force inside Syria
check the font - a cheap zionist website
Killed a lot of innocent civilians, spoiled relations with the countries, devastated Russian economy.For what?
30.09.2015
Ohh, what a new news!
We all are waiting on pictures and videos af such damages!
Everyone at those days have a smartphone in pocket, where are the pictures and videos of so terrible acts? Names of victims?
Maybe they are existing only in the mouth of liars?
There is a peace agreement, who claimed to join to it and communicate, where are the postions of gunmans - no bombing at this address.
So, eat shit, dude, or put some New and with proofs news, not a zionist liars press.
but Russia is doing extremly good , they are truly fighting the terrorists unlike the US
Russia not fighting the terrorists. Russia
"In fact, Russia does not bomb ISIS. They are bombing the areas where the positions of the Free Syrian Army, to allow government troops to move and control more territory -. Said the Syrian opposition leader Yasser al-Haji -. If they bombed positions igil, they would have done in the area of the town of Marey, where ISIS managed to make significant progress. Now ISIS virtually surrounded Aleppo and cut his head. Russian fighting on the side of the regime, killing our soldiers and civilians. "
http://www.7kanal.co.il/News/News.aspx/179639
I think,Putin seems somewhat threatened (eg disconnection from the SWIFT system), and he suddenly announced the withdrawal of troops.
Killed a lot of innocent civilians, spoiled relations with the countries, devastated Russian economy.For what?
What the Western MSM does not write about is as telling as what they write.
Palmyra was liberated by the Syrian army with Russian aerial support. Russian mine-sweepers have come to Palmyra to remove tonnes of landmines left by the terrorists both in the partially destroyed historical complex and in the city. The way the city was trip-wired was highly professional. "Terrorists" installed mines in the roads, covered them with cement and then with new (!) asphalt - edge to edge.
The Western MSM remained silent about the whole Palmyra liberation, though...
Palmyra was liberated by the Syrian army with Russian aerial support. Russian mine-sweepers have come to Palmyra to remove tonnes of landmines left by the terrorists both in the partially destroyed historical complex and in the city. The way the city was trip-wired was highly professional. "Terrorists" installed mines in the roads, covered them with cement and then with new (!) asphalt - edge to edge.
The Western MSM remained silent about the whole Palmyra liberation, though...
yeah that was so professional , and I have no idea if they talked about it in the western media
but I can tell you that they are so mad because US couldn't do anything with its allies in Syria , they had many airstrikes with no good results
but Russia is doing extremly good , they are truly fighting the terrorists unlike the US
One azeri invader helicopter is shot yesterday in Karabakh Republik.
Do You consider USA forces in Turkey as foreghn invaders?
Do You consider USA forces in Turkey as foreghn invaders?
What the Western MSM does not write about is as telling as what they write.
Palmyra was liberated by the Syrian army with Russian aerial support. Russian mine-sweepers have come to Palmyra to remove tonnes of landmines left by the terrorists both in the partially destroyed historical complex and in the city. The way the city was trip-wired was highly professional. "Terrorists" installed mines in the roads, covered them with cement and then with new (!) asphalt - edge to edge.
The Western MSM remained silent about the whole Palmyra liberation, though...
Palmyra was liberated by the Syrian army with Russian aerial support. Russian mine-sweepers have come to Palmyra to remove tonnes of landmines left by the terrorists both in the partially destroyed historical complex and in the city. The way the city was trip-wired was highly professional. "Terrorists" installed mines in the roads, covered them with cement and then with new (!) asphalt - edge to edge.
The Western MSM remained silent about the whole Palmyra liberation, though...
After Syria i hope Russia doesn't make airstrikes on Azerbaijan.
Its good to know that Putin retreats from Syria, since some of his people died and many will continue to die if he didn't did this wise decision. Or maybe he will gonna take a revenge after planning again his actions.
After six months of special operations in Syria, a total of four Russian servicemen have lost their lives. Compare this to the thousands of casualties the NATO suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan. And remember that the NATO intervention in both these nations were complete failures, while the Russian intervention in Syria is enabling Assad to beat back the ISIS and the Al Nusra.
Its good to know that Putin retreats from Syria
LOL.
Where do You find this fake news? Eat shit, the Al Qaida + ISIS supporter.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1--yAJryto
Palmyra, Russian Cosmic-Spacial Forces
Its good to know that Putin retreats from Syria, since some of his people died and many will continue to die if he didn't did this wise decision. Or maybe he will gonna take a revenge after planning again his actions.
Islam Army takes decision for the date of land operation in Syria. When they come, what Russia will do?
How do You call salafi clowns? They are with hard troubles wit Quran. Fight on Asad is illegal under Quran.
Salafi are not muslims, they are mind controlling sect.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lcwnmyjogws
معركة تحرير تدمر ريف حمص سوريا
Liberation of Palmyra
Islam Army takes decision for the date of land operation in Syria. When they come, what Russia will do?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIo2JqO5VJI
Today will be a hot day.
And look at "reatreadet" Russian Air Forces
Today will be a hot day.
And look at "reatreadet" Russian Air Forces
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