-snip-
it introduces some centralizing trust.
-snip-
there is going to be more trust ...
So, we got another Centralization Threat Alert, CTA.
Congratulations, we are a great community with so many centralization tracking procedures that all are convincing us how great bitcoin is and why we shouldn't touch anything about it "recklessly".
You are wrong, deeply wrong bro, and it is killing me because I love you and other guys who have devoted your lifes to bitcoin and this community, I sincerely appreciate it but you are so wrong. Bitcoin is the most important innovation in this century if not the whole modern history, but there is no reason to keep it "as is" or to suppose there is no way to make it better.
Additionally, the UTXO set is kinda big. It isn't really something that you want to package with a software. But you need to get it somehow. Well now you need to trust that whoever gave you the software (either packaged or over the network from another node) haven't changed the UTXO set. Changing the UTXO set would not be as obvious as changing the genesis block. You could simply add an extra UTXO and basically no one would notice. It wouldn't be noticed until the UTXO was spent, and if done at the right time (when no nodes with the full history remain), would be completely unnoticed.
I understand you are trying to educate a newbie meanwhile and it is great to remind challenges but your conclusion is unreasonably biased. There is absolutely _no difference_ between booting from the hash of the genesis and the hash of a UTXO set at given height in terms of resistance to forge, both are immune to forge as long as the node we are booting from is able to convince us about the raw data each hash is committed to.
To combat that, you could say that miners have to include the hash of the UTXO set in their blocks, or maybe even just the hash of the UTXO set for the block immediately after the cutoff. But now we have someone else we need to trust: miners. Now you need to trust that miners have used the correct hash. You need to trust that whoever is producing the UTXO set hasn't colluded with miners to insert a fake UTXO into the UTXO set. If they did, you would have the same problems as earlier, and it would seem like the UTXO set checks out since the hash is also in a block.
Miners couldn't collude for inserting malicious UTXO commitment to blocks, for the same reason that they couldn't do it for any other form of malicious data: full nodes will reject such blocks and commit to the alternative healthy chain.
Speaking of centralization, let's take a look at trade-offs involved:
- Current Situation
- pros:
- secure against complete chain rewrite attacks
- nothing else
- cons:
- centralization threats due to the lack of an incentive system for running full nodes while they are getting more and more costly and hard to setup
- downward compatibility and software bloat because of the need for re-running the protocol from root
- inherent resistance to change and evolution in time
- UTXO Commitment
- pros:
- secure against very long chain rewrite attacks hence practically safe against this class of attacks
- Great decentralization effects because of realization of fast and cheap fully functional nodes
- Improved software quality because of significant reduction in need for downward compatibility.
- cons:
- vulnerability to ultra-long/complete chain rewrite attacks which are not practical anyway
- nothing else