1. Permissionless free market to stand up a consensus ordering (i.e. mining) node. <--- not a flaw, but it is a flaw of DPoS
2. Power-law mining distribution is unstable trending toward winner-take-all devolution.
3. Transaction fees are not a free market because of the block size, regardless whether block size is fixed or variable.
4. No asynchronous concurrency of transaction ordering for enhanced scaling and throughput (although resilency and liveness are provided by miners competing to produce the next block). Only the node that produces the next block may add transactions during the block period.
5. Long range retroactive chain forks (aka long-con attack) if quantum computers appear.
6. 51% attack on minority blocks can’t be objectively observed.
7. Orphans blocks. High transaction confirmation latency. Confirmation only probabilistic, never final. Burning must exceed double-spend value.
8. Wasteful and inefficient.
There is a lot of assuming/guessing here, but here it goes...
1. (this flaw only applies to dPoS). From what I have gathered (very limited time), your solution is a hybrid, but is still similar to dPoS. It seems you are referring to the PoW part of your design, which is much more permission-less than DPoS?*
2. The mining of all forms of PoW (as they currently exist) can be exploited due to economies of scale, which tends towards winner take all. Agreed. That means you have conceived a new PoW consensus algorithm that is immune to economies of scale? Interesting...
3. Since your model is a PoW/dPoS hybrid, I assume your model pays transaction fees evenly to stakeholders and/or destroys transaction fees so everyone benefits in additional equity (the latter of which is exactly what dPoS does, so that would make sense)? Miners can still be compensated by competing for blocks and earning a subsidy when they do find a block.
4. If the network's nodes can agree that a transaction happened by a majority consensus and the sender paid a sufficient transaction fee, then there is no reason why you could not allow multiple stakeholders/miners to put transactions into blocks (rather than just the person who found the block, if they refused to do so)?
5. TPoS?
6. I got nothing...
7 & 8. Enter the DPoS aspect of the hybrid... On 7 you even said "Burning must exceed double-spend value," which perhaps validates the assumption I made on the latter half of #3. ... The destruction of transaction fees for the betterment of all stakeholders in DPoS is referred to burning.
* I still argue PoW is not permission-less, but can concede it is much more permission-less than all forms of PoS.