https://darkcointalk.org/threads/development-updates-july-7th.1735/page-2#post-11487
fernando
fernando
Quote
You are right. If someone controlling both masternodes can deanonymize transactions (haven't checked with devs, maybe there is some measure in that area already), the risk is still there. However, thanks to the high number of masternodes, it is extremely low. I've done some numbers for 600 masternodes (we are at 605 now), 800 and 1000. At 600 you need 61 masternodes (now about 436k USD) coordinated to act roguely to get a 1% chance of deanonymize a transaction. With 1000 masternodes you need more than 100 masternodes for that 1%.
Of course, if you are just looking for any transaction, even a low percentage maybe good enough, but I'm sure devs can do something in the communication with MNs so the probability goes to zero. Something needs to be left for Darksend++ or the fun is going to be over too fast :wink:
You can check the numbers at the table below or in Google Docs: http://j.mp/1mEtWz4
- snip - Of course, if you are just looking for any transaction, even a low percentage maybe good enough, but I'm sure devs can do something in the communication with MNs so the probability goes to zero. Something needs to be left for Darksend++ or the fun is going to be over too fast :wink:
You can check the numbers at the table below or in Google Docs: http://j.mp/1mEtWz4
Not selecting MN2 from the same IP range that MN1 is in, will already help to mitigate the risk of choosing two nodes that are run by the same entity. It also shouldn't happen that MN1 and MN2 have very similar or very little uptime.
The problem of one entity owning the used nodes is inherent to Tor as well and a lot of the countermeasures Tor takes might be used for masternodes too.
But masternodes can be hosted anywhere, if I had another I wouldn't host it on Amazon Australia servers where my first one is.
