If I'm understanding you correctly, what it in fact does, is merely to stop seeking a consensus at that point, and to publish a single validated and signed ledger.
Correct.
What happens if it subsequently detects that others on its UNL have signed conflicting ledgers?
Currently, it treats its own validation as no different from any other validation. If no ledger gets a clear majority, then it won't consider any new ledgers as fully validated until one does.
This works perfectly for servers. However, we plan to modify this behavior a little bit primarily to make things easier for clients. Currently, clients trust their server to tell them which ledger is the most recent fully validated ledger. We want clients to not have to trust the server they connect to. Under the current scheme, that would mean the client would need to see a significant number of validations (and check all their signatures) to become convinced that a particular ledger did in fact get a significant majority.
The planned modification would change the logic as follows:
1) When an 80% consensus is reached, the server terminates the consensus process and builds the next ledger.
2) The server issues a "provisional validation" for the ledger it builds as a result of applying the transactions it thinks are in the consensus set. (This would actually be a new form of proposal and not an actual validation. It probably should be called a "final proposal".)
3) The server goes on to the next consensus process.
4) When a ledger receives sufficient provisional validations to convince the server it's the network consensus ledger, the server only then signs a validation.
This would have no effect on the way servers currently determine ledgers are fully validated. However, it would allow clients to become firmly convinced a ledger had majority support without needing a large number of validations. Each validation now conveys much more information -- the server didn't just build the ledger as a result of the consensus process, it acquired confirmation that a significant number of other nodes also terminated their consensus process at the same point.
This would also protect better against a possible class of bugs where servers might somehow agree on the previous ledger and the transaction set and nevertheless somehow build a different ledger as a result. Imagine, for example, some software bug that causes 32-bit code to produce different results from 64-bit code.
This also makes validators routinely make stronger commitments making it harder for them to claim that a deliberate bogus validation was just a result of unusual conditions.