There's an
interesting thread about 0.46
BTC (~$11k) being released from escrow by OgNasty after receiving authorization to do so from a compromised account. One of the issues being raised there is the lack of 2FA on Bitcointalk:
{...} And to blame it on my account' security... when escrow is being offered on a platform that DOESNT EVEN HAVE BASIC ACCOUNT SECURITY FEATURES LIKE 2FA!!!!! Which I also will make sure that my following is aware of this as well... escrow shouldn't even be fucking allowed on here without 2fa being integrated first. How the fuck does this website not have 2fa?
That in and of itself is what bothers me the most now after thinking about it. WHY IS ESCROW EVEN ALLOWED HERE WHEN ACCOUNT SECURITY CANNOT BE GUARANTEED!!!!!
Close down the marketplace until 2fa is implemented! Do SOMETHING!
Why doesn't Bitcointalk have (optional) 2FA?
Seriously, @theymos needs to set some time aside to read
RFC 6238 and then spend a weekend getting a basic TOTP implementation working (with default parameters to maximize compatibility: 6 digits, 30 second time step, HMAC-SHA-1). I'm sure he's reluctant to add features to the "legacy" codebase but it's not much code and the effort would be worth it, IMO.
I very much doubt he'd need help with something like this, but I'm willing to volunteer my time, although my PHP skills have just about fossilized at this point.
Can anyone think of a good reason why this shouldn't be done? It seems like it would take so little effort for so much reward...
Edit: Based on some of the responses so far, it seems necessary to point out that I'm not suggesting that 2FA would completely stop accounts from being compromised. I'm also not suggesting that there are not already alternative mechanisms to prevent escrow mishaps (like message signing). I'm only suggesting that for a lot of users (especially ones with bad habits, like password reuse) 2FA would help. I also think that even using 2FA lazily (i.e. on a single device) can still prevent things like phishing sites, clipboard malware and keyloggers from being able to easily steal and use your password.
Edit: Thanks @Z-tight for finding
this thread! It seems that someone already attempted this in 2014 and even made some changes at theymos' request but it was never implemented.
Edit: I ended up
tackling, and
finishing this. Here's the topic about it:
A concise 2FA/TOTP implementation (SMF patch).