To present to the network a blockchain which differs from the one others have, the only possible way is the differences must originate from before the retained transaction history (or the differences must include only transactions the attacker can sign which is same vulnerability in Bitcoin), because the attacker can't sign transactions for which he doesn't hold the private key.
Your only valid point is that if someone has significantly more than the network hashrate, they can compute a fake Proof Chain going back to before the retention window of transaction data, then they could claim any Account Tree they wish to.
Then you claim that nodes who have not always been online since the time of the deviation of the Proof Chain would not know which blockchain to trust (they would naturally trust the one with more hashrate).
But Bitcoin has a similar vulnernability, in that nodes would not know which transaction history to trust, i.e. the coinbase coins rewards that were for the miner could be awarded to the attacker. Fact is that there are records on the internet kept and so no one wold dare try this, because it would be front page news.
Thus your argument is silly. Copies of the valid Proof Chain will be stored all over the internet. Anyone trying to go back months and change the Proof Chain is going to be thwarted by the power of human communication.
Orphaned chains resolve on the order of hours, i.e. one chain doesn't hide from the world for months, then suddenly appear and expect to not be outed by human communication. Impossible.
For both mini-block chain coins and Bitcoin, the attacker would create a fork which no one would follow except for followers that were deviously (or fooled by some very powerful entity that could paint the media story) intent on following the attacker's theft.
Side note: bitcoin is slightly more resilient because you can't rewrite history from before of chain spilt, but it doesn't matter anyway.