It's important that a distributed ledger (blockchain) network not get spammed / be vulnerable to wasteful, spammy, or malicious transactions/requests. So, this argument, in favor of small blocks, is very legitimate and must be considered.
It's also important that a distributed ledger (blockchain) network be allowed to grow in userbase, feature set, adapt to new functionalities and processing capabilities, to match the ever-evolving needs and demand from a diverse userbase, particularly in the midst of the rapidly changing technological landscape of modern societies. So, this argument, in favor of larger blocks, is also very legitimate and must be considered.
..But implementing solutions that address either, or ideally, somehow, both of of these main issues, doesn't solve bitcoin's ACTUAL biggest problem as the premier [theoretically] decentralized payment system & store of value we need it for.
Why? Because as Mike unceremoniously put it,
As long as China controls Bitcoin, it has failed it's most cardinal mission as a decentralized trustless system.
To save Bitcoin we must execute a benevolent, temporary 51% attack on Chinese pools and/or vote to change Core to blacklist them (or use any similar method, I don't know - I'm not a programmer ;3) to 'force' Chinese monopolistic miners OUT OF THEIR DDOS'ING, SELF-INTERESTED, CHINESE-WALL+AUTHORITARIAN-REGIME-PROBLEMATIC MAJORITY.
Beyond dreams of a fee market, beyond issues with full blocks ~ If Bitcoin is to succeed, CHINA MUST GO.
It now occurs to me that obviously, the problem isn't that they're Chinese, or even considering their country's regime & internet problems. That's nowhere near an issue as the centralization of power is.So it doesn't matter which nation, ethnicity or social strata any hashing / node-operating monopolies are from. If this were a different world perhaps most the miners would be in Brazil, Indonesia, Congo, Greenland or even Greater Austro-Hungarian Polish Prusso-Lithuania, and we would have this same culture of xenophobia towards their 'fractional exchanges w/ fake volume' and 'greedy subsidized miners' - it's irrelevant, of course.What matters is, NO POOL should be allowed more than ~6-17% of total hashing power, and advanced technical stopgaps to prevent and/or cripple this from happening should be implemented in at the protocol level if need be, even if that concedes a certain unfortunate 'central planning' cost for the greater good of safeguarding Decentralized Trustlessness against any attempts by agents into asserting more than the maximum allowed % control of the network.A cryptocurrency's most core value proposition - trustlessness - cannot exist if its network is centralized!!!