Topic: [ANN] [TPI] The International Payment - TPI (Read 15072 times)

The TPI token can be traded on the ForkDelta exchange
https://forkdelta.app/#!/trade/0xFd41538077D0288E5e473dAC75c019993e690266-ETH

Dev, can you add TPI to Yobit.Net ?
They only list ERC20 tokens

when?

Thank you for your support, we will soon be listing TPI for other exchanges.

Free Listing on FatBTC
2018-11-12 18:55

Dear FatBTC users,



To improve the trading experience for our users and to provide more opportunities for innovative programs, FatBTC is now presenting you with free listing.



Projects can get listed for free and must meet the criteria listed below. The requirements are:



1. ERC20 tokens can apply for free listing only.

2.  The deposits of tokens are available for 30 days, during the observation period, the number of deposit accounts needs to more than 1,000 per, the system will record it automatically.

3.  Projects provide not less than 1% of the total supply of tokens as support for marketing activities, for instance, airdrops, trading and invitation rewards.

4.  Submit the application form by clicking here.

5.  Business inquiries, please contact @FatHammer via Telegram.



Note:



1. The FAT trading pair is supported, transfer to another market is not supported by default.

2. FatBTC will review the trading volume of the token every quarter(100 days is a quarter). When the average quarter trading volume of the token is above $10K, it will be extended to the next quarter.

3. Projects that do not meet the criteria will be removed from FatBTC. Users with related assets can withdraw within 60 days.


4. Cheating is strictly prohibited and the deposits from the smart contracts will not be credited to the acccount.

5. FatBTC reserves the right to cancel or amend the event or event rules at our sole discretion.



Thank you for your support!





FatBTC Team

Nov  12, 2018

Admin, check this exchange
https://freiexchange.com/
https://helpdesk.freiexchange.com/
I think the entry is free

TPICoin removed listed coinexchange.com
What will happen now
I can not make sales

I sell 360 000 000 tpi for 1 btc

You can contakt me on telegram or whats app.

+4369919275096

Will soon be a new exchange office?

After a while you will get sick of waiting for people to bring you flowers and you'll decide to plant a garden

Congratulations, TPI is being delisted from the only exchange it was on.
Hope you got out but it was clear that this coin with a 1sat wall of 15+btc, and 2ethsat wall of 80eth will not go anywhere.
This is a scam coin and you will never get your money back.

There is no exchange and not even sure if there is a wallet for this coin.

I agree with your argument

In the cryptocurrency is now bear market, all currencies fall until the next growth.

Some coins are falling quietly, but someone fell significantly as TPI and him there is more nowhere to fall.

So I'm buying TPI now. I know that when the bull market comes, TPI will grow significantly.


This was already in 2014, then all the coins fell very heavily on the floor. And about all the coins was wrote that it's scammers. But in 2017 all these coins began to cost a lot of money.

And with the TPI coin it will also be.

This was in the history of bitcoin many times, about which everyone said that it was scam.


That's why I'm betting on coins TPI.

All cryptocurrency is now bear market,so there is a time of research useful articles

Yes, I post it for those who want to know more

Good study. Thank you

The first viral DApp on Ethereum (although its decentralization is questionable as analyzed and described in our previous articles) was enough to bring the network to its knees.

The number of pending transactions reached all time highs and transaction fees also reached absurd amounts, with one user also (mistakenly) paying $11.000 in transaction fees.

The need for scaling solutions is becoming more urgent every day, as transaction fees and the transaction backlog increase.

Devcon3 highlighted some potential scaling solutions that would be able to solve most, if not all of today’s scaling issues. However, these solutions (other than uRaiden) are in a research stage and are not mature enough for the main network yet. Others have proposed raising block gas limit (a change analogous to increasing block size in Bitcoin), but that has its own disadvantages.

Meawhile, there is a clear demand for scaling solutions that work today, in order to handle the needs of real-world decentralized applications without completely overwhelming the Ethereum network. If something as trivial as CryptoKitties can make Ethereum unusable, how will it handle something on the scale of StarCraft with millions of users?”

    “You could run StarCraft on the blockchain. Those kinds of things are possible. High level of security and scalability allows all these various other things to be built on top. Ethereum is a secure base layer that doesn’t have too many features.” — Vitalik Buterin

This article’s goal will be to describe how scaling on Ethereum can be achieved through application-specific sidechains, which can have a more customizable “rule-set”, while at the same time maintaining the security of the Ethereum mainchain.
Scaling through Sidechains
What is a Sidechain?

The term “sidechains” was first described in the paper “Enabling Blockchain Innovations with Pegged Sidechains”, circa 2014 by Adam Back et al. The paper describes “two-way pegged sidechains”, a mechanism where by proving that you had “locked” some coins that were previously in your posession, you were allowed to move some other coins within a sidechain.

A misconsception here should be clarified.

    Sidechains can increase scale but do not imply scalability. Sidechains are no better at providing scalability than increasing block size. What sidechains bring is the ability to experiment. To be able to build networks that run on different — and possibly better-scaling — technology.¹

They enable innovation.

A sidechain is defined by a custom “rule-set” and can be used to offload computations from another chain. Individual sidechains can follow different sets of rules from the mainchain, which means they can optimize for applications that require extremely high speeds or heavy computation, while still relying on the mainchain for issues requiring the highest levels of security.


Application-Specific Sidechains

The rules that define a sidechain can imply adding privacy features, or even trading security & decentralization for more throughput. There is a lot of room for experimenting here and what trade-offs should produce the optimal performance, based on the needs of the individual application.

Also, in the case of data-driven applications, incentives differ from financial applications. It may be worth it for an attacker to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to 51% attack a financial blockchain and reverse a payment, but it probably doesn’t make sense for them to do so to reverse a tweet on a microblogging platform. Because of this, applications need to be able to choose more flexible threat modeling and optimize for performance.

    There is a huge need for unstoppable applications that are censorship-resistant, transparent, and provide high performance.

With that in mind, in a Twitter-style Decentralized Application running on a blockchain, adjustable security can enable higher throughput while submitting “checkpoints” to the main-chain in order to declare the finality of the data so far.

Now that we have described a way to scale DApps, what would happen if an entity gathered too much power, due to a potentially relaxed security model, and was able to control a sidechain?
Achieving independence through hard-forks

In centralized communities such as a subreddit, sometimes a toxic moderator gets into place, starts censoring messages according to his agenda, and eventually tears that community apart.

In multiplayer games such as World of Warcraft, sometimes a massive change is implemented against community consensus, leaving no option for users to protest — they’re forced to either accept it or quit the game. Even Vitalik Buterin was horrified by these events!

    “I happily played World of Warcraft during 2007–2010, but one day Blizzard removed the damage component from my beloved warlock’s Siphon Life spell. I cried myself to sleep, and on that day I realized what horrors centralized services can bring. I soon decided to quit.”

Coordinated communities need to be able to pave away from situations they believe are not fair and move on alternatives that they all agree on.

They key to achieving that is sidechain hard forks.

Being as laconic as possible, a fork is a protocol upgrade mechanism. A high-quality comparison between forks can be found on Vitalik’s blog.


How do you achieve independence that way?

In the occurence of an event that was against community consensus, the community is able to fork away, taking the state of the sidechain until before the dispute with it.


There are many questions that would arise in this case such as, in a game for example:

    What if the majority of the leading “malicious” devs decide to stay in the old chain?
    Will the new chain become stagnant of development, or will the developers compromise and adapt?

We do not have all the answers, but we believe the free market will figure these things out and best practices will emerge as more of these types of self-governing applications are created.

    At least in this case, the community has a choice.

TPI Network is aiming to be a platform on which communities can run their software on sidechains, where they all have a vested interest in the platform being provably fair and transparent, while being able to adjust their security restrictions on demand.

Communities will be able to run on a blockchain where users can spin up their own nodes and secure the network. These could be communities like steemit, subreddits, forums, facebook groups, stackoverflow-type Q&A sites — places where people talk about a common interest — as well as MMO games where everyone has an interest in the game remaining fair. The moment there is a divergence from the community consensus, the users must be able to fork away.

When developers are finally able to create these types of platforms just as easily as they build today’s modern Web 2.0 applications, that time will be when the blockchain revolution will truly have begun.

Whenever we talk about consensus, we usually think of PoW, PoS or DPoS etc which are basically network level consensus that comes with blockchain platforms. Like for example, Ethereum ships with PoW, EOS ships with DPoS, so on and so forth. For developing Dapps, usually, we do not need to change/tweak this consensus since we are okay with it as we decide the blockchain platform we are going to use.



But there can/may be another consensus that we can think of, DApp consensus, that we can implement for one or many modules in our Dapp. DApp consensus can be fully customised consensus, developed at application level, depending upon the use case.



For example imagine a content distribution platform (since we have been doing research on this domain quite a while), where a user will upload a content and get some (very minimal) reward for it. Now to implement such module, one of the major challenge is, how to ensure that user should not flood the application with bad content in order to get incentive only. Now to solve this problem if we implement a feature such that each uploaded content will go for validation by moderators before reflecting in the Dapp. The concept of validation arises questions, like who will be these moderators? like for example in a decentralised app, one entity should not take this decision right? the decision has to be taken by a set of people. On what criteria this validation will be done? Etc.



We can think of something called, ‘Consensus-based validation’. Consensus-based validation can be fully customised consensus at the application level. To accomplish this we can introduce the concept of moderators. Moderators are special users who will validate the new content and will earn rewards for doing this activity. Now let us try to understand how this consensus may work.



There will repeatedly elections for moderators at some interval for example 2 months. So every 2 months, out of total potential moderators (those who have opted for moderators), randomly 20 moderators will be chosen. These 20 moderators will operate for 2 months after this interval new election will happen and a new set of 20 moderators will be chosen randomly.







How do moderators work in such system?




    Any user can become a moderator. He has to opt for this option.
    To become a moderator there may be certain criteria :
    The user should have earned a certain amount of Ether (say for ex. 100eth) at least. This will ensure that user has spent a considerable amount of time in the network.
    Out of total earned Ether, the user has to put some Ether as stake (for ex 50eth) in the network. This will ensure that moderator will not validate improper contents as there will always a risk of losing his stake.
    Once a user is eligible to become a moderator he can participate into moderator election.
    Once the election is finished and 20 moderators are chosen randomly, those who lost the elections will get their stake back. These 20 moderators will validate the new contents.
    Validation of new content will also be based on voting.
    At least 51% vote is required to final confirmation of a content in DApp.
    If 51% is not reached then the content will reside in the application as unverified state and can or maybe get verified in next election process.
    On proper verification of each content, the moderator will get rewards.



With this model, everybody will have an equal probability of becoming a moderator. No single moderator can influence/support any content creator as they are randomly chosen.



This can be just one way thinking about ‘DApp consensus’, there can be multiple other ways of doing that based on the use case.



I want to end the discussion by putting some questions in the front of you.



    What is your opinion on this front?
    Do you think such kind on consensus can be implemented and if it is, then will it be worth enough to spend resources for this module as it looks like it is going to be very complex?
    How do we decide those exact figures like 2 months of the interval, 51% of votes, 50 eth for stake etc. It seems that it needs some simulation to come up with these figures?

When I’m discussing blockchain technology with people, I too often hear people ask, “Is it proof-of-stake or is it proof-of-work?” And in 99% of the times, the answer would be “neither.”


The thing is, the PoW/PoS debate has been going on for so long, people have formed a strong opinion on each of these models and tend to think if they classify any new model as one of them, they will already have an opinion about it.


Yet, we do hear about a lot of new models all the time. Life is more complicated.


PoW and PoS represent of the larger family of “eventual” or “slow” consensus models. And, as its name implies, this family accounts for only half the picture — with a broad range of “fast” or “final” models in the other half.


Eventual consensus has its merits. It is, to date, the only mature method of permissionless consensus. In the utopian world of blockchain, permissionlessness is sometimes considered the only way to ensure safety from abuse of power. I do not think it is the only way, but I agree that permissionless models are a more sustainable way to create free and open networks. But it comes at a cost: these models are inherently slow, complicated and inefficient. And in the context of consumer apps, the ability of anyone to have their own software code participate in running the system doesn’t carry a lot of essence, because mainstream consumers simply won’t.


Today, Final consensus models are more practical for real use-cases of blockchain technology, particularly in mass-market applications. They are fast, and they enable simpler systems architecture which in turn enables better scaling, better security and more features. Many of these models are actually older and more widely used than eventual consensus models, as they are common in distributed databases, storage systems, supercomputers and other technologies that have become ubiquitous in the past 30 years.


And, of course, each of these families contains a wide variety of protocols, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, each appropriate to some use-cases and inappropriate to others.




In the Orbs position paper, we let our readers be a fly on the wall in our internal debate that led us to design the Helix consensus algorithm as a protocol for public and open consensus by a federation of consumer application developers. Choosing a protocol for eventual consensus is simply impractical in this context. And now, when asked if we’re PoS or PoW, we can proudly say: “neither.”

Extending my previous article, here, I discuss whether PoW, PoS, and hybrid protocol-based cryptocurrencies could be considered complex or chaotic systems, risking entering a chaotic regime, with catastrophic consequences.

Before proceeding, it must be understood that there is no concise definition of a complex system, which has been oft identified with complicated or random (stochastic) systems. Besides, the term “complexity” has been so much used by so many authors, both scientific and non-scientific, that the word has, unfortunately, almost lost its meaning.

Another remark that should be made is on attempts of understanding chaoticity in terms of high volatility. Volatility is usually defined as a statistical measure of dispersion around the average of any random variable such as market parameters etc. assuming that its price follows a Gaussian random walk or a similar distribution and that some sort of regression toward the mean will always happen. It should be noticed, however, that Mandelbrot showed long ago that financial markets are characterised by “wild randomness,” in the sense that the price changes do not follow a Gaussian distribution, but rather Lévy stable distributions having infinite variance. Therefore, if some market enters a chaotic regime, there will be nothing predictable about it, and the prices can go anywhere. In other words, ordinary volatility is expected and even desirable to some degree as it provides profitable opportunities; chaoticity is deadly.

Consequently, as done in the previous article, the systems’ complexities was analysed by means of the Crutchfield’s Statistical measure of complexity, as it was shown that it was the measure that best captures the qualitative notion of complexity of systems.

As shown in the previous article, Bitcoin blockchain can be seen as an infinite-string-production є-machine (see figure above) that oscillates between two states about every 10 minutes: the mining state (m) and the broadcasting state (b), in which the desired nonce was found and the validated block is broadcast to the P2P network for inclusion into the blockchain.




These extremely low statistical complexity results lead us to the conclusion that PoW-based blockchains, in general, can hardly be considered complex, confirming and extending to all these cryptocurrencies Nakamoto’s statement about Bitcoin that “the network is robust in its unstructured simplicity”. The functioning of these blockchains may be regarded as algorithmically complicated, but not complex.

As the PoW-based cryptocurrencies are computing-power-intensive nature and suffer from significant energy consumption cost overhead in the operation of such networks, there was recently a burst of popularity of the cryptocurrencies that used an alternative algorithm known as “Proof-of-Stake” (PoS) for choosing the block creators. In purely PoS-based cryptocurrencies, the creator of the next block is selected in a deterministic (pseudo-random) way, and the probability that an account is chosen depends on its current wealth (the stake) and not its computational resources. For this reason, in PoS cryptocurrencies, the blocks are usually said to be forged (in the blacksmith sense of this word) or minted.

Therefore, PoS-based blockchains can also be seen as infinite-string-production є-machines that oscillate between two states about every minute: the targeting state (t) and the broadcasting state (b).

Consequently, applying to Nxt the same procedure, the Crutchfield’s Statistical Complexity measure is obtained as 0.122, a value of that is 10 to 20 orders of magnitude bigger than those of Table 1 and that, consequently, raise serious concerns about the possibility of Nxt entering a chaotic regime at any time without notice. For details of the calculation and a discussion on this result, see an extended version of this article.

There are also other protocols PoS with conceptually different implementations. For example, the forging probability may also depend on the so-called coin age, which is simply defined as currency amount times holding period the time the coins were in the account without being transferred.

Another example of PoS variation is Reddcoin’s Proof of Stake Velocity (PoSV), which intends “to encourage both ownership (Stake) and activity (Velocity) which directly correspond to the two main functions of Reddcoin as a real currency: a store of value and a medium of exchange.”

There is also hybrid PoW+PoS implementations, in which PoW mining works as both a steady distribution channel for the cryptocurrency and a fall-back network security mechanism. As PoW block rewards go down over time, the PoS protocol has enough time to move to the spotlight.

For example, in King and Nadal’s Peercoin design, a new minting process is introduced for PoS blocks in addition to Bitcoin’s PoW minting, and blocks are separated into two distinct types: PoW blocks and PoS blocks. However, a significant difference is that the hashing operation is done over a limited search space (more specifically one hash per unspent wallet-output per second) instead of an unlimited search space as in PoW. Thus, no significant consumption of energy is involved.



The figure above exhibits a comparison of the calculated complexities according to the consensus protocols. One observes a dramatically higher value of the complexity measure of the Nxt PoS protocol in comparison to the other protocols.

The higher difficulty of the other protocols in being selected to mine/forge a block, and consequently needed higher hashrate, lead to their lower complexity value. In contrast, as the time interval between blocks forging in Nxt is kept around 60 seconds, the probability of any node to be selected is hugely higher than other currencies.

This may be not a feature of PoS protocol itself, however, but a characteristic of Nxt. It is conceivable, therefore, that some different implementation of the basic PoS protocol could have a higher competition among ‘forgers’ and, consequently, a lower complexity.
Conclusion

This work suggests that Crutchfield’s Statistical Complexity may be used as an effective analysis tool to evaluate the viability of proposed high-performance network cryptographic methods from the available quantitative data.