Proof-of-importance is an obfuscation of proof-of-stake, because it doesn't burn transaction fees, so a cartel majority of stake holders (who thus can control which chain wins) could do as many transactions as they want, paying any transaction fees to themselves:
I am doing my best to share why I abandoned unprofitable PoW within the limited time I have to share.
I am not going to share the scheme because a facet of the scheme is employed in my ongoing (current) solution, even though my current design no longer employs unprofitable PoW. I am instead burning transaction fees and using TaPoS to prevent long-con nothing-at-stake attacks. But the "longest chain rule" is not the default consensus mechanism in my design. I can't give more details than that right now. My design has multiple facets which are (afaik) novel.
W.r.t to consensus ordering algorithm, I have I think a design which removes the power of control from those who have the most wealth resources and puts the control in the hands of those who transact the most. The capitalists transact very little and thus are not consumers and are wealthy. The rest of us transact a lot and our power is that we are the consumers!
Thank you for providing these interesting details! I think I got your basic idea. I'm curious to know in what ways your concept can improve the idea of TaPoS.
Many ways.
Btw, does you model offer objective consensus or does it rely on weak subjectivity in the sense of V. Buterin?
I argue in my white paper that TaPoS is as objective as proof-of-work. I think
Vitalik's idea of how TaPoS could be attacked is as implausible as doing a long-con attack on Bitcoin.
I explained to you that your negative interest idea could be attacked by a 51% attack which enables only the majority to retain stake by orphaning the minority's blocks. So it is just an obfuscated minted block reward. That is not unprofitable PoW.
Of course, this scenario would be possible. But would it make sense economically? I have my doubts. In case of profitable PoW, such an attack indeed makes sense since you only hurt the minority miners, whereas the owners of the currency remain unaffected. With a negative interest on your stake (that gets inevitable due to the attack), the owners would quickly get discouraged from using/keeping the currency, which will eventually lead to depreciation.
It's not sufficient to look at the nominal value of your stake, you also have to take its real value into account.
The hashrate value is only going to be some % of the market cap daily. So to attack this coin and double-spend, you just rent that level of hashrate. Otherwise the coin needs to become the "one chain that rules over all the rest" and is dominated by entrenched mining farms which refuse to rent out 51% of the hashrate.
So what happens in that later optimistic case is that if those who transact end up paying a transaction fee for this PoW to be done on some mining farm. Thus the mining farms are not paying for the hashrate, yet they have the hashrate available to attack the coin when they are ready to flip the switch and take control.
But the mining farms have this huge investment which they don't want to destroy, thus they will not attack in any overt way which undermines their investment.
Additionally I explained to you that if you did indeed have unprofitable PoW then it would have insufficient hashrate and it could be attacked very cheaply by renting hashrate.
I'm not sure how big the hashrate would be if it's used to avoid negative interest on your stake. For sure the total hashrate would depend on the market capitalization of the coin and its popularity. It would also depend on the interest rate itself and how it can be decreased by PoW blocks.
Even if the hashrate alone was insufficient to protect the coin, an attacker would still have to buy/rent 51% of the stake if we put an upper limit on block creation for each account, in proportion to its stake.
Without acquiring the necessary stake, you would have to create a whole new alternative chain (fork) by doing PoW, which would be very costly even if the hashrate is lower than in Satoshi's PoW. This would amount to surpassing the cumulative hash power (or energy) as I explained here:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.15972492One of the other problems is that you are disincentivizing buy & hold investors/speculators.
You are basically emulating Freicoin's market failure and its demurrage concept.
I don't see penalizing those who don't transact as a viable model for a store-of-value which is one of the attributes of money.
Power vacuums are disequilibria. That is the fundamental point of my white paper and my attempt at a technical solution.
So in your proposed negative interest rate design, if the loss of stake is
greater than the cost of the proof-of-work, then all savers will transact to themselves,
thus this is just proof-of-stake so the majority stake must collude to do the 51% attack I explained as quoted above. If the loss of stake is
less than the cost of the proof-of-work, then there is a gradual transfer of the ownership of the coin to the mining farms and thus the stake eventually becomes winner-take-all concentrated.
I hope readers are starting to understand how very difficult it is to design a money system which is not a winner-take-all power vacuum.