Nodes don't have an uniform view about the mempool. So you can't force miners to include certain transactions that pay a certain fee or have waited a certain time, because you can't know they have seen them. It would be necessary to know which transactions "exist objectively" for an efficient priority mechanism, but that's simply not possible when we have decentralized mempools.
If we could enforce a priority mechanism by consensus rule, then we would also be able to enforce an "anti-censorship" rule, i.e. that no transaction that pays enough fees could be discarded by miners. But that has the same problem.
if they want better chances, they organise there transaction to be lean, mature utxo and not use certain junk opcodes
separately.. the consensus enforcement..
its about when mining pools solve a block. nodes check if they contain junk that has not paid fair fee according to fee formulae.. reject the block. thus enforcing pools to actually choose transactions wisely. its what consensus rules are for
you call it censorship resistance.. but just look at what mining pools do now. they cherry pick transactions anyway. atleast having decency rules about what should get priority to get included first.. where the indecent junk get penalised personally if they want to be included. again its not censorship if a spammy junk bloaty transaction has to pay 200x higher than a normal tx.
not even a 2 step mining process.. just a fee formulae score reading. as soon as it reaches a threshold of priority, put it in the block template, if not just leave it in mempool until utxo age matures or transactor RBF. or mempool of mining node prunes low priority thresholds
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my posts about a fee priority formulae are not about censoring (default reject, no question) transactions. its about penalising transactions specifically independently without penalising everyone.. transactions that spam(young utxo). bloaty transactions(tx length). junk transactions (abuse unconditioned opcodes)