The incentives are what they are. Sure some miner can play the role of 'attacker', and include a transaction that takes an inordinate amount of time to validate. My claim is that incentives are aligned to render this a non-problem.
Riddle me this: built off a parent of the same block height, a miner is presented -- at roughly the same time:
1) an aberrant block that takes an inordinate amount of time to verify but is otherwise valid;
2) a 'normal' valid block that does not take an inordinate amount of time to verify; and
3) an invalid block.
Which of these three do you suppose that miner will choose to build the next round atop?
Your question is poorly constructed because you do not define what qualifies as an "inordinate amount of time to verify."
Riddle me this: built off a parent of the same block height, a miner is presented -- at roughly the same time:
1) an aberrant block that takes an inordinate amount of time (e.g., hour) to verify but is otherwise valid;
2) a 'normal' valid block that does not take an inordinate amount of time to verify; and
3) an invalid block.
Which of these three do you suppose that miner will choose to build the next round atop in order to maximize profit?
Another poorly constructed question demonstrating you lack the basic background required to pose interesting questions, much less form valid conclusions, on this topic.
If you paid attention during the Grand Schism you'd already know what in the context of 10 minute block targets constitutes an "inordinate amount of time to verify."
Hint: your example is off by more than an order of magnitude. So your question is not only uninteresting, it's entirely meaningless.
Once again you've shown yourself to be out of your depth. Once again your fanciful reach has greatly exceeded your dimwitted grasp. In other words, you are a great fit for Team Unlimite_.
For the sake of
pity charity and the benefit of lurkers I will again spoon feed you like a baby the facts you should already know, given your proven propensity to pontificate.
Miners' decisions depend on their goals, motivations, and levels of expertise, the amount of fees in the blocks, their software/hardware/network configuration/capabilities/limitations, what they expect other miners to do and/or their strategy for attacking other miners (game theory), etc. For example, a computationally 999.657k hard block construed in order to clean up a bunch of UXTO dust was intentionally mined by F2pool not very long ago. That functionality would be lost if we used Gavin's artificial 100k/tx limit.
Any more silly questions?
Are you now ready to join us here in the real world, where O(n^2) attacks are a problem, or are you going to stick with the wishful thinking, hand-waving, and "Because Mining Incentives!" slogan?
