Thank god this legal door was blown open then, as obviously the convictions here were so strong. Has anyone here read the Hobby Lobby decision? How would you characterize the holding?
It has no balls.
People calling it a "landmark case" are hyperbolic. There is nothing landmark about it. The court has already recognized the personhood of non-natural persons many times over, including under the RFRA. I don't find it to be very remarkable or surprising that a non-natural person who also happens to have a net income was also recognized as a person under RFRA. Anyone who didn't see that coming is a naive leftarded child.
As for the lack of balls, I'm referring to the fact that it provides no guidance for similar religious challenges. Yes, the blogosphere is squawking about how the decision may not be as narrow as the court would like. The blogosphere, however, is effectively wrong. Because the holding says that it's narrow in scope, any future claims hinging on broader scope will be challenged by citing the court's claim that it was narrow in scope. Ultimately, the court will have to clarify whether its decision is narrow or broad, effectively making it narrow since broader interpretations will just wind up back in the court anyway until the court effectively broadens the scope of its ruling. In short, blogosphere is wrong, decision is narrow in scope.
As noted by Ginsburg:
Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)? 31 According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, “each one of these cases . . . would have to be evaluated on its own . . . apply[ing] the compelling interest-least restrictive alternative test.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Not much help there for the lower courts bound by today’s decision.
The Court, however, sees nothing to worry about. Today’s cases, the Court concludes, are “concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.” Ante, at 46. But the Court has assumed, for RFRA purposes, that the interest in women’s health and well being is compelling and has come up with no means adequate to serve that interest, the one motivating Congress to adopt the Women’s Health Amendment.
There is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts “out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,” Lee, 455 U. S., at 263, n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), or the sincerity with which an asserted religious belief is held. Indeed, approving some religious claims while deeming others unworthy of accommodation could be “perceived as favoring one religion over another,” the very “risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.” Ibid. The Court, I fear, has ventured into a minefield, cf. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F. 3d 723, 730 (CA9 2010) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring), by its immoderate reading of RFRA. I would confine religious exemptions under that Act to organizations formed “for a religious purpose,” “engage[d] primarily in carrying out that religious purpose,” and not “engaged . . . substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.” See id., at 748 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
In general, I agree with the decision, but I would have liked to have seen a broader scope decision that provides guidance to address these issues.
I am a social liberal, and I agree with the decision as well. But I disagree that it could or should be broader. The Court can only decide the case before it and it exceeds its mandate if it decides anything broader.
