So this is my response:
This one was already found in the article:
"No honest (or semi-honest) miner would want to join a selfish pool," he suggested. "Even if they do have a small incentive to [join], they have an even greater incentive to not break the Bitcoin network to preserve the value of their own Bitcoins and mining hardware."
And than there is just this argument: "what does it matter that there is a selfish attack?"
When such an attack occurs, what will those guys do? They just continue to confirm all the transactions... (ok, their is no incentive for other people to mine, but hey, They are doing all the work, that deserves a reward
)
They do not have the power to change the protocol. When they do that, we get a hard fork and all regular miners will just continue on the "normal blockchain". Let those selfish people mine on their selfish fork
If they like to exclude some transactions from the confirmation process, they reveal themselves and we would probably get a new "selfish" fork (or just a regular non-selfish fork) wich includes all transactions.
I dont really see the problem.
