Also Apple doesn't seem to be particularly worried about Curve25519....
i think the points you mentioned are precisely why cryptography has gone the way it has in the past 30-40 years. algorithms are not considered usable unless everyone else is already using them, creating a chicken-and-the-egg problem that is tilted substantially to the benefit of the NSA and its sockpuppet, NIST. since people are apprehensive about using lesser-used ciphers and modes, it makes manipulation of the standards process a very potent technique for the NSA to control the quality and ubiquity of encryption.
there are few other options besides ECC for a system with small keys with, as far as anyone knows publicly, comparatively strong security. i would certainly take curve25519 over secp256k1, but migrating the BTC address space would be very non-trivial and everyone would supply the usual "but you can't prove it's broken!" argument. i'm not familiar with any other small-key ciphers that could be a good replacement.
it's too bad that NTRU has such massive key sizes and is covered by many patents: imo, it is the most interesting option for pki currently since it involves almost zero magic constants, unlike RSA and ECC.
If everyone only keeps a ultrapruned chain(not recommended of course) then NTRU key size may not be a problem as only the key hash will be kept anyway.
But in the end I think it's probably a better idea to keep the Damocles sword of ECDSA hanging over us, so that everyone feels some urgency when it comes to the adoption of deterministic addresses.