Topic: What can really be done about server hacking - page 3. (Read 8334 times)

hi,

@rjh
That looks alright, but it doesnt say what antitamper it has, it looks like someone with physical access to the machine could just take the key out, then probe it for the secret key
I would be a little hessitant about running a multimillon dollar business on a $500 key. (it mentions sha but not sha256...)

The Edge usecase is a bit more relevant, when in remote operation mode (via ssh/tls/cert based) it takes a physical device (smart card) inserted at the remote management location to sign something.
so you could have 4 cards, a,b,c and d.  card a inserted allows signing of transactions upto $1000.  if card b is inserted then you can process transactions of $1000 - $5000. for any transactions over $5000 you need cards c and d.

you can have multiple copies of each card with thier own unique encryption code and with their own revocation certificates.

you would always have key a in until you need to process large transactions, then once an hour put card b in once all transactions are verified and clear transactions that are $1000-$5000, then twice a day, you and someone else have to insert keys c and d to process the really large transactions.

on top of this, if anyone tries to mess with the device it will purge all the keys off the device, to a standard you could not get them back by probing or skimming the chips. but not the cards. (which are on the other side of the world anyway) you can then use the cards and the master cards to reprogram the device remotely.

This kind of functionality has been around and avaliable to the public for at least 4 or 5 years. I guess that the Edge costs around $7000 based of the pricing of thales' other products.

physical access does you no good at all.

@check_status maybe, maybe not.  there is no out of the box solution for this that i know of that uses tpm.  the thales technology is proven.

@sgtspike - in that one circumstance that would protect the system.  however it does not help if there is a priv elevation.  Also what happens if the box falls over? someone in the datacentre or nearby must have the keys.

if you are processing $50k a month in profit how can you not spend $7k on one very good layer of defense (shit a paysheild is only around $50k anyway...), then add more layers (i am not suggesting have only one layer of defense) the everyone already knows the drill for that (death and taxes just posted a good list - the edge will do all that too...). but people dont do it, that really amazes me. if you are lazy buy an edge!

 - if someone wants to buy me one, I will write a guide.

EDIT: from the ncipher website the device "Delivers FIPS compliance" That is the bit that should allow you to be underwritten and insured as a standard finacial institiution. (although i am not in anyway a lawyer at all. I do know you wont get any insurance without it)

EDIT2: they are at least security level 3 in fips... i think payshields are 4 iirc but dont quote me on either

Yes, there are ways which could prevent your cloud/VPS provider from resetting your password and accessing your stuff.  That's not the point though.  A currency exchange should never be in the situation where an external party could have unauthorized access to your servers [which will ALWAYS be the case for VPS/cloud].  An external party shouldn't even have physical access to their servers.  Sure, there's always the chance of a physical break-in, thats why you still have strong security on the server.

Hosting a site like that on hardware you don't own and have control over in terms of physical access is just asking for trouble.

DeathandTaxes I don't think you can get any more secure then this but I think more then a few of the cloud services could be made just as secure with out owning all the hardware.

+1.  Anybody attempting to host a currency exchange where their machines aren't in a locked cabinet/cage that only they have the key to is only fooling themselves if they think they're being professional.

Pretty simple stuff:

1) Use your own hardware in a colo-cage.
2) No external password reset.  Period.
3) Remote access only via a dedicated NIC
4) Hardware firewall/VPN which handles IP whitelisting
5) Two factor authentication for all server logins.

TL/DR version:
How about don't let the hacker reset your password and login to your server?

Well, it might be possible to configure it so that it auto-remounted on reboot, but that would require the boot password to be stored on the machine, which would defeat the purpose of an encrypted disk.

So are you saying the server has to reboot to change the root password and the encrypted disk would not be automatically remounted on reboot?   I use keys on all my server so I'm not familiar with this.

Preventing access to the Bitcoin keys should the root password be reset is pretty simple, really.

Encrypt the drive with the keys on it.  If it is mounted, it is accessible.  But as long as the hacker does not have the root password, and has to reset the root password to gain access to it, the drive will unmount, and be inaccessible even with the root password reset.  They would have to know the encryption password for the drive itself to gain access.

Not sure.  Sounds like an email account was accessed which was used to reset the server password.  Seems like "they" had root access.

Would TPM have stopped this?

Steve,

Thanks for starting this thread.  I think except for those who have BTC tied up in the downed servers the best that can come of this latest incident if for the community to  share their best practices while we come to understand what the root cause of Bitcoinica's issue so others can prevent similar incidents in the future.  I hope others will see fit to post insightful info for the benefit of the community.

Thanks.

How about this? http://www.yubico.com/YubiHSM
I don't know the details of how fast it can go or anything like that, but it is intended to be a secure store of secrets.

Hi all,

It seems now after another major crack we are again in the same position.  I have started this thread to offer some reasonable way of being able to operate with proper server security. And therefore potentially be able to get insurance from _normal_ insurance companies.

For a long time the traditional banks have faced this situation.  The only full solutions for banks is the Hardware Securty Module 8000 from thales or the paysheild 9000 from ncipher (now owned by thales)

These devices will secure the secret keys and sign credit card transactions.  most of the worlds interbanking relies on these devices.

I have worked with both HSM's and PayShields before.  They would not translate in their current format to any non banking transactions. So Thales and nCipher created this at a fraction of the cost, but still with all the goodness that is needed for a tamper proof bitcoin signing box. (it will purge the key if needs be)

http://www.thales-esecurity.com/Products/Hardware%20Security%20Modules/nShield%20Edge.aspx

the nCipher EDGE.

I urge all major bitcoin handlers to seriously consider contacting Thales or nCipher for a demo.

I do not work for Thales or nCipher.  I just know their products very well and this _will_ help the community.  my email address is in my profile if anyone wishes to discuss this further.

(why dont companies purge the keys when the alarms go off? restoring a key from a paper back up is a lot cheaper...)

regards,

steve