If you encrypt your private key of your paper wallet by BIP38 it is obviously very important to properly document your encryption passphrase on redundant offline media which needs to be stored safely and separately from your paper wallet. Failing to do so or trying to rely on human memory will quite certainly leed to a loss in the future.
It should be obvious that such an encryption passphrase should never touch any online digital device!
The code of bitaddress.org is pretty well checked and tested, so it doesn't need to be updated like crazy as e.g. browser code desperately needs to be. You also already trusted the page code of bitaddress.org and idealy it should be the same as what you download from the Github repo. The difference is that you can verify the authenticity of the page code from Github!
To generate safe paper wallets any involved software pieces need to be verified for authenticity! The computer environment used needs to be safe (boot a Live Linux that runs solely in RAM best) and offline and after creation, printingoffline non-saving printer!/saving your paper wallet(s) the computer working environment has to be erased/formatted (easiest with a Live Linux that only runs in RAM as after a shutdown no traces of your working environment are left behind).
If you save a digital copy of your paper wallet on some removable storage media (if any then redundant copies recommended), those digital copies should never touch an online digital device (temporarily offline doesn't provide safety).
The CSPRNG used by Javascript might have implementation flaws and is dependant of the underlying Javascript engine of the browser. As o_e_l_e_o pointed out, if you're looking for better security (i.e. randomness of your paper wallet's private key) let well known and established wallets like Bitcoin Core, Electrum or Sparrow generate your paper wallet's private key(s). They all use very likely safer CSPRNG implementations than Javascript.