Topic: BTC endgame = Mega Miner controlling everything, BTC is not "trustless" - page 2. (Read 5404 times)

Another thing to add to your above^.

If Ghash.io tried to do something like that, there is nothing preventing them from coming back from the Hard Fork they created, and getting back on to the "legitimate" Block Chain. it might be a pain in the ass to code themselves back into it and reset whatever they have to reset, but they could do it.

If it is in the best interests of all Miners to always agree Ghash.io on transactions(which it currently is), then you won't have someone with 30% not agreeing. You see what I mean, I am taking the inverse of what most people argue. They argue that since Ghash.io says "they are not bad" then they will not be bad and that it is in the interest of Ghash.io to always be "good". Ghash.io can run the show fully right now if they wanted to and that should scare people, but they haven't really double spent many times yet(google it and see they have double spent).


The inverse is also the same in an odd way. A 71% rule or whatever number implemented would still hold the smaller miners to keeping to the "legitimate" Block Chain and wanting to agree with the majority of miners, only now you have a better chance at 2 or 3 miners being the "Super Majority" now instead of just Ghash.io... The smaller miners wouldn't want to try and go against the 71% because then they would be left out and would not want to create their own "Ghash.io coins" as you reference above. So if this universal law holds true and all players want to stay on a legitimate Block Chain, there will never really be major problems. But if later down the road Ghash.io decides to mess around at a larger level, the recourse of corrective action will be harder and harder to take and might ruin Bitcoin for a long time.

It only takes one major event to put a bad taste in dumb peoples' mouths and have them running for the hills.

just my 2 centz

I agree, I only make these posts to facilitate discussion. I am by no means any kind of expert in this field at all. I merely think too much sometimes. Sometimes I have a pretty good grasp on a situation, but other times there are a few things I am missing(information wise) to make the best decision.

I still argue it would be better to have confirmations not confirmed than to have double spends and other BS happen. At least with transactions not getting confirmed a lot of people notice right away and will deal with it within hours.

How don't you understand this. BTC Protocol is code, CODE CAN BE EFFING CHANGED TO ANYTHING.

A VARIABLE CAN BE MADE TO HANDLE THIS LOGIC.

Jesus H. Christ people....

Having the highest proportion of hashpower will attract more miners to point to their pool which has more chance to mine btc than other small pools.  On the other hand Ghash.io reluctantly splits  some of its hashers into independent pool in order to grab more profits.

This is the whole point. "MAJORITY!" How big of a majority does a mining company really need? And if we want to change the protocol, what percent of the users and developers need to be in the majority? 51%? 66%? 75%?

If 51% of the people want some kind of protocol change, and I am in the 49% who want a different change, will I be happy? Now we're starting to talk politics, and we're heading for semantics.

20 / 20 hindsight. The guys who put the whole thing together used a lot of hindsight from previous programming experience, right along with the hindsight of living life experience. Yet, we now see that their hindsight didn't cover some things, and it is only this present hindsight that is uncovering those things.

What we need is a conference made up of anyone who has hindsight experience. It needs to be a cool, logical discussion, with as many points as possible being brought into view. Advantages and disadvantages need to be weighed. The scary thing about doing it this way is, we may find that the whole Bitcoin project might need to be scrapped, replaced by something different and better.

If we were only a handful of devs, sitting around the table and brainstorming, things would be different. As it stands now, the fortunes of many people are tied up in Bitcoin, and whomever takes it upon themselves to make changes, better do a real good job of it.

Kicking out all the other miners by denying them any rewards and then reduce the online miners to a bare minimum would probably be profitable enough.

The 71% wouldn't have the power to do everything.  They couldn't, for example, increase their block reward, or spend coins they don't own.*

A small number of 0-confirmation double-spends sounds plausible, but repeatedly double-spending transactions with 2 or more confirmations will be noticed quickly (depth 2 block re-orgs are very rare).

Notice also that 31% could attack with equal subtlety by freezing a small selection of bitcoin accounts.


* The mechanics of a protocol change are practically orthogonal to those concerned with hashrate.  If some users (users/merchants/wallets/exchanges/pools) want to change the protocol, and other users want no change, then we'll have a hard-fork.  It will be as if those that wanted the change created an alt-coin with a pre-mine distributed among all bitcoin holders in proportion to their holdings.  If GHash.io wants to create GHash.io-coin and start mining it right away then I expect that many miners there will leave; who would want GHash.io-coins?  Such an attack would be roughly equivalent to GHash.io sending all their blocks to /dev/null.

Yes, code can be changed. But it cannot be changed in a manner that accomplishes that which is impossible.

It is harder to change a protocol (in a workable way) than it is to change code. Nevertheless, it is possible to change a protocol. But that protocol cannot be changed in a manner that accomplishes that which is impossible.

For all science knows at this point, in a Proof-Of-Work system, the 51% attack is indeed an inviolable property of the system.

Until a few scant years ago, mankind new of no way to solve the general double spend problem without appeal to central authority. _Anyone_ - owner of all the global hashpower, or owner of none of the global hashpower - could double spend in all decentralized systems.

Satoshi solved the generalized double spend problem. The corner he was unable to solve is the case where one aggressor has a significant portion of the global hashpower.

By all means, change the code. If indeed you can make the change you suggest is possible, you will no doubt be hailed as a hero to the entire cryptocurrency community. Your name may go down in history right alongside Satoshi's. If indeed you can perform this feat, you will deserve such accolade.

To be successful in this endeavor, however, it is going to require some critical thinking ^[tm].

With that, I think I'm out.

That code fragment you liked in the other thread was a joke.

I suggest you try to read and understand the Original Bitcoin Whitepaper.

There is no variable for deciding to trust the majority of the hash-power. It is inherent in the design of Bitcoin that the majority of the hash-power will be trusted. If that trust is not viable, then neither is Bitcoin.

People interested in preserving Bitcoin's value should work to reduce mining concentration as much as they are able.

This is the reason why we need a coin that is only mineable by GPU. But no such coin exist.

I wonder if way back in the day as GPU capable miners where first starting to hit the scene if similar arguments to this where raised regarding the centralization of mining power into huge GPU farm's and then ultimately from GPU to FPGA and obviously now from FPGA to asic?

Let us think critically for a moment. This is all open source code we are talking about, the BTC Protocol can be changed. If the majority agree to lines of code that validate transactions based on a larger percentage than 50%, the change will go through.

I am not sure if you are serious, if you were any kind of coder you would realize EVERYTHING about the BTC Protocol can be changed and that changes are still pushed through from time to time. There is no "inviolable law of mathematics" to invoke here, it is CODE, code can be changed.



What you seem to be "trying to argue" is that it won't be changed or that you disagree with everything I type because you don't like thinking critically.

I have thought about this also.

Is it better for double spends to happen and a 51% miner is in charge of everything? Or is it better for a super majority rule to be imposed, implying 70% must agree on transactions. If the 30% keeps vetoing it, this doesn't cause harm to bitcoin because they only hold veto power, not the power to do everything. I say it is better to have a rogue Mining Guild abuse veto power(then people stop using them) than it is for a rogue Mining Guild to have all the power.

I say this because having no transactions confirmed is an immediate thing to notice for anyone using it, and is probably a better thing to happen than lots of small scale double spends and obfuscation. Not everyone keeps track of double spending or is interested in it, but everyone is interested in transactions going through. Management by exception, IE if the block chain isn't confirming transactions a whole ton of people will notice within the hour and do something about it.

If the Rogue 51% Mining Guild keeps messing around for small amounts or does something not many people will care about, I feel like that will be a lot harder to combat and get enough people to rally behind fighting the 51% Mining Guild.

I disagree. I believe Bitcoin is becoming more decentralized. More Asics companies equals more consumer adoption for mining hardware.

Ironically, they are the one that pointed out the "backfire Effect" earlier in the thread.
Suggestions on the linked page are to let tempers cool down a bit, or if it suits your purposes, make them look like an idiot.

Edit: on the original topic: Bitcoin is supposed to avoid the mega-miner scenario by lowering the barriers to entry. I don't think Satoshi anticipated the rise of mining pools where people blindly point hash-power at a few "trusted" entities.
If the hashers don't smarten up, something will happen to crash the price. Hopefully after 2-3 years of sliding value, hashers and pool operators will know to not concentrate hash-power again.

I think Ghash.io didnt even think about option they will be so successfull to have 51% at some time. Otherwise they started running second seemingly independed pool when around 30%

It was suggested that Ghash.io split some of its hashers into a new "unknown" pool in order to appear to have less than 50%. This shows they may be thinking the same way you are.

Certainly, a 71% attack would be quite a lot harder to mount than a 51% attack.  However, I don't see how such a "super majority" mechanic could work here.  Are you suggesting something like: transactions only get confirmed if they are backed by 70% of the network?  If so, couldn't a pool with 40% of the hashing power attack the network by vetoing all transactions?

While true, this is of limited value in answering the question of 'why 50%?'.

Not sure if serious. O.o

Please refer to the bolded portion above. And for god's sake, think before spewing.

Re: "Talk down" - you're the one who waded into this with guns blazing.