Topic: Bitcoin puzzle transaction ~32 BTC prize to who solves it - page 76. (Read 248927 times)

Then, it is "mining pool vs mining pool". Reorging a single block is not that easy. First, the block will quickly propagate across the whole network, so a lot of major pools will be mining on top of the earliest one. And second: successfully mining a single block is not enough to reorg the chain. You would need to mine two blocks: one on the same height, and another one, on top of it, to actually trigger a chain reorganization.

Also, it is possible to check on testnet, how hard it is to reorg a single confirmation (especially, if a block is ASIC-confirmed). Sending 9950 tBTC in fees was not reverted, even though the block was CPU-mined. I don't know exactly, which amount would be big enough, to get it reorged, but I am accumulating test coins, to test that kind of scenarios.

Edit: More than that: small pools have too low hashrate, to succeed at such attack. And big mining pools have too much reputation to lose, because if some pool will attack, then by looking at chaintips, node runners could prove, that "the pool named X stole those coins". And then, you can imagine, how many miners will switch to a different pool in that case.

So, full-RBF is applied only to transactions, not to the whole blocks. In case of blocks, it is first-seen. And you need two blocks, to trigger a reorg, a single block is not enough, because first-seen block will be different in 99% of mining pools, so they will extend the original chain.

How can it be any safe for a buyer of any unkown puzzle's private key? Let's stick to #66 as of now. A potential seller can prove that he actually found the correct private key by disclosing SHA256(public key). Some large mining pool operators would be excellent buyers as they have sufficient hashing power at their "disposal" and could confirm spending the #66's coins without making the transaction public. Keeping the spending transaction secret is crucial, no way around it so far.

But it's still a risky deal for any buyer as any second someone else could've found the damn private key! Back to square one with potential of high loss. Selling the private key for some (substantial?) discount is likely worse than a half backed solution.

Maybe he tries to sell the key with a discount. That is a different situation, it is not just help to copy-paste. It is about the risk of failure.

Anyone who tries RBF through mempool will be left with 0 BTC. Because the bot will find the private key in 10 seconds.
In fact, any public transaction with puzzle 66 is disastrous. The outcome is uncertain.

No, I mean if he could transfer puzzle #66 to his own wallet using RBF, bsgs method …
Would he return 90% of the reward to the real finder? (The one who proves ownership by sharing sha256 of publickey or privatekey before broadcasting the first transaction)

They probably don't know how to Export the Raw Transaction from Electrum and copy/paste it to Mara slipstream window.
But anyway, if someone wants to pay for copy/paste 10%, I'm here.  

Ok, first try to quote properly to avoid unnecesary sub-quotes.

I am going to add some previous comment that I already did:


Even 5% for me is OK

But as i write before, the only ways to perform securely that Transactions are:


Anyone with a little of knowlege can use the Marathom Slipstream service, So i don't see the point to request do that to someone else.

Would you help the real finder of puzzle 66 if you could transfer his bitcoin to your own wallet? (a big share of it ...)

What do you need SHA256(privkey) for? If you don't know the privkey how do you know he has it?

With SHA256(pubkey) you can calculate the BTC address (ripemd160 + checksum) and verify that he actually has the pubkey, and if he has the pubkey he also has the privkey.

I think that is the only way to prove that someone has the key before the transaction is made and without exposing the pubkey.

_https://i.imgur.com/FYSwISi.png
Did you find a solution? I'm working on that too.
I can't find an option to disable RBF in Electrum.

There's no difference between SHA256(PubKey) and SHA256(PrivKey).
By the way adding salt would be better since bruteforcing SHA256(PrivKey) is much easier than bitcoin directly.
So, SHA256(PubKey) or SHA256(PrivKey+salt) are both safe.

mainly because with SHA256(PubKey) you can derive and check the ripemd160 , while with SHA56(PrivKey) there is nothing you can do ( maybe to establish the authenticity after the balance has been cleared out, but that will serve no good)

No. Because noone knows when the next block will be created. It's possible the next block get mined in 55min, or 90min or even 2 hours. There's no guarantee it'll be mined within the next 10 minutes, it's just an average value.


why the sha256 hash of the public key and not simply publish the sha256 hash of the “PRIVATE” key instead? Sha256 is secure and there is no way backwards to get the private key. This would mean that everyone in here could only check afterwards whether the person knew the correct private key, i.e. only after the pubkey had been made public by a TX.

can't you just view the progression of the block creation on https://mempool.space/ , calc the perfect timing to tranfer and just do it in about a minute?

Ahh ok, I have never needed to make transactions of that type and I know that they exist and little else, but the way I understood it, if that type of attack can be perpetrated, what is the use of RBF? It makes no sense.

 On the other hand, having created several posts you are right, I will see if I can correct it, I apologize.

This doesn't solve the problem as likely a lot of mining pools have their nodes set to Full-RBF policy which allows replacement transactions in any case, even if your transaction flags it's non-replacable.

The only solution is to confirm aka mine the transaction undercover, i.e. without making it publicly visible, like via slipstream.mara.com.

BTW, there's a forum rule which frowns multiple consecutive posts by same user within less than 24h. If you want to post some additional things, you can simply edit your last post when it's the last one in a topic. It's no rocket science...

It is trivial to import 13zb1hQbWVsc2S7ZTZnP2G4undNNpdh5so as a watch-only address. And then, you can get this screenshot:



Then, manipulating the screenshot is quite easy, if you have that. Also, there is even no need to manipulate the image, because you can just remove this "watching only" from the window title, and then take the real, unmodified screenshot of that (changing window title can be easily done by any library like WinAPI, if working under Windows; and there are many bindings for other languages as well). Another option is to simply build the source code for Electrum, where the string "watching only" is discarded.

I have a dude,  if you import a private key in electrum, I have verified that in your Electrum version (windows 10 in my case, W11 idk),  if you import a private key, window title shows  [imported]  next wallet name. Your screenshot is not showing that but I didn’t deep into it. What I mean is that screenshot is manipulable. If someone intends to help, at least be sure that it is not a scam. That has  been my first impression reading your post.

Edit_

By this rule albertobsd could also has found the key? Or am I losing something?

Finally, if that’s  true, and I am not mistaken, you can make transactions in a non-replaceable way (non-RBF), you should look into yourself before doing anything, test with new wallets and once you have mastered it, then go ahead. I don't think trusting other people you don't even know is a good idea.

Bitcoin address
13zb1hQbWVnN3ag9GNS2vCraT8PQJDjVdr 

Wrong hash.


Expected rmd160 for puzzle 66 is:


Your hash result is:


Nice try keep participating!