Topic: Which crypto-coins are "investment securities"? Implications? - page 2. (Read 6047 times)

Bitcoin had the best model to be honest. It got launched, everyone was free to access the software and start mining. Sure, the creator mined some, but who in hell would know that they would be worth anything? It was worth 0 back then. That's the main difference. Never will be the same post-Bitcoin. The scenario cannot be recreated. Now everyone is looking for "that coin". When people was back in the day playing with Bitcoin, they did it out of curiosity. The early investors mined and bought something that was basically worthless. They deserve a lot more Bitcoin than a guy that comes years later when it's stablished and very promising technology.

An "investment of money" under Howey means the investor must have committed his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss. SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F.Supp. 76, 80 (E.D.N.C.1996).

Cryptoequity may not meet the common enterprise requirement, either. Courts have interpreted a common enterprise to exist when an investor's gain is tied directly to the success of the promoter (or a third party), or at least generally dependent on the promoter's efforts. Applying this "vertical commonality" requirement to cryptoequities, however, indicates they are not securities due to the potentially massive gap between the success of a platform (i.e., the promoter) and an individual token holder.

Individual developers and entrepreneurs may fail using an otherwise successful platform. The converse may be true as well. Tokens may be interoperable so that holders can use them on multiple platforms, or export their underlying applications or projects to other platforms. The fact that Ethereum's platform was recreated on the Bitcoin platform suggests that very little intrinsic relationship exists between the success of a token holder and any particular platform, and certainly not something like a passive investor's relationship to a single company's management. And depending on how they develop their applications, individual token holders may find their purchase to be worthwhile or a waste of money. This potentially different payoff undermines the common enterprise in the "horizontal" sense (i.e., among token holders).

investment contracts may be found where the investor has duties that are nominal and insignificant or where the investor lacks any real control over the operation of the enterprise

Jet Set is a nonprofit corporation, organized under the laws of Washington in 1970 for the purpose of owning and operating an airplane in order to provide vacation travel for its members. The club scheduled flights to fixed destinations. Members were permitted to reserve space on any flight on a first-come, first-served basis; however, scheduled flights were often canceled if there were insufficient reservations. Members, in addition to membership fees, paid approximately one-half the cost of commercial airline fares for their flights. Flights were limited to particular dates and destinations. Membership also included participation in certain social activities sponsored by the club, including parties, ground accommodation packages and social activities at some destinations. Memberships in Jet Set were transferable.

After Jet Set was incorporated in 1970 "select memberships" were sold for a price of $1,000. The proceeds from the sale of these memberships were placed in escrow until Jet Set secured the use of an airplane. Approximately $70,000 was raised from the sale of these memberships, which were lifetime and nontransferable in nature, and entitled the holder to fly on any Jet Set flight for $20. These memberships were also subject to monthly dues.

Likewise, what cryptoequity holders actually purchase with their funds may undermine the sale from being classified as a securities offering. The expectation of profits requirement does not exist when a buyer receives a good, service, or property. This is why crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter are not subject to federal regulation. It is also why courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, hold that shares in housing cooperatives or condos are not securities, even when they come with a reduction in rent or income from renting common areas. If cryptoequity is viewed as conferring a right to use "real estate" on a ledger, then, like housing shares, they may not qualify as regulated agreements.
The active involvement of cryptoequity holders--either as developers or entrepreneurs--may limit the applicability of federal law as well. Passive parties that rely on managers to generate a profit are the hallmark of securities investors. On the opposite extreme are partners that equally manage a business: the law presumes that partnership interests are not securities. This is because a partner, as opposed to a mere investor, does not rely on the efforts of others and does not need to be protected by the securities laws in doing so. (The same approach applies to LLCs managed by its members.) Buyers of Ethereum's tokens may be viewed as active participants because they promised their purchase was to use and develop on its software platform (and not as an investment). According to Howey, a purchase motivated to actively "develop" property is not a securities investment.

Finally, based on the 1990 Supreme Court case of Reves v. Ernst & Young, cryptoequities may not be regulated because they closely resemble commercial contracts that are obviously not securities. The Reves court held that promissory notes secured by home mortgages or business assets were obviously not securities, and neither were agreements that resembled them. The commercial nature of cryptoequity tokens in providing access to software and fundraising platforms may lead a court to hold the same.

Under Howey, it doesn't matter whether the investment capital comes in the form of legal tender, digital currency, or some other valuable asset. Bitcoin ponzi schemer Trendon Shavers found that out the hard way.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SG LTD. et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Nos. 01-1176, 01-1332.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard August 2, 2001.
Decided September 13, 2001.

Relying upon a dictum from Howey discussing "the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security,", the district court drew a distinction between what it termed "commercial dealings" and what it termed "games." Characterizing purchases of the privileged company's shares as a "clearly marked and defined game," the court concluded that since that activity was not part of the commercial world, it fell beyond the jurisdictional reach of the federal securities laws. Id. In so ruling, the court differentiated SG's operations from a classic Ponzi or pyramid scheme on the ground that those types of chicanery involved commercial dealings within a business context. Id.

We do not gainsay the obvious correctness of the district court's observation that investment contracts lie within the commercial world. Contrary to the district court's view, however, this locution does not translate into a dichotomy between business dealings, on the one hand, and games, on the other hand, as a failsafe way for determining whether a particular financial arrangement should (or should not) be characterized as an investment contract. Howey remains the touchstone for ascertaining whether an investment contract exists — and the test that it prescribes must be administered without regard to nomenclature.

A fairly recent Supreme Court opinion demonstrates that the "commercial world" to which the Howey Court alluded actually encompasses the total universe of financial instruments available to investors, rather than the subset of financial instruments envisioned by the district court (i.e., "commerce" as opposed to "games"). In that case, Justice Marshall wrote:


The Howey Court established a tripartite test to determine whether a particular financial instrument constitutes an investment contract (and, hence, a security). This test has proven durable.


The Supreme Court has long espoused a broad construction of what constitutes an investment contract, aspiring "to afford the investing public a full measure of protection." The investment contract taxonomy thus "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."

The Howey test has proven to be versatile in practice. Over time, courts have classified as investment contracts a kaleidoscopic assortment of pecuniary arrangements that defy categorization in conventional financial terms, yet nonetheless satisfy the Howey Court's three criteria.

A. Investment of Money.

The first component of the Howey test focuses on the investment of money. The determining factor is whether an investor "chose to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a security."

B. Common Enterprise.

The second component of the Howey test involves the existence of a common enterprise. Before diving headlong into the sea of facts, we must dispel the miasma that surrounds the appropriate legal standard.

1. The Legal Standard. Courts are in some disarray as to the legal rules associated with the ascertainment of a common enterprise. See generally II Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 989-97 (3d ed. rev.1999). Many courts require a showing of horizontal commonality — a type of commonality that involves the pooling of assets from multiple investors so that all share in the profits and risks of the enterprise.

Other courts have modeled the concept of common enterprise around fact patterns in which an investor's fortunes are tied to the promoter's success rather than to the fortunes of his or her fellow investors. This doctrine, known as vertical commonality, has two variants. Broad vertical commonality requires that the well-being of all investors be dependent upon the promoter's expertise.

In contrast, narrow vertical commonality requires that the investors' fortunes be "interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties."

We hold that a showing of horizontal commonality — the pooling of assets from multiple investors in such a manner that all share in the profits and risks of the enterprise — satisfies the [Howey] test. Adopting this rule also aligns us with the majority view and confirms the intimation of Rodriguez. Last, but surely not least, the horizontal commonality standard places easily ascertainable and predictable limits on the types of financial instruments that will qualify as securities.

C. Expectation of Profits Solely From the Efforts of Others.

The final component of the Howey test — the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others — is itself divisible. We address each sub-element separately.

1. Expectation of Profits. The Supreme Court has recognized an expectation of profits in two situations, namely, (1) capital appreciation from the original investment, and (2) participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. These situations are to be contrasted with transactions in which an individual purchases a commodity for personal use or consumption. The SEC posits that SG's guarantees created a reasonable expectancy of profit from investments in the privileged company, whereas SG maintains that participants paid money not to make money, but, rather, to acquire an entertainment commodity for personal consumption.

In Forman, apartment dwellers who desired to reside in a New York City cooperative were required to buy shares of stock in the nonprofit cooperative housing corporation that owned and operated the complex. Based on its determination that "investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their investments," the Forman Court held that the cooperative housing arrangement did not qualify as a security under either the "stock" or "investment contract" rubrics. The Court's conclusion rested in large part upon an Information Bulletin distributed to prospective residents which stressed the nonprofit nature of the cooperative housing endeavor.

We think it noteworthy that the Forman Court contrasted the case before it with Joiner. In that case, economic inducements made by promoters in conjunction with the assignment of oil well leases transformed the financial instrument under consideration from a naked leasehold right to an investment contract. The Joiner Court found dispositive advertising literature circulated by the promoters which emphasized the benefits to be reaped from the exploratory drilling of a test well. Id. ("Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration well, it would have been a quite different proposition.").

The way in which these cases fit together is instructive. In Forman, the apartment was the principal attraction for prospective buyers, the purchase of shares was merely incidental, and the combination of the two did not add up to an investment contract. In Joiner, the prospect of exploratory drilling gave the investments "most of their value and all of their lure," the leasehold interests themselves were no more than an incidental consideration in the transaction, and the combination of the two added up to an investment contract.

Seen in this light, SG's persistent representations of substantial pecuniary gains for privileged company shareholders distinguish its StockGeneration website from the Information Bulletin circulated to prospective purchasers in Forman. While SG's use of gaming language is roughly analogous to the cooperative's emphasis on the nonprofit nature of the housing endeavor, SG made additional representations on its website that played upon greed and fueled expectations of profit.

This is not to say that SG's gaming language and repeated disclaimers are irrelevant. SG has a plausible argument, forcefully advanced by able counsel, that no participant in his or her right mind should have expected guaranteed profits from purchases of privileged company shares. But this argument, though plausible, is not inevitable. In the end, it merely gives rise to an issue of fact (or, perhaps, multiple issues of fact) regarding whether SG's representations satisfy Howey's expectation-of-profit requirement.

2. Solely from the Efforts of Others. We turn now to the question of whether the expected profits can be said to result solely from the efforts of others. The courts of appeals have been unanimous in declining to give literal meaning to the word "solely" in this context, instead holding the requirement satisfied as long as "the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." This liberal interpretation of the requirement seemingly comports with the Supreme Court's restatement of the Howey test. (explaining that "the touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others").

We need not reach the issue of whether a lesser degree of control by a promoter or third party suffices to give rise to an investment contract because SG's alleged scheme meets the literal definition of "solely." According to the SEC's allegations, SG represented to its customers the lack of investor effort required to make guaranteed profits on purchases of the privileged company's shares, noting, for example, that "playing with [the] privileged shares practically requires no time at all." SG was responsible for all the important efforts that undergirded the 10% guaranteed monthly return. As the sole proprietor of the StockGeneration website, SG enjoyed direct operational control over all aspects of the virtual stock exchange. And SG's marketing efforts generated direct capital investment and commissions on the transactions (which it pledged to earmark to support the privileged company's shares).

I don't think you understand the key essence of the thread.

The Howey decision clarifies the "investment contract" clause of the Securities Act, that promoting a reasonable expectation of gains where the investors have any reason to base their decisions to purchase on those pronouncements has converted what they are promoting into an "investment security", because of the implicit "investment contract" created by those pronouncements and the resultant "reasonable expectations" of investors.

My interpretation is that you are overemphasizing the "common enterprise" because Howey decision and court decisions hence have stated all special cases will still apply to the economic reality that the Securities Act's (stated) purpose is to protect unsophisticated (unaccredited) investors from losses due to faulty disclosure.  Just because the shares are coordinated in a decentralized protocol, doesn't mean the promoters have not created an implied investment contract with the buyers. The "common enterprise" is the mutual participation in the decentralized system of shares. Participation as a user does not in my view cause the shares to be "investment securities", as any game token wouldn't be an investment security if the tokens are not promoted to investors (and especially if there are disclaimers from the "controlling or influential entities" stating no investment gains should be expected at all and that the tokens are intended for users only). Rather it is the promotion of the shares to investors that does. And IMO it is much more likely to be prosecuted when those doing the promoting are "controlling or influential entities" in that "common enterprise", i.e. the developer(s) who can introduce new features and whose reputation drives investor confidence and ditto influential community members or foundation, especially those endorsed by the lead developer(s).

If you review the thread I linked to, which has more details on what the legislation and case law has stated, I think the conclusion is that the determination of whether an implicit "investment contract" has been formed is tied into whether there are those who are selling (and/or offering for sale, including reselling) shares in a "common enterprise" wherein they are "promoting the reasonable expectation of profits/gains" and another condemning characteristic is when those who have those reasonable expectations, are depending on the efforts and/or promotion of those aforementioned promoters or trusted controllers of the common enterprise. So it appears that when the developers of the coin have created a community promotion wherein there is a reasonable expectation of profits backed by the efforts and promotion of those developers who are in control of the common enterprise, then a security (dependency on the developers to deliver gains) has been formed and thus these shares need to be registered and regulated under the law. IANAL, but that is my interpretation.

I have proposed that no security would be created if the developer of a crypto-token protocol and implementing software instead does a crowdsale (and/or just launches with distribution via mining debasement) where it is made very clear in the pronouncements and actions of the developer that the tokens created by this protocol and software are being offered to users of the tokens for using the protocol network, and disclaims prominently and profusely that no one obtaining these tokens should have any expectations of future gains based on any exchange value. The developer should not be targeting his marketing (such as forum activities, naming, etc) to individual public investors and rather to selling his software and protocol to users, for example via a crowdfunding to gain funding to complete or repay loans he incurred to do the programming. He should not make public announcements of the available of tokens to  investors. One way perhaps to make this very clear, is to limit the maximum size that any one person can donate at the crowdfunding to perhaps $500 or what ever would be considered too small to be a reasonable worthwhile investment in the first world. In other words, there are many users of a new technology (even include other developers who can work on ecosystem projects) who have an interest in using the real world product (thus they need some tokens to use it) who have an interest in its success and in interacting with the product, that have nothing to do with a reasonable expectation of profits on those tokens. Whereas if you are constantly trolling in these forums acting as if you want to funnel all the speculators to your coin, then ostensibly you are not targeting usership but rather speculation and thus arguably (and implicitly) promoting a security.

One issue I am still trying to work out is how accepting placements from angel investors would mesh with the crowdfunding direction for funding programming of software and protocols for users?

Apparently there are several types of exceptions to requirements to register securities in the USA, which seem to revolve around accredited and/or sophiscated investors:

http://thismatter.com/money/stocks/exempt-securities.htm

These all appear to place restrictions on when the shares of the angel investors can be sold and also require subsequent registration. Apparently sales to non-USA angel investors is complete exception to all requirements (but may trigger requirements in the non-USA angel investor's domicile or tax jurisdiction).  What is worrisome is that such may trigger all shares (even those sold to users and not investors) to be classified as security especially if these shares are divisible and fungible (become mixed up) as is the case for crypto-currencies.

Thus it appears one would be best pay their angel investors back in cash (with any agreed interest rate or equation of return), classifying these as loans are investments in the programmer, and not in the final protocol and software which is sold and provided to users, not investors. Angel investors who wanted to convert this cash to shares would have to do so on some open exchange market (and again with disclaimers from the developer in force that no reasonable expectations of gains should be expected and shares should be obtained for use and not for investment and if they choose to ignore that, there is nothing the developer can do to prevent markets from forming). This has been a very important epiphany for me.

I argue the powers-that-be do hope you are so willfully ignorant of the law, so they can entrap you. I reviewed the EU legislation and they are very busy advancing the securities law and the definitions are sufficiently broad that they could start to interpret securities law very similar to USA courts do in some EU court that gains powers as the EU is federalized (reducing national sovereignty) as this sovereign debt smashup crisis comes crashing down 2016 - 2018. The powers-that-be appear to have planned it out very well to trap you Europeans who boast to yourselves how you don't have to pay taxes on income abroad and yet the powers-that-be are busy formulating a G20 coordination on unified taxing so that no one escapes paying taxes and regulation. The global economic collapse is the way they will get all the nations to accede to this coordination to hunt down all capital.

You are just buying a little time before your demise.

Certain facts bear repeating, both now in this thread and in the past in the other threads.

You and other people tend to be missing the fact that most successful securities prosecutions in the USA were against promoters and sales agents. The courts spent very little time considering the nature of the underlying security. Most of the time was spent analyzing the "economic reality" of the promoter who sold "something" to the buyers and the promoter gained money while buyers lost money.

One thing that you have in common with all the others successfully prosecuted in the USA is your plain and innate desire for attention and self-promotion. Conceivably you could be raising about the same money working quietly behind some figureheads (either persons or organizations). This is how the traditional securities industry is organized: the responsibility is spread over multiple layers underwriters, syndicators, sales brokers, etc. It seems like you abhor working with other professionals on the equal terms and always want to do it alone. In particular I clearly sense that you didn't even go to a friendly lunch with some securities lawyer. Your style of argumentation shows that you can't distinguish between "arguing the case" and "arguing with a person". Theoretically you could change and obtain a securities counsel and listen to his advice. But I feel that that would completely go against your personality and your goals in life.

TL;DR: Yup, it is the promoters that most often get prosecuted in the securities litigation.

Does it really matter if users accidentally misspell it 'clicks' or 'clickz' (or 'fucks' hehe), if they are using the same protocol when doing it.

Note it is actually quite desirable to present this project of as "less serious" to investors (although I am very serious about targeting large markets with my software) and solely targeted towards users so that I can't be accused of promoting some investment security. I am trying to create software that targets large markets, because I want to use the software. I am not targeting investors. I only want to be funded for my efforts to create this user software (not investment focus) because I do have bills to pay. And there are other users who may also want this software and protocol and want to crowdfund me to create so they can use the software and protocol too. Any expectation of gains in exchange value to fiat or whatever is your own to make and I offer no such representations and I will disclaim profusely that these tokens are for investors. These clickz tokens are targeted for users of the software and protocol. If I do a crowdfunding, it will be explained clearly that these tokens are for users and no gains in exchange value should be expected.

I want to speak to people who think ion is a better name than clickz. Why?

Who are we creating this altcoin for? As a pump & dump (targeting only the readers of this forum and Reddit) for starry-eyed, crypto-nerd investors who think ions are so "ray gun" cool? Or as a serious attempt to go spread microtransactions to a billion users on the internet?

Ion means nothing to your sister, mother, and your grandma. Go ask them. Feedback to me your market canvassing results.

For the men you ask (who don't read this forum), ask them what type of internet services, function, or product an ion would connote for them. I doubt any of them will say money, microtransactions, social networking, or any answer related to any of our target markets.

Erik Vorhees got of relatively easy because he astutely traded the Bitcoins raised by his issues and (after advice of his counsel) preempted prosecution by simply rebuying/repaying all the holders of his securities. Because the buyers had no loss to show the SEC had very weak case that basically consisted of "missing paperwork".

If you can design your "cryptographic protocol" in such a way that its users/buyers are highly unlikely to lose money and the managers/sellers are highly unlikely gain the money at the expense of the former, then it is the best defense against any prosecution in any jurisdiction.

Unless they qualify for an exemption, securities offered or sold to the public in the U.S. must be registered by filing a registration statement with the SEC. Although the law is written to require registration of securities, it is more useful as a practical matter to consider the requirement to be that of registering offers and sales. If person A registers a sale of securities to person B, and then person B seeks to resell those securities, person B must still either file a registration statement or find an available exemption.

The United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a security as: "Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited."

With respect to investment schemes that do not fall within the traditional categories of securities listed in the definition of a security (Sec. 2(a)(1) of the 33 act and Sec. 3(a)(10) of the 34 act) the US Courts have developed a broad definition for securities that must then be registered with the SEC. When determining if there is an "investment contract" that must be registered the courts look for an investment of money, a common enterprise and expectation of profits to come primarily from the efforts of others. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co..

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. W. J. HOWEY CO., (1946)

...

The term 'investment contract' is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legislative reports. But the term was common in many state 'blue sky' laws in existence prior to the adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also undefined by the state laws, it had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon economic reality. An investment contract thus came to mean a contract or scheme for 'the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment.' State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938. This definition was uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.

In other words, an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical as ets employed in the enterprise. ... It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.

...

A common enterprise managed by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments. Their respective shares in this enterprise are evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which serve as a convenient method of determining the investors' allocable shares of the profits.

Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors' interests are made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed. The investment contracts in this instance take the form of land sales contracts, warranty deeds and service contracts which respondents offer to prospective investors.

...

The test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.

Only Bitcoin is an investment security, it leverages the most zero to one growth and innovation, plus Bitcoin is anti-fragile like any currency.

Your other points continue to belie the ability to separate concerns that are clearly delineated in the law as orthogonal. I will respond to those in detail in a future post, but really if you don't have anything new and just repeating the same myopia, eventually I am going to see this as a waste of time. But I'll go one more round (or so) to see if you can (or have) presented any new point. That you apparently don't realize that you continue repeating the same point is instructive of your inability to extract the generative essence from orthogonal concerns which was quite apparent to me in the way you were responding in Nagle's thread.

The reason you're not getting feedback is because the question is confusing. This poll is too complicated and seems to require supplemental reading just to understand what you're asking.

I think you clearly plan to promote and distribute a security in the USA but you plan to sidestep the registration requirements by claiming that your security is not a security.

The courts have rejected attempts to narrow the definition of a security. As one opinion put it, “In searching for the meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ . . . form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.”

Courts have frequently examined the promotional materials associated with an instrument in determining whether it is a security.  If the materials promise things like great returns or guaranteed income, the court will almost certainly find the instrument to be a security, and therefore subject to federal securities regulations.

A common enterprise is a venture ‘in which the “fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment . . . .”’  It is not necessary that the funds of investors are pooled; what must be shown is that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those of the promoters, thereby establishing the requisite element of vertical commonality. Thus, a common enterprise exists if a direct correlation has been established between success or failure of the promoter’s efforts and success or failure of the investment.

Are you seriously trying to cite an "invitation for comments" from some law firm as a legal precedent having valid legal standing in USA law?

Much better divagations were posted by John Nagle in 2011:

https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/a-few-questions-about-glbse-46486

d) you seem to be searching for a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirmative_defense loophole to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_Act_of_1933#Regulation_S

c) you are misapplying reasoning rooted in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inquisitorial_system to an old case from 1946 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEC_v._W._J._Howey_Co.


The AdSurfDaily case he mentioned ended in imprisonment of Bowdoin in 2012. It would be a much better source for a precedent involving cryptocurrencies in 2015 than some old cases from the 1st half of the 20th century.

The Indictment alleges that Mr. Bowdoin perpetrated a scheme to defraud the members of ASD. Specifically, it alleges that Mr. Bowdoin solicited prospective customers to ASD based upon, among other things, his promise to use their funds to operate what was represented to be a profitable Internet advertising company capable of providing high returns on the funds they paid to ASD. Over the course of two years, Mr. Bowdoin is alleged to have made numerous misrepresentations and omissions in order to raise funds including: claiming to be operating a legitimate Internet advertising company; asserting that ASD had independent revenue to pay members the returns promised; representing that Mr. Bowdoin’s only run-in with law enforcement consisted of a traffic ticket, when he had been convicted already of criminal securities violations; representing that the revenue methodology and numbers ASD published in support of its payouts were true and accurate, when ASD was really managing its revenue to ensure that it only paid out about one percent (1%) of a member’s investment each weekday and one-half a percent (.5%) on the weekends; representing that ASD was not required to register with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and representing that Mr. Bowdoin was operating ASD in a far different manner than that which he followed.