Awesome, somehow my notifications were turned off on this thread! Sorry for being unresponsive (especially PRab)!
First of all, I wanted to mention that I haven't forgotten about this bounty. We've been working hard to fix bugs in lockboxes and make it easier to use without third-party services. Check out the new dashboard!
And we started some documentation on using lockboxes, and will even be making some videos as soon as we're done tweaking the interface (nothing like creating videos that walk you through an outdated interface!).
@PRab
Thanks for the feedback. You'll definitely get some bounties! I just want to respond to a couple points:
(1) Repeated public keys in lockboxes:
this is actually intentional! Consider this scenario: There's a CEO and four other officers of an organization. Realistically, the CEO's signature should carry more weight than the others, but he still shouldn't have complete access to the funds. So what we do is set up a 3-of-6 lockbox: his key is repeated twice, and each of the other four officers' keys are included once. The result is that you need three signatures from the lower-level officers to move the money
or only two signatures if the CEO is one of them (still three sigs but the CEO is providing two of them). We refer to this as "asymmetric signing authority" and is a useful feature of lockboxes, especially in situations where you may have higher- and lower-security devices, perhaps using the higher- security devices as backup in case the worst happens.
(2) About change addresses: this is fixed in the latest version which I will release into this thread shortly. There was some logic that needed to be re-implemented for every user-address-entry widget, which was getting unwieldy, and we hadn't update the change addr box. We've now consolidated the logic and all address-entry widgets use it (and have the little autodetect label to let you know that Armory recognizes what you entered). 0.91.99.4+ will have this.
@ Simcom
The offline bundle is simply the regular Armory installer bundled with all the dependencies needed to run on 12.04.3. If you really need to use the latest Ubuntu on your hardware, you can manually fetch the dependencies the same way we do it for the offline bundles. There's a command-line way and a GUI way ... can describe the CLI way later if needed. The GUI way is to use Synaptic. At least in older version of Ubuntu, there was an option in the File menu like "Generate Offline Download Script". You select the dependencies you need to install (listed below), and it will list all downloads needed for the dependency tree. The script is just a bunch of wget calls. When you bring that script to an online computer, it will download all the .debs. Take it back to the offline computer and again within synaptic, something like File->"Install Packages". The packages you need are:
libqtcore4 python-qt4 python-twisted python-psutil@ PodBayDoors
What you describe is what Armory lockboxes are all about. Armory has made the literal security for single-signature wallets as strong as we can. Anything else we do to implement things like "segregation of duties" for organizations would be purely artificial -- i.e. we could have
Armory enforce multi-factor auth for access to wallets, etc, but anyone with physical access to the machine could bypass all of it by pulling the data off the harddrive, etc. This could be solved with phsyical- and electronic-tamperproof HSMs used for protecting SSL private certificate data (for like Verisign, etc). And I hope one day we'll have that. But until then, we don't want to give anyone a false sense of security about their
single-signature wallet(s).
However this thread is all about multi-sig lockboxes which does exactly what you're talking about. You can have the multiple parties manage the systems separately, so that no one party has access to more than one signing authority for funds. Again, if you use HSMs you could have each signing authority protected with further access control (like 2 people per device needed to execute signing), but even without that you have all the segregation of duties you need, here. Each party sets up their own device and merges their public keys into a lockbox. No one has access to anyone else's. They might not even know who the other holders are, or how the other devices are secured! Fully-decentralized, no single points of failure.
