Yes, the masternode reward far exceeds the cost to operate a masternode on face value. Are there hidden costs? Maybe, cost to acquire 1000 DASH and not trade or use it for another investment maybe?
That isn't a cost, it's a capital investment and so cannot be offset against the operating revenue of a masternode. It doesn't affect the margin. There are no hidden costs (I know cos I've run one for years) apart from the capital loss incurred when the market devalues the coin. That's how it can destroy these margins if we fail to put them to good use. Which would be either:
• protecting a larger proportion of the coin supply scarcity with competitive mining (restoring mining reward) or
• having masternodes invest a large part of the margin back into the network in some service provision capacity
Why would anyone hold a masternode right now if the rewards were reduced substantially?
This depends on how you denominate the "rewards". Since Dash isn't a stablecoin the reward is dependent on the exchange rate. At its peak, the masternode reward was around $83k per projected annum. Right now it's around $5k per annum. I ask you the same question: "why would anyone hold a masternode when the potential capital loss far outweighs the reward itself ?"The idea is that by restoring the mining reward we'd become more competitive in terms of investment (by needing to draw less capital from fiat markets as I've outlined in other posts) and restore price growth. This would INCREASE (dollar denominated) masternode rewards, not decrease them.I realise this conclusion is counter-intuitive but it's rational all the same when you work through things on a fiat measured basis and consider the cryptocurrency market as a whole rather than simply draw a line around Dash miners and masternodes.It's at least as justifiable as the "shot in the dark" that's being taken now - IMO more so since it's based on known quantities and relationships rather than on speculated ones.
It also has observable evidence on its side while the current proposal does not. 10% change may not seem much but the problem is it's in the wrong direction and we're already suffering enough from loss of marketcap share.
There are 3 groups of voters to be convinced here, not just 1:
• masterndoes
• non-masternode Dash holders (who vote in markets)
• non-Dash holders (who vote in markets)
Convincing the first group is not enough. Their interests may or not be in conflict with the other 2 so people need to be slightly more sophisticated and not think like a turkey. I know what I will vote and which of those 3 groups I need to appeal to, unfortunately it's not the popular option. Which one of us ends up the turkey, only the second & third of those groups can decide.
******************************************
Fork it.
I think DCG should just fork the code. One at 30% mining reward and the other at 70%. Then let the miners & market discover which priority is more valuable. It would be an amazing experiment and worthwhile because it would empirically prove one or other priority as viable with market endorsement. A "controlled burn" version of the Ethereum fork minus the community contention. All current investors would be on both sides anyway and it would be a piece of research that's pioneering, instructive and at the same time would generate media interest and ultimately investment as people bet on one side or the other.
Agree. The role of fiat - and even substitutes - in crypto can be decisive, just look at BTC.
But if a higher economic performance in those terms can justify that the percentage for Mnodes does not skyrocket and their returns are satisfactory ... it is also for the miners. And what I don't see is that a higher return to miners implies conferring a higher and more stable value, which, basically, is the basis of your approach.
I do accept that adequate fiat growth is a good point on which to organize a deal. And also, without accepting that it is the POW's heritage, a soil of real wealth, the capacity to retain that wealth. Although there, the role of the miners may remain questionable ... and according to some positions, even expendable.
Regarding the final approach, in the BTC forks there are also holders on both sides ... for that part, there is nothing "pioneer". And at the level of "instruction", I am more attracted to optimizing a marked declaration of DASH principles such as that of "
financial independence, decentralization and resistance to censorship" which are really susceptible to being improved and affects de facto the WHOLE real community (which the mining "added value" to do so is a merely theoretical possibility that you play with - imo, you oversize - so that your approach is "of general interest", because if it were not, it would simply not have any option to impose itself ... and I understand that a Fork is a measure of such forcefulness that it needs much more palpable and concrete scenarios than "probable theories" to be executed, which I find disproportionate - In addition to not seeing any possibility of arousing sufficient consensus for a "voluntary" Fork, I don't think your thesis triggers enough interest to have "two versions of DASH dancing in the ranking " ... for a measure of such importance,sincerely, it sounds frivolous, imo (Although I would be willing to contemplate a satisfactory FIAT performance for both Mnodes and miners, both, as an important premise ... through a fiat revaluation strategy that with RTaylor's measures to improve DASH as a store of value, I don't see...understanding therefore the logic disenchantment of the miners ) -).
Nor do I see DCG as essential at this crossroads, perhaps it can assume a certain continuity or conservatism based on its current role in the DASH hierarchy ... and that, although in a group and clearly notorious, are particular interests. If technically possible, I prefer a "non-friendly" fork that prioritizes the maximum possible optimization of the potential of DASH, of the collective project as a whole.
