Where is the technical description of your algorithm?
It's written in Java code. I'll publish it when complete the development of the prototype.
Topic: Bitcoin: The Digital Kill Switch - page 20. (Read 55260 times)
It's written in Java code. I'll publish it when complete the development of the prototype.
If Bitcoin is taken over by a cartel we will all just move on to the next thing (maybe even your idea!). On our way out the door we will make it as expensive as possilbe for the cartel to take over Bitcoin.
I see nothing new in your OP.
I see nothing new in your OP.
It will be too late. Please read my prior reply to joris.
And why not make it cartel-proof now? Why risk it?
There is something unique in my OP. What I am saying is not a 51% attack that does malicious actions. I am saying a 30 then 40 then 50 then 60 then 70 then 80 then 90 then 99 then 99.9999% friendly takeover of mining by corporations that make mining free and never do malicious acts.
No one will have a reason to switch.
Then they can turn off your access, because you wrote something that threatens the power elite. No one will care that you die. You are just one lone "terrorist". The rest of us are enjoying our junk and "free" transaction processing (because we can't see the opaque cost that has been added to everything in the market).
You see the problem, so you blog about it. Next day, your digital tax id is turned off. You die. No one cares. We won't even know it. You won't be able to even upload your blog, because by that time you have to make a micropayment to the hosting.
I have studied the power elite. I know how they operate. They do things insidiously so the masses don't know they've been enslaved.
Even if that were true that it is cheaper in some parts of world, it doesn't make it free, which is what you will need to compete with a cartel giving away mining for free. You will earn 0 from mining. Plus you have your hardware costs.
It doesn't make it completely free, but much cheaper and independent. Where's your cartel that is "giving away mining for free"? It doesn't exist. There's not a single bank that doesn't charge any fees. Make your cartel and see how "profitable" it is
I am alleging the cartel will come, because monopolies make profits by extracting rents, e.g. they can increase the prices of products the customers are buying everywhere, just like how credit card fees are opaquely passed on to the customer and the customer does not care (because they don't know and they get to buy their junk).
Even if you argue the monopoly won't come (which I strongly doubt, since they always do), it is better to make a P2P currency that does not have this design flaw that exists in Bitcoin, so then we can be SURE it won't come.
In my design for a P2P currency, you will forever make money on mining. In my design, it would be impossible for the cartel to make mining free.
Even if that were true that it is cheaper in some parts of world, it doesn't make it free, which is what you will need to compete with a cartel giving away mining for free. You will earn 0 from mining. Plus you have your hardware costs.
It doesn't make it completely free, but much cheaper and most importantly independent from price changes on electricity. Where's your cartel that is "giving away mining for free"? It doesn't exist. There's not a single bank that doesn't charge any fees. Make your cartel and see how "profitable" it is
Having numerous competing P2P currencies does not escape from this diabolical threat, if all of them have the same diabolical design. A non-diabolical design would either have debasement that never ends and/or a minimum transaction fee.
Is it a diabolical design or not - http://qubic.boards.net/index.cgi?board=theconcept&action=display&thread=1 ?
Is your argument that there is no first mover advantage, thus a competing P2P currency can be created at any time to fix any design flaw that handed control to corporate monopoly?
As I explained in my prior post, I would not agree. You would have to address my prior post and show me why I am wrong about the first mover advantage.
I don't say you are wrong about the first mover advantage. In my concept there are no fees, no way to identify approved/non-approved users, 51% attack becomes 99.999% attack for paranoic users, transactions are handled outside the system, scalability is not an issue... Just interesting if my concept looks non-diabolical from your point of view.
Where is the technical description of your algorithm?
Readers please note he is not disagreeing with me whether Bitcoin has the problem I allege.
You fail to understand the technical problem in the OP. Merged mining does not fix the threat. The threat is the corporations can make it uneconomic to mine because they can offer it for free and the other miners will get paid nothing for mining, thus they control all of the mining (merged or otherwise). Before you attack that, go re-read the OP more carefully.
Technically it may be a logical outcome, but how will the alpha-males work harmoniously together to form and continue this cartel?
On world-scale there exists no such 51%-entity, AFAIK. Human nature breaks organisations down internally long before world domination and after a break they will compete which each other, since they both think they are on the right track.
The largest companies and countries are small at the global scale, only one's exposure to one of them can be particularly large. So Bitcoin can be sufficiently protected by size and dispersity.
You don't realize that investing in PV is economically worse than renting electricity from the utility.
You don't realize that nobody can manipulate electricity prices if you produce it and in the long term it's cheaper in some parts of the world.
Even if that were true that it is cheaper in some parts of world, it doesn't make it free, which is what you will need to compete with a cartel giving away mining for free. You will earn 0 from mining. Plus you have your hardware costs (PV and ASICs) to amortize.
Simpleton masses? Who are you, Dr. Evil?
The cartel decides to blacklist Wal-Mart because they won't play ball. John Q. Simpleton goes to walmart.com to buy a new NASCAR shirt and some Slim Jims. Wal-Mart generates a never-before-used public address for John to send in his payment. How is the cartel going to identify it as a Wal-Mart address?
The cartel decides to blacklist Wal-Mart because they won't play ball. John Q. Simpleton goes to walmart.com to buy a new NASCAR shirt and some Slim Jims. Wal-Mart generates a never-before-used public address for John to send in his payment. How is the cartel going to identify it as a Wal-Mart address?
Obviously you fail to understand the technical problem. The cartel will control all the processing. John won't be able to get his transaction to go through.
This is a lack of technical understanding on your part as to how the Bitcoin algorithm works.
Once the cartel has all the mining, then John can't route his transaction to his own miner (or any good miner), because the miner who wins the next block must have processing power that is in scale with the total. But if the cartel has made it uneconomic to mine, then these miners with sufficiently high processing power, will no longer exist, because they long since went bankrupt. For example, say the cartel has 10 quadrillion terahashes by 2030, and so to have a 1% chance of getting your transaction through on each block try, you need 100 terahashes of computing power in your good miner. Who is going to keep 100 terahashes of computing power laying around unused because it has been rendered uneconomic by the free processing being given away by the cartel?
Just for those few dissidants that are affected?
Economics doesn't work that way. Go think this out more deeply.
Let's say you're correct that the cartel effectively controls all mining power. In order for them to use it effectively they must be able to distinguish between their friends and their enemies. But there's no way to do that.
If they choose to assume anyone they haven't identified is an enemy, the public will quickly abandon the whole system, causing the exchange value to plummet. That's bad economics.
Bitcoin is just the first head of a Hydra. If it gets compromised over overtaken it can be abandoned and replaced with incredible speed. The cartels get left holding all the worthless currency and useless mining hardware.
You don't realize that investing in PV is economically worse than renting electricity from the utility.
You don't realize that nobody can manipulate electricity prices if you produce it and in the long term it's cheaper in some parts of the world.
@chmod755: AFAICS apparently you entirely missed the point of the OP as to the technical threat. Please try re-reading it.
Why did you even mention other things if you didn't want to hear comments about them? Of course the risk of a 51% attack exists and building it up slowly is possible. I'd advise every miner who paid off the rig and is making some BTC now to invest them in something like photovoltaics (or anything else that produces electricity) to keep the risk of "going bankrupt" in mining at almost 0%.
No malice intended, but you don't realize that investing in PV is economically worse than renting electricity from the utility. You will go bankrupt faster.
Having numerous competing P2P currencies does not escape from this diabolical threat, if all of them have the same diabolical design. A non-diabolical design would either have debasement that never ends and/or a minimum transaction fee.
Is it a diabolical design or not - http://qubic.boards.net/index.cgi?board=theconcept&action=display&thread=1 ?
Is your argument that there is no first mover advantage, thus a competing P2P currency can be created at any time to fix any design flaw that handed control to corporate monopoly?
As I explained in my prior post, I would not agree. You would have to address my prior post and show me why I am wrong about the first mover advantage.
I don't say you are wrong about the first mover advantage. In my concept there are no fees, no way to identify approved/non-approved users, 51% attack becomes 99.999% attack for paranoic users, transactions are handled outside the system, scalability is not an issue... Just interesting if my concept looks non-diabolical from your point of view.
@chmod755: AFAICS apparently you entirely missed the point of the OP as to the technical threat. Please try re-reading it.
Why did you even mention other things if you didn't want to hear comments about them? Of course the risk of a 51% attack exists and building it up slowly is possible. I'd advise every miner who paid off the rig and is making some BTC now to invest them in something like photovoltaics (or anything else that produces electricity) to keep the risk of "going bankrupt" in mining at almost 0%.
Simpleton masses? Who are you, Dr. Evil?
The cartel decides to blacklist Wal-Mart because they won't play ball. John Q. Simpleton goes to walmart.com to buy a new NASCAR shirt and some Slim Jims. Wal-Mart generates a never-before-used public address for John to send in his payment. How is the cartel going to identify it as a Wal-Mart address?
The cartel decides to blacklist Wal-Mart because they won't play ball. John Q. Simpleton goes to walmart.com to buy a new NASCAR shirt and some Slim Jims. Wal-Mart generates a never-before-used public address for John to send in his payment. How is the cartel going to identify it as a Wal-Mart address?
Obviously you fail to understand the technical problem. The cartel will control all the processing. John won't be able to get his transaction to go through.
This is a lack of technical understanding on your part as to how the Bitcoin algorithm works.
Once the cartel has all the mining, then John can't route his transaction to his own miner (or any good miner), because the miner who wins the next block must have processing power that is in scale with the total. But if the cartel has made it uneconomic to mine, then these miners with sufficiently high processing power, will no longer exist, because they long since went bankrupt. For example, say the cartel has 10 quadrillion terahashes by 2030, and so to have a 1% chance of getting your transaction through on each block try, you need 100 terahashes of computing power in your good miner. Who is going to keep 100 terahashes of computing power laying around unused because it has been rendered uneconomic by the free processing being given away by the cartel?
Just for those few dissidants that are affected?
Economics doesn't work that way. Go think this out more deeply.
Once you have that cartel, you can eliminate those outside the cartel by delaying their transactions or charging transaction fees only to your competitors...
Bitcoin already accounts for this. Before the cartel can squeeze its competitors it must identify them. It is trivially easy for anyone to create new address pairs that are not obviously linked to any identified account. If your payment address changes with every transaction it will be impossible for a cartel to blacklist you.
If the cartel chooses to blacklist everyone except their friends, there will be a strong incentive for other miners to return, or abandon the currency altogether.
Bitcoin already accounts for this. Before the cartel can squeeze its competitors it must identify them. It is trivially easy for anyone to create new address pairs that are not obviously linked to any identified account. If your payment address changes with every transaction it will be impossible for a cartel to blacklist you.
If the cartel chooses to blacklist everyone except their friends, there will be a strong incentive for other miners to return, or abandon the currency altogether.
The cartel knows who the merchants and retailers are, they are publicly visible.
Once you have the inertia with the simpleton masses able to buy their junk from Walmart, Amazon, etc, then no one is going to be able to induce those masses to switch to a different P2P currency/payment system. When the cartel wants the users to upgrade their clients, they will have them click a button on amazon.com for example before they checkout. They can then convert the client to auto-update.
Once the cartel has this inertia, they can change the protocol to require tax id on every transaction (to "comply with government regulations", but of course they own the government, so it is just a ruse).
Welcome to 1984.
Simpleton masses? Who are you, Dr. Evil?
The cartel decides to blacklist Wal-Mart because they won't play ball. John Q. Simpleton goes to walmart.com to buy a new NASCAR shirt and some Slim Jims. Wal-Mart generates a never-before-used public address for John to send in his payment. How is the cartel going to identify it as a Wal-Mart address?
merged mining has its own set of tradeoffs
I guess OP hasn't heard about merged-mining?
If a superior form of crypto-currency blockchain comes along, it can co-opt the bitcoin mining power and take-over ... it is a level playing field for any good ideas to compete upon.
Wait, don't tell me, that is diabolical?
If a superior form of crypto-currency blockchain comes along, it can co-opt the bitcoin mining power and take-over ... it is a level playing field for any good ideas to compete upon.
Wait, don't tell me, that is diabolical?
You fail to understand the technical problem in the OP. Merged mining does not fix the threat. The threat is the corporations can make it uneconomic to mine because they can offer it for free and the other miners will get paid nothing for mining, thus they control all of the mining (merged or otherwise). Before you attack that, go re-read the OP more carefully.
I guess OP hasn't heard about merged-mining?
If a superior form of crypto-currency blockchain comes along, it can co-opt the bitcoin mining power and take-over ... it is a level playing field for any good ideas to compete upon.
Wait, don't tell me, that is diabolical?
If a superior form of crypto-currency blockchain comes along, it can co-opt the bitcoin mining power and take-over ... it is a level playing field for any good ideas to compete upon.
Wait, don't tell me, that is diabolical?
Once you have that cartel, you can eliminate those outside the cartel by delaying their transactions or charging transaction fees only to your competitors...
Bitcoin already accounts for this. Before the cartel can squeeze its competitors it must identify them. It is trivially easy for anyone to create new address pairs that are not obviously linked to any identified account. If your payment address changes with every transaction it will be impossible for a cartel to blacklist you.
If the cartel chooses to blacklist everyone except their friends, there will be a strong incentive for other miners to return, or abandon the currency altogether.
Bitcoin already accounts for this. Before the cartel can squeeze its competitors it must identify them. It is trivially easy for anyone to create new address pairs that are not obviously linked to any identified account. If your payment address changes with every transaction it will be impossible for a cartel to blacklist you.
If the cartel chooses to blacklist everyone except their friends, there will be a strong incentive for other miners to return, or abandon the currency altogether.
The cartel knows who the merchants and retailers are, they are publicly visible.
Once you have the inertia with the simpleton masses able to buy their junk from Walmart, Amazon, etc, then no one is going to be able to induce those masses to switch to a different P2P currency/payment system. When the cartel wants the users to upgrade their clients, they will have them click a button on amazon.com for example before they checkout. They can then convert the client to auto-update.
Once the cartel has this inertia, they can change the protocol to require tax id on every transaction (to "comply with government regulations", but of course they own the government, so it is just a ruse).
Welcome to 1984.
Satoshi
Satashi
Satash
Satan
He's right! It is diabolical!
Satashi
Satash
Satan
He's right! It is diabolical!
You've not addressed the technical argument.
Having numerous competing P2P currencies does not escape from this diabolical threat, if all of them have the same diabolical design. A non-diabolical design would either have debasement that never ends and/or a minimum transaction fee.
Is it a diabolical design or not - http://qubic.boards.net/index.cgi?board=theconcept&action=display&thread=1 ?
Is your argument that there is no first mover advantage, thus a competing P2P currency can be created at any time to fix any design flaw that handed control to corporate monopoly?
As I explained in my prior post, I would not agree. You would have to address my prior post and show me why I am wrong about the first mover advantage.
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