Hm, I just came back to this old thread to find that some people still don't get it. (And some of them resort to insults, on top of that.)
There is a social aspect of mining and bitcoin in general which is not controlled by code. Simply, it is the act of good and bad, the intentions of creating a pool structure which promotes a healthy network even when costing them in other ways. [ ... ] I believe you will find this social aspect or better yet, the court of public opinion can have a significant impact on these pools in the coming months and years.
Sorry, that is exactly what I can't agree with. It seems that miners have come to constitute a connected social group, much as ranchers in a county or plumbers in a city, and believe that they must have a code of ethics and have common policies and decision --- such as ostracizing peers that don't follow those rules.
But that is bad, terribly bad. Bitcoin's "Fundamental Assumption" is that mining is distributed among thousands of
independent miners that act
individually, motivated by their
individual gain. That is,
selfish and greedy, not "good" or "honest" in any sense. If miners start acting as a group, sacrificing some selfish gain in pursuit of group profits (or other goals), then it is impossible to give any guarantees at all, not even probabilistic ones.
Today the "good miners guild" may decide that its members should not do hash-stealing and should not mine empty blocks while waiting for the parent to download -- because they decided that such things are bad for bitcoin. (I don't think so, but let's skip that issue for now.)
But tomorrow they may decide that the minimum fee should be raised to well above the cost, because of suitable excuses --- and all guild members agree to orphan any blocks that contain low-paying transactions. Or the guild may decide that transactions from or to a certain wallet should not be processed, because that wallet belongs to the "wrong" side in some war, and the guild does not want trouble with the government that is backing the "right" side. Or the guild may decide to
increase the block reward via a soft fork. Or...
These last things are typical of what the "bankers guilds" -- formal or informal, national and international -- do all the time; and are percisely the sort of thing that the bitcoin protocol was hoped to avoid: miners colluding to act so as to achieve a commong goal, rather than their individual selfish interests.
That is the the only original feature of bitcoin, that justifies its existence: it is a system of incentives that is supposed to achieve the desired group behavior out of the
selfish choices of anonymous, uncoordinated, unregulated and unscrupulous miners.
And it
almost worked! It fialed, not because of trifles like hash-stealing, but because mining, quite unexpectedly, became concentrated in a handful of big pools and a few dozen big farms. (In a rarely-quoted post, Satoshi estimated that the number of independent miners would grow to "100'000, maybe less", serving "millions" of clients.) Not only the big miners, but even miners in the 5% range, like Slush and KnC, are already too big to make the Fundamental Assumption believable.
Indeed, objectively, the present concentration of mining means that bitcoin is already dead. It still works as a payment system, but it requires trusting some third parties -- the 5 big miners. Than, what is the point?
(What is worse, the concentration happened because of many unavoidable social and economic factors; the advantage of short propagation delay is only one of the weakest. I see no hope of this problem being fixed -- unless the price crashes to pennies ber BTC, n which case industrial mining woudl not be worthwhile, whatever the difficulty.)
The court of public opinion has destroyed the reputations of companies, and sometimes those companies are so big they can withstand that assault and with changes can maintain and even grow beyond those terrible choices.
Big pools and miners identify themselves for marketing reasons, but they don't have to. In the original design, in fact, it was sort of assumed that miners would be anonymous, coming and going at random times with no control or coordination. A miner with 75% of the hashpower, who did not care fro marketing, could easily disguise himself as hundreds of anonymous miners with less than 1% each, with unknown geographic location.
Thus, boycotts and public campaign against transgressors of the "guild ethics", besides wrong in principle, are ineffective. The attacked company can split and mutate into other pools, and no one will know whether they are independent or owned by the same persons (and maybe located under the same roof).
My advice is that miners forget about "the good of bitcoin", as doing so will only bring them frustration and stress; and just behave as Satoshi expected them to behave.