This is the ultimate problem in crypto.
Remind me of the old days of MemoryCoin before they went on to do Protoshares / Bitshares.
That coin MEM is a worthy mention for this topic.. which i have explained lots before.
I see a centralization problem everywhere.
And if it's an automated / decentralized thing then i guess it's going to suffer like Mr. Moore here said.
Look at Monero and the guy running MEW, hell look at any coins.
They all have a head figure of sorts etc.. which pulls the strings etc.
Every coin is hosted on Github pretty much and who has the Password ?
And who does Github report to ? I know for a fact from Piracy circles they are US Govt compliant 100%.
I believe this forum is also.
Follow the trails and it starts to look ugly.
Decentralized automation of sorts is the answer and if it gives a bad result then oh well.
For example we need a fully autonomous exchange solution.
I can't wrap my head around how hard that would be to make.
Imagine Cryptsy or Poloniex or Bittrex etc all fully 100% decentralized running on it's own basically.
So you could do the exact same thing as you do on them now.. that's a LOT of code !
That was the next step after Bitcoin we never took.
Topic: Who could be trusted to do governance? - page 4. (Read 3434 times)
I'm new, as you know, so take with a grain of salt, as you will.....
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
Their economic incentives don't always align with the best directions for the development of the coin. Also they may be deficient in technical understanding of complex issues.
I guess you will always have both those problems with any kind of fairish voting system.
Another 2 options:
1 - Allow the development team to (heaven forbid) pre-mine some coins for themselves, they get paid when they make them worth something
2 - A perfectly fair launch with no treasury system and the developers beg for a different currency to fund development (USD, Bitcoin). People have incentive to fund good development as it will increase the value of their holdings. This does obviously means that people that hold the coin but dont help with funding the development get a "free ride".
I'm new, as you know, so take with a grain of salt, as you will.....
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
Their economic incentives don't always align with the best directions for the development of the coin. Also they may be deficient in technical understanding of complex issues.
3. No end time on the treasury, ongoing.
Problem is it becomes a centralized resource to fight over. It eventually it will be controlled by those at the top of the power-law distribution. So it will be a "the rich collect rents and parasite" formula. So I don't think perpetual is a good idea. The centralized bootstrap should get out of the way and let the ecosystem fund itself decentralized as Satoshi did when he stepped aside.
How about decentralized voting by the token owners wherein they vote their stake in the treasury separately from the others, i.e. not monolithic appropriation?
But after developers get this ICO money, it is down to them to use that money, how to use and allocate it, how to control the development process etc. I don't think there are any procedure to punish them.
An idea popped into my mind.
What if ICO coin buyers vote on each release of the budget. They only get to vote up to the value of the tokens they own. They can vote any fraction of their tokens on any budget release. Once they've voted all their tokens, they can't vote any more.
The approved releases are taken from the pool of BTC. Any of the pool not released after a certain period of time, is returned back to all ICO investors proportionally.
What do you think? See any flaws in it?
One flaw is that it means some ICO owners can hold the other owners hostage, by refusing to fully fund what the developer thought had been raised already. But I am not sure that is really a flaw. It means the devs have an ongoing incentive to perform. I am very sleepy so I might have a major flaw in this idea.
I'm new, as you know, so take with a grain of salt, as you will.....
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
2. The percentage of income to the "treasury" would depend on the emission scheme of the coin, but assuming something like bitcoin, 1 percent of the block mining and 1 percent transaction fees should be enough. I think Dash's 10 percent is way too high.
3. No end time on the treasury, ongoing.
4. Unspent treasury is distributed to all miners equally (based on work over the 30 day period or whatever period). If no agreement on spending can be reached then automatically distributed in this fashion.
1. The top 500 (random number, enter number there that you see fit) miners in the last 30 days or X blocks should be able to vote. Same people are the only ones able to submit ideas to be funded.
2. The percentage of income to the "treasury" would depend on the emission scheme of the coin, but assuming something like bitcoin, 1 percent of the block mining and 1 percent transaction fees should be enough. I think Dash's 10 percent is way too high.
3. No end time on the treasury, ongoing.
4. Unspent treasury is distributed to all miners equally (based on work over the 30 day period or whatever period). If no agreement on spending can be reached then automatically distributed in this fashion.
If a coin was going to copy Dash and Zcash's model of having some portion of transaction fees (more generally block reward) paid to a governance board which then distributed the funds, who would you trust to be on this board and what percentage of the board's funds would you want paid to the members of this board for their effort to manage the distribution of the funds?
Bitshares learned that if you let everyone vote, you end up with rigor mortis due to political turf battles, i.e. a power vacuum. So for Steem they did a sneaky stealth "pre"mine to make sure the principals control 80% of the money supply. Essentially they copied Dash which has a sneaky "bug" "pre"mine so that the insiders got a huge portion of the tokens and thus control the money supply and voting (probably via proxies so they can hide their control).
So in lieu of doing some scam like those, the only way I can see to make a governance work is to permanently install trusted board members and then pre-program in the protocol to dissolve the entire funding source after a set period of time once the initial bootstrap development is completed. Perhaps a 2 - 5 year period. What do you all think?
Feedback please. Ideas?
Those doing governance would need to be very technical so they understand the visionary developers. Yet they need to be solidly grounded. And they need to not have a conflicting agenda.
The first person who came to my mind is @smooth, but he has conflicting vested interests.
P.S. I am not saying it is a good idea to do because it involves centralized trust (and don't we want decentralized and trustless?), but during bootstrap stage possibly it can help to have a funding source. I am starting a discussion if anyone is interested to discuss.
P.S.S. Feel free to discuss legal implications as well if you want. Note that providing the illusion of (i.e. ostensibly hiding the ownership of your masternodes via proxy owners, etc.) decentralized voting that the Steem and Dash scams do, is probably intended to be a way to avoid issues with the law about investment securities.
Bitshares learned that if you let everyone vote, you end up with rigor mortis due to political turf battles, i.e. a power vacuum. So for Steem they did a sneaky stealth "pre"mine to make sure the principals control 80% of the money supply. Essentially they copied Dash which has a sneaky "bug" "pre"mine so that the insiders got a huge portion of the tokens and thus control the money supply and voting (probably via proxies so they can hide their control).
So in lieu of doing some scam like those, the only way I can see to make a governance work is to permanently install trusted board members and then pre-program in the protocol to dissolve the entire funding source after a set period of time once the initial bootstrap development is completed. Perhaps a 2 - 5 year period. What do you all think?
Feedback please. Ideas?
Those doing governance would need to be very technical so they understand the visionary developers. Yet they need to be solidly grounded. And they need to not have a conflicting agenda.
The first person who came to my mind is @smooth, but he has conflicting vested interests.
P.S. I am not saying it is a good idea to do because it involves centralized trust (and don't we want decentralized and trustless?), but during bootstrap stage possibly it can help to have a funding source. I am starting a discussion if anyone is interested to discuss.
P.S.S. Feel free to discuss legal implications as well if you want. Note that providing the illusion of (i.e. ostensibly hiding the ownership of your masternodes via proxy owners, etc.) decentralized voting that the Steem and Dash scams do, is probably intended to be a way to avoid issues with the law about investment securities.
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