Good paper..
The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Fees:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400519We study the economics of Bitcoin transaction fees in a simple static partial
equilibrium model with the specificity that the system security is directly linked to
the total computational power of miners. We show that any situation with a fixed
fee is equivalent to another situation with a limited block size. In both cases, we
give the optimal value of the transaction fee or of the block size. We also show that
making the block size a non binding constraint and, in the same time, letting the fee
be fixed as the outcome of a decentralized competitive market cannot guarantee the
very existence of Bitcoin in the long-term...
A myopic dissertation of double-entry accounting era thinking. He's criticizing a startup company, not Bitcoin. Bitcoin is about breaking paradigms in economics. At least he admits using simple statistics, but his conclusion has been debunked. Then I noticed this paper was written a year ago when the FUD machine was on overdrive.
hmmokee...
Block size limits are not so much about mining economics. More about controlling threats to Bitcoin and keeping it both secure and useful.
There is room in the blocks today, and some transactions with lower than the recommended fees get queued anyway, so there is already a market for block space without hitting the max size. Free transactions still do get processed eventually. This is fairly optimal (and this current reality is in contrast to assumptions made in the paper, the paper is not really so great).
If you are concerned about miner economics, consider (as mentioned in the paper you cite by pointing to the [urlhttp://www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/btcProcArXiv.pdf]selfish mining paper[/url]):
The fees are a tiny minority of the miner rewards today. Part of increasing that percentage is having more transactions per block.
...However, the notion of selfish mining is created to an extent by very large block sizes. Larger Blocks take a longer time to propagate and so have a similar effect (but lesser and non-insidious) to block withholding.
So at the end what are the real problems with the hard-fork ?
- Bandwidth
- Download/upload (of all the users)
- The reward fee for the Pools (miners).
..
...
Add storage, search, maintenance, then multiply by the number of full nodes.
I don't thing there is much of a reward fee problem here though.
Which part of the paper validates whether or not the model they chose to examine is an accurate of the present or future operation of the Bitcoin network?
Part 2. Comments welcome.
It is not accurate to the present or future operation of the Bitcoin network (as I mention above also), it is a model only, and not at all a complete one.
Like doing physics but discounting friction. It isn't really close enough to be useful.