Segwit is a 51% attack (aka a hard fork) solely because segwit coins have a different attack vector profile than non-segwit coins, making segwit coins non-fungible with regular bitcoins. Unless you can somehow objectively prove segwit coins are equally or more secure, but if you did it objectively, the result would probably be that the attack vector on segwit coins is higher, such as miners turning them to anyone can spend.
Segwit is not a hard fork, and a 51% attack is not a hard fork. Segwit is a soft fork. You can choose to not use segwit.
The anyone-can-spend vector is complete nonsense. Did you know that pay-to-script-hash was the same way? To old nodes, P2SH was "anyone-can-spend". Today there are individual P2SH addresses holding over a billion dollars worth of bitcoins by themselves. Sounds pretty solid to me. Stop the FUD! It's not helping anyone, segwit has already been activated (and that's a good thing).
You completely disregarded the issue of fungibility. Bitcoin is not fungible from the start, so people just ignore further issues that add to that problem, but it doesn't mean I'm not right. Your stance is that fungibility doesn't matter at all. Newsflash: it's not money in the first place unless it's fungible. If it's not fungible money, then all it is is a govt tracking and enslavement system.
If you would just create a new address for each transaction as was the original intention it would be fungible would it not?
As illustrated above, you are replying to somebody who misapplied the fungibility issue to FUD Segwit. That’s a totally nonsensical
non sequitur, like saying that gold will crash because I have a headache. (It is true that I currently have a headache, brought on by too much FUD.) Segwit transactions are equally secure as to old-style transactions—actually, before confirmation,
more secure due to Segwit’s tx malleability bugfix. The only people ascribing “taint” to Segwit transactions are BCH shills, most of whom don’t own any Bitcoin anyway.
To describe the fungibility issue in itself, and answer your question: You can create a new address for each transaction—you
should do that; and it helps with, but does not solve the problem. What is really needed is strong transaction
unlinkability, so that nobody can consider a coin to have “taint” based on its prior history. By analogy, consider a $100 bill being passed hand to hand: Your bank can’t close your account and blacklist you if you deposit a $20 bill which, unbeknownst to you, passed through the hands of a drug dealer, who gambled it with a bookie, who used it to hire a plumber, who bought a widget from you. Whereas some services such as Coinbase will do exactly that. (Quick solution: Don’t use Coinbase.)
Things like CoinJoin reduce the problem, by introducing confusion about which coins passed through whose hands. Confidential Transactions will really help. A sidechain with zerocoins would be great for fungibility. I also expect Lightning Network to substantially increase fungibility:
On Lightning, coins will rapidly pass through many different hands without ever leaving a mark on the blockchain; on a mass scale, this will break up the transactional links which some people use to “taint” coins. N.b. that Lightning is enabled by Segwit, depends on Segwit, and cannot be implemented by any forkcoin which lacks Segwit. CoinJoin will also get a big boost from Schnorr signatures, an upcoming technology which will be implemented via—you guessed it, Segwit!
Thus as you can see, the lying little insect self-identified as “realr0ach” was building a pernicious half-truth out of a problem which is real, but here irrelevant. Nobody is tainting Segwit coins. Nobody has any reason to, except for Roger, Jihan, and their idiotic sycophants.
Disclosure of interests: I am a privacy activist, and I lost a painful amount of money on a perfectly unlinkable, thus fungible altcoin; I can’t very well be accused of not caring about fungibility.