Topic: Bitcoin developer @lukedashjr's wallet was hacked - page 9. (Read 12899 times)

knowing the information and implementing it are two different things. you can know all the information about best practices but if you don't actually follow them then it doesn't help!

yeah if he would have done that then he would still have his 209 bitcoin or whatever it is he supposedly lost.

I don't know what seems the be the method or reason how he was hacked but the reality is that we shouldn't really trust our own wallets neither if he got hacked. I mean think about it, dude is a bitcoin developer, he probably knows more about how safety works let alone just being safe, so he had all the knowledge and tools and items he needs to be safe and he still got hacked and all his money was stolen.

This shows that we can't be safe if we do not know what we are doing. The best thing we could do right now would be making sure that its on a place that is secure which is cold wallets and offline, that would be a lot better for sure.

It is a worrying situation, it seems to me very necessary to look for new forms of security to be able to deal with this type of inconvenience that constantly attacks users. This type of case is not something new, so you have to take drastic measures and be increasingly careful, hackers will constantly try to breach security and get something in return, it is good to be aware of this and take the necessary measures to reduce the risks of losing everything.

if you are sending funds to a multisig where you own the keys.. then you are just (in practice) sending funds to yourself.. thus no point needing to call it a refund.. its just you sending funds to yourself.. as a wasted transaction before sending it to someone else
becasue you own the keys you dont need to send it "back" thus no point using it forward before giving it to a recipient..

a multisig is meant for having 2 people combine to control decisions. .. which is escrow

so which are you trying to explain.. wastefully sending funds to yourself in a new address.. pointlessly to want to send it back you YOURSELF if you change your mind/accidentally moved/funds moved via theft.  .. its wasteful because you dont need to "send back" because you own the keys for the multisig.. which means a hacker would too!! so you or they can just do with as they please from the address. so its the same as just hoarding from a base utxo address

or .. send coins to a multisig where there is the recipient or a middleman having the other key to co-sign funds forward or back when conditions are met

either way.. those proposals wont help fund thefts of a hoard where there was no situation of wanting funds to move as a spend. but where an invader found the keys..

..
i know you are trying to suggest a CPFP
where a parent address pays a child address.. and the child then pays it forward or back where it moves the coins faster back or forward rather then just paying direct to a recipient.
but again. there ends up no point.. because a hacker will have whatever keys you have so wherever the child funds are the hacker also has.. just like you.

(EG imagine you exposed keys to the internet/hacker via a spend in september 2021, in whatever scheme you make. where you end up needing to use the child keys in your scheme in september. then the hacker has them too because the child keys got exposed too)

............
if you are talking about needing two devices to finalise a payment to a recipient (one device for parent tx to child and second device for child to recipient) well you can do that anyway without needing any special sub layer network or change in protocol. however a hacker wont care because they will just take the parents key. and just send funds direct to hacker address without doing the send to child thing

Before anything, is his Twitter account still in his possession as this might turnout to be a hacker seeking public sympathy to get donations using his reputation and the alike.

Trying to exchange 3mil won't be so easy, any sight of these coins on a Cex and these coins will certainly get frozen.... Btw can a mixer freeze such coins knowing that they are tagged stolen in the event they try to clean them

I wouldn't be so sure.

You assume that every exchange is in the same league, playing the good game.

Some exchanges in the past were known to be money launderers like the once popular BTCe. There are exchanges that tried some shady things in the past and don't care much about their reputation like Yobit. Many exchanges situated in poor countries will agree to exchange stolen for you for a fee.

I'm talking about developing a Bitcoin address with corresponding private keys specifically meant for this purpose —sending fund to multisig address before it's automatically transferred to the recipient.

Escrow would be a contract address between the sender and receiver but this has nothing to do with escrow or contract. It's simply a reversible solution for people who could have their keys stolen.

I imagine blockchain analysis methods are like a scoring system. There is of course a lot of things that are considered and analyzed but when the transaction checks all the boxes it has a higher chance of addresses being linked compared to a case where it doesn't (like having different address types among its outputs or round amounts, etc.). This is also why using it alone and like this makes no sense.

some people thought you were trying to promote a CSW protocol breaking money steal/refund option.. breaking bitcoins immutability

however the multisig option you now describe is how some have done things in the past.. its called escrow

however escrow refunds only work when you want to spend but unsure if the other party will release goods.. they only work when/because you enter a cooperative multisig. to cooperate and agree with the other party on payment/refund terms..

it doesnt work when someone is hoarding and not expecting a hacker to steal funds from hoarded funded addresses

That's just a poor assumption. Shuffling your coins on addresses with or without different types provides the same levels of privacy. Just because one chain analysis treats different types as likely different individuals it doesn't mean another doesn't, and actually it doesn't make sense for even a chain analysis employee to justify such thing.

One of the ways to do this:
A decentralized platform could offer a reversible transaction service for funds that can only be sent to a multisig address before reaching its final destination. This should enable people with huge amount of Bitcoin to only send their coins to such addresses controlled by them and co-signers. Once a multi-sig address receives such fund the owner is immediately alerted and he can then authorize the transaction and the fund automatically sent to the final recipient. If the owner reject the transaction the coins is sent back to his address

that use to be true. but the stupidity to consolidate different paths back together several taints across just makes the whole point of shifting fund over several disposable addresses pointless.. because when they were split in a same pattern per shift and then consolidate again it shows all the coins in between are the same person

usually you would split funds up into different addresses and types and amounts to be complete randomness..  and never let them meet up again to then make it appear they were sent to different people or services for different reasons to make it less clear when funds changed hands/ownership.. but however having a pattern and ending up together again just shows they never left that persons custody and just a wasted effort

One method that blockchain analyzers use is to create the link between input and output addresses that are of the same type and consider it less likely for different types to be linked. Using a different type of address among the outputs could be an attempt at throwing chain analyzers off.
Of course on its own and on such a high profile transaction, it is a weird thing to do...

One conjecture I can make to justify this situation is that Luke is searching for some safe manner to evade taxation. He's been donated generously over the years, and he must have screwed it up with privacy at the most part. Pretending to be robbed and he might get away with it.

It's quite sad if that isn't true. A Bitcoin developer having his PGP key and his private keys compromised is just ironic.

as said about the 204 which split down into legacy addresses before consolidating with another 9btc 1yar amount

the off shoot of the legacy splits went to p2sh wallet taint jumps
EG a 24 split that went into p2sh (prefix 3)
and a 17 split that went into p2sh (prefix 3)

then the 2 paths of p2sh split into small sw (bc1q prefix) addresses of precise amounts of 1-5btc whilst the remainders taint jumped down the p2sh paths

where the ends of the 2 paths of p2sh taint jumps resulting in two under 1btc amounts consolidated together into 1 sw address of 1btc
               1 sw
             23.352 p2sh
           /        \  1 sw
24leg              22.352 p2sh   1 sw                  sw sw sw
180leg                             \ 21 p2sh               /    /  /
         \                                      \.and so on  .\ .. \..\0.349324 p2sh \_  1 sw
        162 leg                              /and so on ../ ../../0.651364 p2sh /
           17.6532 p2sh         15.6532 p2sh       \   \  \
                   \                  /1 sw                    sw sw sw
                  16.6532 p2sh
                     1 sw

end result of the 2 paths of p2sh
https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/transactions/btc/6fc2f7370682b068c78778ce591a24c13dc797a172c69e31a1fd331e0cb80bff

basically whomever the hacker/mover is he is not even experienced with mixers because he is just taint jumping..
and is using 3 wallets/services to do so
one that prefers legacy change addresses. one that prefers p2sh change addresses and one that prefers segwit

---

im presuming the precise single digit btc amounts in segwit are 'chip mixer'(term not brand) chip amounts about to be mixed. but usually they get spent quite quickly in a mixer shuffle.

If the attacker will eventually do something stupid, it will be quite easy to trace him. Don’t underestimate the human factor here. We have seen in the past some very experienced hackers, or rather social engineer, do l’incredibile stupid things with the stolen funds.

im wondering if luke meant coinjoin not as a mixer but as a term meaning consolidated to new address

well the coins are moving again but the idiot is consolidating coins yet again
the ~204 lump that went out and the 9 lump that went out after.. . part of the 204lump split up and re-consolidated to the 9 lump few taints later

thus not a mixer. but a idiot just taint jumping through addresses he created himself in his own wallet (whomever he is)


1yar  204btc split split split split down to 33.7btc.(using legacy)
 and then consolidated with the 1yar 9btc  to make 43btc in a bc1q address

I wonder if it will be possible to cash those BTC in. There is a digital footprint now and every crypto exchange will be watching for this closely.

Incidents like this always happen every year and we as bitcoin users always have to be careful in storing private keys, and applying maximum security, if we have done that then there is no way to stop hackers because they are always looking for ways to get into our bitcoin account which has a fairly large asset, the victims right now I'm concerned because no matter what way we do it's very difficult to detect hackers,hopefully this will be a valuable lesson for all of us.

Luke's funds are on the move again:




This is a proof that those funds weren't conjoined at all. Of course those funds will hit a conjoin sooner of later, that's inevitable.

Also this proves the "tax evasion scheme" would be playing poorly, if true.