Pages:
Author

Topic: bitcoin "unlimited" seeks review - page 3. (Read 16106 times)

alp
full member
Activity: 284
Merit: 101
January 04, 2016, 09:28:36 PM
This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

Quote
The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

Quote
By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.

Quite the foresight by good ol gmax.



The real question is where did Blockstream find a time machine to go back and bribe him then?
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
January 04, 2016, 08:10:34 PM
This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

Quote
The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

Quote
By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.

Quite the foresight by good ol gmax.

newbie
Activity: 21
Merit: 0
January 04, 2016, 07:16:08 PM
This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

Quote
The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

Quote
By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.
legendary
Activity: 996
Merit: 1013
January 04, 2016, 04:45:56 PM
The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard


Even if miners got so rich that they started to revel in luxurious
irrationality, the "ordinary" users will have to count their pennies.
If the price discovery is allowed to happen unhindered, the fees will
not be exorbitant, but reflect the actual demand & supply.

Also there will be in all probability advanced tools to calculate the right fee,
similar to the current fee estimation functionality.
 
In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem

Advances in propagation will translate to increased supply of
block space, and that will be measured by the market.
hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
January 04, 2016, 04:29:28 PM
It seems to me like you are missing the point. The advantages that BU brings are primarily political, empowering the participants of the Bitcoin network. From a purely technical perspective BU is not that different from Core or from the protocol today as a whole. Considering that you are not interested in discussing the political implications only further proves to me that you are completely missing the point.

That you think that a flexcap is similar to BU in regards to the blocksize only further highlights this misunderstanding. Flexcap if introduced by Core is a form of centralized economic planning, which history has shown us is ill advised. Flexcap will be charging miners for creating bigger blocks, this can be seen as a type of "taxation" or "fine", which would then be payed out to the next miner if they create a smaller block, forever adding a new incentive structure to Bitcoin mining in order to keep the blocks small fundamentally changing the economic policy of Bitcoin.

Almost all of the blocksize proposals so far have been forms of centralized economic planning. Since we are free to choose alternative implementations, these alternative have their own proposals and policies. We are limited in our choice however by the options that are giving to us by developers. This is like a form a representative democracy, with some of the accompanying problems that this creates. Singular implementations must decide on the vision and path for Bitcoin into the future, this is where some implementations have now diverged. Bitcoin Unlimited in many ways is different since it has transcended this debate, both small blockists and big blockists can arguably use BU, instead of dividing up into political camps and fighting over what the vision of Bitcoin should be, which would most likely lead to a split. Many of us can choose instead to allow the free market to decide what the blocksize should be in a more distributed and emergent fashion. Bitcoin Unlimited helps to further remove any barriers to this free market. Bitcoin Unlimited is also about disempowering developers from having a disproportionate influence over the economic policy of Bitcoin.

I can see why you might think that developers having more control over the protocol is a good thing. I can bite the bullet and say that this would most likely also slow down development, as I did in my conversation with Greg Maxwell. This can be percieved as being a positive thing however, making development in Bitcoin more conservative. It can also be argued that many developers are not well equipped to decide on the future of Bitcoin, considering that many of them have engineering and computer science backgrounds, these questions have a very large scope where the humanities also become important. I would argue that it is better that the market decides, I think that the wisdom of the crowd will always be better compared to any other form of centralized authority deciding for us. We can only lose our freedom by allowing others to decide for us.

Quote from: Rip Rowan
The only way to destroy freedom, is to convince people they are safer without it.
hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
January 04, 2016, 04:29:19 PM
The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns.
I do think this is true, and if it was it would render rule by the economic majority non viable. The more invested a person is the more incentivized they will become in order to do what is best for the network and inform themselves, overall.

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard
If there where fifty plus BTC of fees with high volume I would consider this a great success, large blocks are a consequence and a necessary condition for Bitcoins success, that is if we define success as greater mass adoption of the Bitcoin blockchain. It seems like you are more interested in running an extremely efficient network like a good engineer should, however there is more at stake then that.

In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem
The value of this can be measured by the market, and if you do not think so then you are disconnected with the reality. The market capitalization of Bitcoin directly influences the security of the protocol, when the price goes up the protocol pays the miners more for security, bringing more people in further distributing the hashpower.

I suppose according to your definition of a well running network there should not be many people using it and cloging up the blockspace. Since lots of people wanting to use the Bitcoin blockchain is an "enviromental hazzard"? This is why we need to limit blockspace and price most use cases and bussiness out of the ecostystem? I see it completly differently, when more people join Bitcoin it strenghtens the network, adds value, and brings about profound change in our civilization. I think we should allow that to continue to happen, keep the fees low and transactions reliable with an increased blocksize.
legendary
Activity: 1988
Merit: 1012
Beyond Imagination
January 04, 2016, 01:01:40 PM
The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard

In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem
sr. member
Activity: 409
Merit: 286
January 04, 2016, 12:56:26 PM
Sorry for stepping in.

If someone tries to sybill the networks and sets up 2,000 nodes with a blocklimit of 200 MB, no responsible miner would take this as a reason to set his own limit to 200 MB.

When one of the miners was corrupted too, he could release a 200 MB block and 2,000 Nodes would propagate it. All the other nodes with lower limits would reject the block untill it reaches some depth. For that to happen the majority of miners has to be corrupted.

The attack is a lot more complex than that. I think you're on the BU forum? Taek had a nice explanation of the centralization pressure enabled by BU. Someone could leverage a sybil attack to effectively do just what he proposed: slowly but surely prune nodes out of the network until it gets consolidated into a few more controllable hands.

Quote from: Taek
If you are a miner, and you know a block of size X can be processed by 85% of the network, but not 100%, do you mine it? If by 'network', we mean hashrate, then definitely! 85% is high enough that you'll be able to build the longest chain. The miners that can't keep up will be pruned, and then the target for '85% fastest' moves - now a smaller set of miners represents 85% and you can move the block size up, pruning another set of miners.

If by 'network', you mean all nodes... today we already have nodes that can't keep up. So by necessity you are picking a subset of nodes that can keep up, and a subset that cannot. So, now you are deciding who is safe to prune. Raspi's? Probably safe. Single merchants that run their own nodes on desktop hardware? Probably safe. All desktop hardware, but none of the exchanges? Maybe not safe today. But if you've been near desktop levels for a while, and slowly driving off the slower desktops, at some point you might only be driving away 10 nodes to jump up to 'small datacenter' levels.

And so it continues anyway. You get perpetual centralization pressure because there will always be that temptation to drive off that slowest subset of the network since by doing so you can claim more transaction fees.
I countered the criticism of Taek and so did many other people on the bitco.in forum, here is a link to my response:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-203#post-7395
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-208#post-7550

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.

Nothing to see here.

Wrong. I read it some seconds ago. You can combat his responses, you can try to destroy them, but if you try to make people think they are no responses and don't adress the problem, you obviously aren't trying to communicate the issue well and objective but to spread things that are not true. Play fair.

Here are the quotes:
Quote
. In conclusion however I think that you are mistakenly equating pool centralization with mining centralization.

--> he says that there is nothing like mining centralization, but only pool centralization. Criticize this argument, but don't pretend it is none.  Bitcoins natural game theory is that there are more honest miners than dishonest miners.

Quote
The incentive mechanism acts upon the miners, if the underlying game theory is correct, miners would not consciously undermine the value proposition of Bitcoin and therefore their own investment, they would not allow a pool to act maliciously in such a way for a sustained period of time ...  Increasing the blocksize would not effect mining centralization however. You are correct in pointing out this hypothetical attack vector, however this is only true for pool centralization and ultimately it is the people that control the hashing power that determine the size of the pools.

--> he says that an increase in the blocksize doesn't centralize mining. I made a similar objection in this discussion on page 3, but you didn't respond it.

Other than you taek followed the discussion and took the response serious. He claimed that the pool owner can force the miners to accept things they don't like, since they are a centralized source of power.

The response was:

Quote
More then seventy percent of the hashpower is currently in public pools, if we want there to be more decentralization we would want the pools to have more of this hashpower, since the other thirty percent is represented by companies like Bitfury, KNC, 21inc, which are the only type of mining operations that do not need to pool their hashpower in order to counter variance ... It is true that a pool is a centralized form of power, however when the hashpower is represented by 10-20 pools like it is today then that power is in effect distributed.

--> If there are 10-20 pools cumulating the hash power of hundreds, it is distributed. We experienced what happened to ghash when they nearly reached 51 percent for some time. If miners don' like what a pool does, they leave. In the case of ghash they even left when ghash just had the chance to do something evil but claimed they won't do.

hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
Warning: Confrmed Gavinista
January 04, 2016, 12:18:20 PM

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.


brg - the English language was on and left you a message:

"Please stop torturing me!!"
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
January 04, 2016, 12:09:31 PM
Sorry for stepping in.

If someone tries to sybill the networks and sets up 2,000 nodes with a blocklimit of 200 MB, no responsible miner would take this as a reason to set his own limit to 200 MB.

When one of the miners was corrupted too, he could release a 200 MB block and 2,000 Nodes would propagate it. All the other nodes with lower limits would reject the block untill it reaches some depth. For that to happen the majority of miners has to be corrupted.

The attack is a lot more complex than that. I think you're on the BU forum? Taek had a nice explanation of the centralization pressure enabled by BU. Someone could leverage a sybil attack to effectively do just what he proposed: slowly but surely prune nodes out of the network until it gets consolidated into a few more controllable hands.

Quote from: Taek
If you are a miner, and you know a block of size X can be processed by 85% of the network, but not 100%, do you mine it? If by 'network', we mean hashrate, then definitely! 85% is high enough that you'll be able to build the longest chain. The miners that can't keep up will be pruned, and then the target for '85% fastest' moves - now a smaller set of miners represents 85% and you can move the block size up, pruning another set of miners.

If by 'network', you mean all nodes... today we already have nodes that can't keep up. So by necessity you are picking a subset of nodes that can keep up, and a subset that cannot. So, now you are deciding who is safe to prune. Raspi's? Probably safe. Single merchants that run their own nodes on desktop hardware? Probably safe. All desktop hardware, but none of the exchanges? Maybe not safe today. But if you've been near desktop levels for a while, and slowly driving off the slower desktops, at some point you might only be driving away 10 nodes to jump up to 'small datacenter' levels.

And so it continues anyway. You get perpetual centralization pressure because there will always be that temptation to drive off that slowest subset of the network since by doing so you can claim more transaction fees.
I countered the criticism of Taek and so did many other people on the bitco.in forum, here is a link to my response:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-203#post-7395
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-208#post-7550

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.

Nothing to see here.
hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
January 04, 2016, 09:37:57 AM
Sorry for stepping in.

If someone tries to sybill the networks and sets up 2,000 nodes with a blocklimit of 200 MB, no responsible miner would take this as a reason to set his own limit to 200 MB.

When one of the miners was corrupted too, he could release a 200 MB block and 2,000 Nodes would propagate it. All the other nodes with lower limits would reject the block untill it reaches some depth. For that to happen the majority of miners has to be corrupted.

The attack is a lot more complex than that. I think you're on the BU forum? Taek had a nice explanation of the centralization pressure enabled by BU. Someone could leverage a sybil attack to effectively do just what he proposed: slowly but surely prune nodes out of the network until it gets consolidated into a few more controllable hands.

Quote from: Taek
If you are a miner, and you know a block of size X can be processed by 85% of the network, but not 100%, do you mine it? If by 'network', we mean hashrate, then definitely! 85% is high enough that you'll be able to build the longest chain. The miners that can't keep up will be pruned, and then the target for '85% fastest' moves - now a smaller set of miners represents 85% and you can move the block size up, pruning another set of miners.

If by 'network', you mean all nodes... today we already have nodes that can't keep up. So by necessity you are picking a subset of nodes that can keep up, and a subset that cannot. So, now you are deciding who is safe to prune. Raspi's? Probably safe. Single merchants that run their own nodes on desktop hardware? Probably safe. All desktop hardware, but none of the exchanges? Maybe not safe today. But if you've been near desktop levels for a while, and slowly driving off the slower desktops, at some point you might only be driving away 10 nodes to jump up to 'small datacenter' levels.

And so it continues anyway. You get perpetual centralization pressure because there will always be that temptation to drive off that slowest subset of the network since by doing so you can claim more transaction fees.
I countered the criticism of Taek and so did many other people on the bitco.in forum, here is a link to my response:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-203#post-7395
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-208#post-7550
legendary
Activity: 2156
Merit: 1072
Crypto is the separation of Power and State.
January 04, 2016, 12:08:57 AM

Cry  [BitcointalkObituaries.com]  Cry


Hi PR.  I too had a mostly on-topic, albeit slightly aggro, post deleted by a mod apparently set on keeping the thread's decorum conducive to productive discourse.

So quit yer bitchin!   Wink


EDIT: How close is BU to JR's block-market proposal?

I've always thought https://bitcoinism.liberty.me/economic-fallacies-and-the-block-size-limit-part-1-scarcity/ is full of great ideas....for altcoins to test.

It seems BU is just an abstraction onto which people like Frap.doc project their unrequited ideals, at evidence by the inability to get the story straight w/r/t whether or not BU follows the longest ("valid") chain.
sr. member
Activity: 392
Merit: 250
January 03, 2016, 11:33:03 PM
Legitimate kudos to adam for moving the discussion here:

https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/3zc6qg/review_of_shelling_point_protocol_selection_ideas/

Your arguments via oprah meme and appended "tard" might get downvoted, but they won't be deleted.
alp
full member
Activity: 284
Merit: 101
January 03, 2016, 10:21:57 PM
sr. member
Activity: 310
Merit: 253
January 03, 2016, 07:12:59 PM
I am very enthusiastic about Bitcoin Unlimited and think it is a great idea. (Disclaimer: I am a big blocker, and see BU as the mechanism that will end up bringing higher maximum block sizes that can let Bitcoin scale with on-chain transactions. Anyway, my stance on big blocks is, I think, independent of my argument below.)

As Zangelbert Bingledack has argued before, BU lets users do something that they can already do, albeit currently in a more complicated way. Let's suppose a group of miners decide that a blockchain with 2 MB blocks is acceptable to them, and want to gamble that other miners and economic actors (like exchanges) will think likewise and accept such big blocks too. They can already upgrade to a blockchain that supports larger blocks by recompiling their own custom version of Bitoin Core where they substitute a higher value for the integer constant MAX_BLOCK_SIZE. If these miners command a minority of the total hashing power, they will find that whenever they try to relay a 1.9-MB block, it gets stalled among nodes that refuse to relay it and the block gets orphaned and rejected by the longest chain. Now they could keep on trying to propagate their blocks and use human-communication channels like this forum to try to attract other miners and users to the 2-MB camp, but there is something that will probably put them off and that makes it hard for this approach to succeed: the moral aspect. Right now, the more common view is that a block that exceeds the 1-MB cap is an "invalid" block that violates the consensus rules, just as would be a block that contains, say, invalid transactions or incorrect hash values. This leads to a situation where the miners sending 1.9-MB blocks out to the open will get rejected as "malicious" or "attacking" nodes. Any reputable mining company won't want to be associated with such antics, and will understandably keep their blocks under the limit to be seen as well-behaved legit nodes.

Now the great idea behind BU is that it completely eliminates this moral aspect by taking the maximum block size out of the consensus rules. Under BU, the blockchain becomes a parameterised family of N-capped blockchains. If BU becomes the main Bitcoin implementation, miners may freely choose to decide that they can support a 2-MB-capped blockchain or a 32-MB-capped blockchain without anyone shouting at them "malicious!", "attacker!", "you filthy rascal, impostor of a node, boo, boo, boo!!!". The moral aspect vanishes as it is now just as legit to adhere to any cap. Those who only support the 1-MB-capped blockchain will reject any blocks bigger than 1 MB, while the 2-MB-capped blockchain nodes may keep on trying to build a longer chain. It's important to note that the blockchain only splits when a subset of the miners advocating for an N-capped blockchain command more hashing power than those miners that advocate for M-capped blockchains such that M < N. At that point, two things could happen: a node supporting the M-capped blockchains may accept that a longer chain now has larger blocks and raise their M parameter to match at least N, the new proof-of-work consensus, or insist that they won't support such large blocks and keep on mining a shorter chain of blocks that respect their M limit. This might lead to several alternative chains coexisting for some time, but the ensuing chaos should be very brief as the free market will rapidly settle for one of them. My feeling is that this would be the chain with the higher block sizes and the larger proof-of-work behind it.

How will the growth of the block size cap happen under this mechanism? I think the pressure on miners to increase the limit will grow as the cap starts to be hit. As more users try to send (on-chain) Bitcoin payments, the 1 MB limit will be hit more and more often and a backlog of transactions will start to grow. This will lead to users complaining about their transactions being stuck in limbo and some negative media reporting about it ("Bitcoin network collapsing" and the like). Under such strained conditions, which we may start to see pretty soon, the Bitcoin price will take a battering in the exchanges with miners starting to worry about their income and realising that they're jeopardising the Bitcoin network and their earnings by not raising the cap. I could be wrong about all this, of course, but then it would be the free market which would prove me wrong by settling on a tightly capped blockchain. In any case, thanks to the mechanism that BU provides, raising the block size limit can be a market-driven smooth transition rather than an incessant and unseemly fracas among the core developers in the mailing lists and IRC channels.
sr. member
Activity: 404
Merit: 362
in bitcoin we trust
January 03, 2016, 07:00:19 PM
I wouldn't say they are 'broken' - there is a lot of misunderstanding about it, and due to the level of censure taking place on bitcointalk its difficult to get a clear picture of what it is about on this forum.

We might need to think about moving forum because some of the people proposing the ideas apparently being "moderator incompatible". Technically I dont think it is accurate to say the clarity has been hurt by deletions directly, as far as I saw & remember contents of now deleted post no technical comments were deleted.  What has hurt clarity possibly is the refusal of people to participate because of the potential of moderation or clash of egos and moderators.

I do sympathize and dislike moderation myself, though there is a little irony in Peter R's deleted comment containing a proud link to his own heavy trolling of /r/bitcoin which is not exactly the way to encourage people to divert their time to review your proposal (moderator or not!)

I started a thread on /r/btc

https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/3zc6qg/review_of_shelling_point_protocol_selection_ideas/

and typed up a summary of ideas explained so far (including the below one that I already read before starting this thread we're in).

Quote
So may I respectfully point interested parties to the BU 'white paper' ( without having this post moderated/deleted as a result) here where you can digest the finer details.

I had read that one before starting the thread. It seems to be a different idea again not mentioned on this thread.  Maybe we should be analysing a set of features that BU proposes to combine.

Immediate observation with empty block ratios is that this appears not to work in the face of 4 existing network behaviours SPV mining, relay network, big pools and selfish-mining.

Quote
Additionally, the FAQ provides a higher level description of key topics. This should remove some of the guesswork which has characterised  this thread.

Dont recall if I read that one yet.

Quote
Then present your thoughts or arguments on the unmoderated  /r/btc reddit or directly to bitco.in where they can be discussed.

Ha after thought I figured /r/btc is the next best option given the egos and the moderators clashing, yes, see above.

Adam
legendary
Activity: 2968
Merit: 1198
January 03, 2016, 05:43:32 PM
In the interest of this "review", I will point out a point commonly not understood by those new to BU:

BU follows the longest chain.



BU does not always follow the longest chain.  In general BU operates in the same way as in Core,  BU nodes follow the longest valid chain.  There is a slight difference with respect to the blocksize issue.  It is possible BU nodes will follow the longest chain, where the blocksizes are arbitrarily large, but only under certain limited unusual conditions.  There is an “N depth” idea in BU, where nodes switch from regarding one chain as valid to another chain, if the chain with larger blocks has a lead of N blocks.  The default value of N is 4 and N could be manually set to any number, including infinity, when BU nodes will never switch to the longest chain.  Only if N is manually changed to 1, does BU follow the longest chain with respect to any blocksize.  Therefore the claim that BU always follows the longest chain is false.

It is not false with respect to any setting other than infinity (but your point is valid since infinity is a apparently a valid setting). There is never a guarantee that any Bitcoin node will converge to the longest chain in finite time, only eventually. The exact same guarantee applies to BU, though it may take longer to agree on a chain than other implementations.

hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
Warning: Confrmed Gavinista
January 03, 2016, 05:26:11 PM
The idea of enabling nodes & miners to set a market block-size is quite reasonable so there is no criticism of the idea.

That seems a reasonable result. Just need to iron out the details....

Quote from: adam3us
In summary:

1. The use case: dynamic market set block-sizes are interesting.

2. bitcoin unlimited proposals so far seems broken as discussed by multiple people for a whole range of reasons.  We didnt have a crisp definition and it seems that some things maybe undecided.  That's ok - just keep working on it and make a concrete proposal later and people can analyse it from that.

I wouldn't say they are 'broken' - there is a lot of misunderstanding about it, and due to the level of censure taking place on bitcointalk its difficult to get a clear picture of what it is about on this forum.

So may I respectfully point interested parties to the BU 'white paper' ( without having this post moderated/deleted as a result) here where you can digest the finer details. Additionally, the FAQ provides a higher level description of key topics. This should remove some of the guesswork which has characterised  this thread. Then present your thoughts or arguments on the unmoderated  /r/btc reddit or directly to bitco.in where they can be discussed.

legendary
Activity: 994
Merit: 1035
January 03, 2016, 03:11:42 PM
There seems to be multiple different explanations of BU which is leading to some confusion.

Aquent has posted his reply to Adam's thread-opening post:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/re-bitcoin-unlimited-seeks-review.718/

Quote from: Aquent
Bitcoin Unlimited instead proposes that node operators configure their own limit in a simple GUI menu. Currently, as there is unanimous agreement for a 2mb limit, the miners just sign their blocks with 2mb so communicating that they are willing to accept 2mb blocks. Once 90 or whatever % of them agree, then the miners can create the first 1.1 mb block and wala, we have a new limit.

Is this a hypothetical "unanimous agreement for a 2mb limit" of the miners or just BU nodes? So BU takes queue from a miner "BIP100 like" vote and combines that with a supermajority BU node vote to determine a new maxBlockSize limit?

  
Quote from: Aquent
That would only work if 51% of them so decided and, as we know, if 51% of miners decide to fork off they can do so currently.

Thus a simple majority of miners is the "BIP-100" like vote that would permit an increase if the corresponding nodes agreed?

  
Quote from: Aquent
The miners are self interested economic actors and we can assume that 51% of them will be honest (if we don't make such assumption then bitcoin does not work).

My thoughts are bitcoin simply made the game theory incentive to merely discourage dishonesty by incentivizing miners at a greater degree to secure the blockchain than attack it. Why are we assuming honesty? I hold the opinion we should prepare for dishonest and malicious miners as a possible attack vector. This is why we need to focus on decentralizing mining much more.


  
Quote from: Aquent

Right now for example we have core stating 1mb or bust - well there is unanimous agreement that approach is wrong and the limit has to increase to at least 2mb because businesses right now are hurting.

Is this true? As far as I know only Luke-jr wants to keep the blocklimit or lower it. Peter Todd signed up to make an effective increase and the rest of the scaling signers want to raise maxBlockSize after all the other improvements are completed to accommodate the LN. Is this simply a misunderstanding because I repeatedly see this being repeated on that forum and on r/btc or do you acknowledge cores statements and are assuming dishonest intent?

FYI... regarding post deletions, the only posts being deleted should be offtopic or non technical related ones, which we welcome because after all this is the " Development & Technical Discussion " section. Please take a screenshot of any "technical" post if you believe there is censorship here.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1004
January 03, 2016, 02:31:06 PM
I just wanted to point out that the one comment I left in this thread has now been deleted. The idea that this place is "neutral" is silly.

All the good people are leaving.

Zero opposition from Adam against the deletions.
Pages:
Jump to: