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Topic: Decrits Proposal: Solution for an unbound, energy-related, stable value currency - page 3. (Read 8182 times)

hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
Tytus, I revised the OP per your suggestion. I also changed the title as I think I was unconsciously trolling by calling it inflationary. We'll see how this one goes. Grin
sr. member
Activity: 250
Merit: 250
to launch a new currency You have to solve an important NEW problem that has not been solved. You can also rely on BTC breaking because after 2 years nobody can keep track of all BTC transactions any more, but there, You will have competition :-)
The new problem that has not been solved is simple: bitcoin is a commodity, decrits will be a currency.

You have me, but this is not enough :-)
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
to launch a new currency You have to solve an important NEW problem that has not been solved. You can also rely on BTC breaking because after 2 years nobody can keep track of all BTC transactions any more, but there, You will have competition :-)

The new problem that has not been solved is simple: bitcoin is a commodity, decrits will be a currency.

I forgot ... I think an additional problem is that bitcoins are stolen to easily :-) this is also a problem that should be addressed in the new currency.

In the consciousness stream linked in the OP I talk about an account restrictions block where people could put restrictions on what an account can do without the master key or whatever. Early stage of ideas, but it will happen and no one should be foolhardy enough to trust a site that won't identify its cold wallet and the restrictions on it.
sr. member
Activity: 250
Merit: 250
I forgot ... I think an additional problem is that bitcoins are stolen to easily :-) this is also a problem that should be addressed in the new currency.
sr. member
Activity: 250
Merit: 250
In any case the coin can only be launched if it has features that attract people "exponentially".
I would expect a slow adoption of the currency and it doesn't bother me. Why? Because bitcoin is doomed to fail. The idea is absolutely ingenious; the execution fatally flawed. Businesses are not interested in bitcoin as is anyway. It boils down to a speculative digital pet rock, nothing more.

BTC solved some important problems.
1) very small international transaction fees [not sufficient to survive / evolve]
2) anonymous accounts good for drug deals, black mail etc [yes(!) this is innovative and made the success possible]
3) it is easy to creating "home banking" with this, it is open source, it is not controlled by authorities ... [yes, I like all this, but the (2) point was probably more important]

to launch a new currency You have to solve an important NEW problem that has not been solved. You can also rely on BTC breaking because after 2 years nobody can keep track of all BTC transactions any more, but there, You will have competition :-) ... and You have to develop the code for the currency.

BTC will defend itself. It will adopt changes if it starts taking competition seriously. If it is possible to solve some of the problems You mentions with small modifications in the BTC code then You risk a lot :-) ... You risk because people who start with the new currency invest their time in it and they don't want to fail after 2 years.
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
In any case the coin can only be launched if it has features that attract people "exponentially".
I would expect a slow adoption of the currency and it doesn't bother me. Why? Because bitcoin is doomed to fail. The idea is absolutely ingenious; the execution fatally flawed. Businesses are not interested in bitcoin as is anyway. It boils down to a speculative digital pet rock, nothing more.

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A btc fork is probably easier to implement.
And a complete waste of time in the grand scheme of things. Too many things need to change; why just build another stepping stone instead of going for it all?
sr. member
Activity: 250
Merit: 250
You did not criticize me for ignoring the point on disk space :-) maybe contrary to my previous comment this is a driving force for changes. I managed to install bitcoin on debian only after some parameter changes in the database. I also have a problem explaining others why they have to wait 2 days for the client to be up to date :-) If You go for the mobile market a leaner currency system is better.
Also if You put an effort on network health maybe in addition to financial transactions You could use the system to fight e-mail spam by implementing a proof-of-work header in emails. Maybe after some time email clients will notice and verify such headers and You would have a potential market to start the currency.
In any case the coin can only be launched if it has features that attract people "exponentially". A btc fork is probably easier to implement.
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
It would be easier for newbies to understand the proposal if it has an abstract with a table where You have a structure like this:
1. what problem of BTC You want to solve
2. how You want to solve it
... preferably ordered by decreasing priority

You are right, and the reason why it isn't here is because I went over and over this stuff with the Encoin proposals. That's not an excuse, but I got tired of repeating myself and get into the habit of feeling that bitcoin's major problems are self-evident. Grin

* To require energy only to verify transactions or to create a small percentage of new currency with the rest being given freely and fairly.
here, there are two goals right ? ... reduce work AND give coins freely [the second may scare people so it has to be explained]
The "how" is explained under the money creation section, though some of the "whys" are probably not that clear.

* To ensure direct developer intervention is not required to adapt the currency to future, unforeseen events. This will exist via both the voting system as well as a highly modular network that allows for the insertion of new protocols or algorithms with relative ease.
how does this relate to BTC?
BTC's only mechanism for changing the protocol is in the hands of relatively few mining pool operators. Google the BIP16/BIP17 fiasco if you're curious. Plus many changes will take a year or more to be realized, while this system can quickly resolve protocol issues.

* To enable the users of the currency to create new currency quickly in response to increased demand to avoid both price shocks and manipulation of the currency via "credit crises."
are price shocks (high fluctuations) expected?
No, contrary to bitcoin. But if someone does attempt to manipulate the currency, or if banks decide to stop lending to cause a credit crisis (which gives them the opportunity to buy up durable goods at highly deflated prices--see the ongoing mortgage crisis), the people can create new currency and effectively diminish the power of the banks or manipulators. This is a powerful, powerful idea that is absolutely necessary, imo, to get rid of the business cycle and the constant siphoning of wealth and productivity from the people to the banks.

* To ensure a reasonable, base demand for money via the proof-of-share profit system as well as the benefits of the coin multiplier during periods of high demand (with save, spend, and receive behavior all being rewarded).
coin multiplier sounds scary again :-(
It serves several aspects: 1) you don't need to mine to get new money, so any monopoly over mining is powerless; 2) if the market expands rapidly, the price will be much less volatile as 10x the currency is created for every 1x mined--this is great for new business opportunities and will entice entrepreneurs rather than scare them off; 3) existing accounts receive new money and people who transact receive new money--incentives for saving and spending (and receiving!) in a growing economy, not massively hoarding. Instead of just increasing the value of the coin, more coins are created instead. But people who have faith in the currency should be and are rewarded, just like bitcoin. But bitcoin only rewards those who hold many coins. There is little incentive for new adopters (except to hope that there are more adopters after them) and there is little incentive to actually transact. This changes that.

* To incentivize being a transmitting node for the health of the network.
BTC can exist with only very few nodes up, right?
Yes, but it puts the power in the hands of a few people; hardly decentralized. Because of the bandwidth and storage costs, it even makes sense for this to happen with bitcoin which is why reducing storage and bandwidth dramatically was a big part of the encoin proposals. So that the everyman can be a part of the network. In Decrits, you will actually get paid just for being a transmitting node too!

* To ensure that being a transmitting node is always within the reach of an everyday (power) user.
Are so many transmitting nodes needed?
The more the network can support the better. It makes it harder to attempt a denial of service, it makes it harder for "evil entities" to destroy the network, etc. Because decrits is based on shareholders rather than proof of work, a potential but costly attack on the network would be to try to take control of the majority of the network reputation and start dropping valid transactions or ignoring honest shareholders transaction blocks in an attempt to get them removed. The transmitting nodes will be the defense against that. You can't fool all the people all the time, but if there's only a few people to fool...

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Ignore my post if I ask to many stupid questions. An abstract would help also other though.
There are no stupid questions. I posted this so people could question and comment. Like I said though, I have a habit of leaving stuff out because of so much discussion that has gone into this proposal prior to this thread. There is a lot of stuff. I have literally spent hundreds of hours coming to this point where I think I have done a seriously solid job of proposing what could be a very successful alternative currency to bitcoin. I'll work on an abstract.
sr. member
Activity: 250
Merit: 250
The initial post is too big to read it.

You also start with something

Decrits is a continuation of my proposals for Encoin, a proposal for a currency that attempts to keep a stable value over time. I've mostly ditched that idea in favor of one that acts in a sort of equal but opposite manner to bitcoin where instead of coin value rising to meet demand, new coins are given freely to those that save and transact on the network.

that is probably hidden somewhere in the overall goals but it does not seem to be a primary goal.

OVERALL GOALS
* To require far less data than Bitcoin in terms of both bandwidth and disk space.
* To require energy only to verify transactions or to create a small percentage of new currency with the rest being given freely and fairly.
* To ensure direct developer intervention is not required to adapt the currency to future, unforeseen events. This will exist via both the voting system as well as a highly modular network that allows for the insertion of new protocols or algorithms with relative ease.
* To ensure that transactions are secure from double/bad spend attacks within seconds.
* To enable the users of the currency to create new currency quickly in response to increased demand to avoid both price shocks and manipulation of the currency via "credit crises."
* To ensure a reasonable, base demand for money via the proof-of-share profit system as well as the benefits of the coin multiplier during periods of high demand (with save, spend, and receive behavior all being rewarded).
* To incentivize being a transmitting node for the health of the network.
* To ensure that being a transmitting node is always within the reach of an everyday (power) user.

It would be easier for newbies to understand the proposal if it has an abstract with a table where You have a structure like this:
1. what problem of BTC You want to solve
2. how You want to solve it
... preferably ordered by decreasing priority

some other comments

OVERALL GOALS
* To require far less data than Bitcoin in terms of both bandwidth and disk space.
this is probably not a driving force to start a new currency [to low priority to be on the top of the list
* To require energy only to verify transactions or to create a small percentage of new currency with the rest being given freely and fairly.
here, there are two goals right ? ... reduce work AND give coins freely [the second may scare people so it has to be explained]
* To ensure direct developer intervention is not required to adapt the currency to future, unforeseen events. This will exist via both the voting system as well as a highly modular network that allows for the insertion of new protocols or algorithms with relative ease.
how does this relate to BTC?
* To ensure that transactions are secure from double/bad spend attacks within seconds.
cool, it makes paying at a physical store easier.
* To enable the users of the currency to create new currency quickly in response to increased demand to avoid both price shocks and manipulation of the currency via "credit crises."
are price shocks (high fluctuations) expected?
* To ensure a reasonable, base demand for money via the proof-of-share profit system as well as the benefits of the coin multiplier during periods of high demand (with save, spend, and receive behavior all being rewarded).
coin multiplier sounds scary again :-(
* To incentivize being a transmitting node for the health of the network.
BTC can exist with only very few nodes up, right?
* To ensure that being a transmitting node is always within the reach of an everyday (power) user.
Are so many transmitting nodes needed?

Ignore my post if I ask to many stupid questions. An abstract would help also other though.
legendary
Activity: 1050
Merit: 1003
Okay, I'll leave your thread alone.
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
Cunicula, there is no point in acting aggressive and making unsubstantiated statements. I am not going to get in a flame war with you because you think you've solved proof of stake in cryptocurrencies or something. If you want to actually argue something, argue it instead of beating around the bush and leaving me with nothing to actually respond to. I would be absolutely happy to, and it is the reason for posting these ideas.

edit: Since you edited your post give me a moment to respond without looking silly.


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Provisions allowing for probationary periods, vesting periods, unequal voting power, unequal returns relative to share ownership, etc. are generally believed to weaken corporate governance (i.e. encourage mismanagement).

This is an appeal fallacy, though to which I am not sure. Appeal to common belief? I suppose.

Anyways, as far as transactional security goes, each share is essentially as powerful as any other. As far as voting power goes, as I mentioned in the voting section, the 75% majority is only for "pre-approved" voting options such as adding specific types of functionality to the network (new signature algorithms, new hashing algorithms for storing scripts, etc.), or changing non-essential functionality from a pre-determined list of options (like, if the value of the coins go down and a 2 coin award causes too much spam from the minting network, it could be increased to 4 coins--but this may end up being automatic anyway).

The 90% majority is required to actually change the code. Now, while changing the code is significant, it also requires that clients accept the change. It requires that the CloudNet accepts the change as well. Since what would be considered a standard bitcoin network peer will actually get paid for their services under this model (and the data storage and bandwidth requirements compared to bitcoin will be significantly less), I expect there to be a lot of network peers. You can't fool all of the people all of the time, and if a change is not universally regarded as a good thing, the network can peaceably split. Or perhaps we should just rely on a dozen or so pools to decide what's best for us? Or people endowed with power from the earliest adoption phases to be benevolent in their decision-making in the case of proof-of-stake?

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Probably because you believe incumbents are more trustworthy and that the evil entities are new guys.

No, because there are provisions against what you call incumbents from accruing any type of real power over the network. "The probationary period exists so that long-standing shareholders are rewarded for continuing service to the network."

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I think you are wrong about this and instead that incumbents and entrants are equally prone to dishonesty. If so, then your complex provisions will facilitate dishonest behavior.

If they are equally prone, then the provisions do not facilitate anything more than greater profitability for the "incumbents" as is designed.
legendary
Activity: 1050
Merit: 1003

As far as "strange ideas" there are no incumbents so your analogy is flawed.

Oh really?


Additionally, an "evil entity" trying to weed out existing protect his power from new shareholders by reducing their profitability would will have a much easier time of it if there were no becuase of the probationary period.


FTFY

Provisions allowing for probationary periods, vesting periods, unequal voting power, unequal returns relative to share ownership, etc. are generally believed to weaken corporate governance (i.e. encourage mismanagement).

However, you feel like these provisions are a good idea. Probably because you believe incumbents are more trustworthy and that the evil entities are new guys.

I think you are wrong about this and instead that incumbents and entrants are equally prone to dishonesty. If so, then your complex provisions will facilitate dishonest behavior.
hero member
Activity: 798
Merit: 1000
The complexity argument is one I can't argue against, though in reality it is more about many small ideas adding up to a bigger whole rather than something insanely more complex than say, for example, bitcoin.

Be more specific about which part's beneficence is unclear and I will be happy to explain. I can't do it all in one post because the issues I sought to resolve in bitcoin were discussed across many emails and many threads on these message boards, and I know no one will read a book on a message board.

As far as "strange ideas" there are no incumbents so your analogy is flawed. There is no limit to the amount of people who may purchase shares (it is the third sentence of that section). But, during periods of network expansion, it will be profitable for more people to purchase shares to the detriment of those who already own shares. The reputation system rewards the existing shareholders temporarily with a larger piece of the profit. Anyone interested in the currency's future should be happy to stick around and eventually reap the same reward. Additionally, an "evil entity" trying to weed out existing shareholders by reducing their profitability would have a much easier time of it if there were no probationary period. Unlike bitcoin's reward system, there is no need to be there first or before someone else, only to stay in for the long haul. It encourages the sustainability of the currency, not a pyramidal shape to the currency.
legendary
Activity: 1050
Merit: 1003
This seems exceptionally complex to me and the benefits are unclear. Not good keep it simple.
It also incorporates some strange ideas (e.g. Incumbents are inherently more trustworthy than new entrants) Really? In most discussions of governance, provisions protecting incumbents are viewed as weaking governance. Doesn't stop megalomaniac founders from adding them though. If you are right, guess we should tell the founding fathers and get that term limit / regular elction crap ripped up so we can get more trustworthy, permanent  leaders.
hero member
Activity: 686
Merit: 500
Wat
Update: clarified a few extra things and added the overall goals section.

Is no one really at all interested in something that doesn't sound like just-another-scamcoin?

Just do it. If it's good, people will use it.

+1

donator
Activity: 1736
Merit: 1014
Let's talk governance, lipstick, and pigs.
This could work if it had both demurrage *and* proof-of-stake as well as a third system. If it could be immune from both a 51% attack *and* a stake monopoly, then you will have a Bitcoin killer.  If a stake monopoly expires and block rewards distribute randomly with the hashrate, then you have the best of both worlds.  You would be able to bootstrap adoption with just a few people and more can always join with some hope of getting block rewards through demurrage to create their own stake.

When a proof-of-stake expires through demurrage, it can be replaced with a reputation based system I like to call proof-of-merit. It allows you to maintain your stake for purposes of difficulty as long as your block additions remain consistent with the blocks created by other proof-of-stake and proof-of-work miners.

This creates a sort of rock-scissors-paper game of block verification. OTOH, simple is usually better. I'll put my money on Bitcoin.
legendary
Activity: 1358
Merit: 1003
Ron Gross
TL;DR this for me - is Decrits the pure Proof of Stake coin? (If so, I suggest renaming it StakeCoin).
hero member
Activity: 798
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Regarding the share system: If my node does something bad, I'd lose my share(s). How exactly does this work, step by step? Who determines I did something bad, where is the database of shares kept, and how can I be sure noone sabotages me so I lose my shares?

As far as sabotage goes, shareholders use their signatures to sign their communications. As long as their private key is secure and the DSA is secure, they are secure from sabotage.


As far determining you did something bad, there are only a few possibilities:

1) approving a transaction for an account that has an insufficient balance to make the tx (bad spend): Every cloudnet peer and every shareholder will be able to immediately spot this. What will happen is that anyone honest seeing this transaction block will either see an alert attached to it or add an alert to it if it's missing. Assuming all of the rest of the shareholders are honest, they will continue the transaction block chain as normal but everyone will mark those shares as bad and remove them from the total reputation and all of the other details that go along with cleaning the situation up. It can be continually monitored that everyone agrees on all data by using a hash of the up-to-date consensus block (described in encoin threads).

2) creating two or more transaction blocks for the same 10 second period (double spend): while this one is a little trickier, it still should be no problem. If a man-in-the-middle or similar attack is executed against a merchant to be scammed, a shareholder will have to coordinate and feed them a false transaction block. Considering there are likely to eventually be tens of thousands of shareholders this will already be a daunting task. Not only will they have to use their 10 second window exactly to pay the merchant, the thieves must be able to get away within a few short minutes (seconds?) before the merchant notices that he is not getting a proper tx block chain including this block. When CN peers see a duplicate-but-different block, they will transmit it as normal and shareholders will include the evidence in the tx block chain. This means double spends are theoretically possible, but merchant software could easily identify risk factors (e.g. tx value is greater than this shareholders share) and wait for another confirmation.

3) and excluding perfectly valid transactions: this is a complicated one that I don't have a solution for yet, though I do have some ideas.

All of these factors above assume a mostly honest combination of shareholders and CN peers. If shareholders become mostly dishonest, CN peers must be mostly dishonest as well too. Whenever a portion of the network decides to break away, the honest members of the CN will transmit enough information to prove that the other portion of the network is bad to anyone who will listen. Any shareholder that has been responsible and kept track of all data could never be fooled into signing a tx block on the wrong portion of the network. Regular old clients that do not keep up with the network continuously can retrieve a small amount of data (parts of the consensus block) and compare it to previously known history before sending a tx or believing a confirmed tx to ensure that nothing seems awry.


And as far as "database of shares" this information is kept in the consensus block as described in the encoin thread. It is a local store of all of the information that should agree with what everybody else has. I think I did put some mention of fail-safes and penalties when a shareholder does not create a tx block during the time-frame required in the consciousness stream. It will create some fork-like symptoms that are temporary and merchants will be aware of, but again it comes down to just waiting a few extra seconds for an extra confirm if the tx is of value.
hero member
Activity: 642
Merit: 500
Regarding the share system: If my node does something bad, I'd lose my share(s). How exactly does this work, step by step? Who determines I did something bad, where is the database of shares kept, and how can I be sure noone sabotages me so I lose my shares?
hero member
Activity: 642
Merit: 500
Only if you're on dialup  Grin

Or, like me, live in a country with slow internet and quotas on bandwidth.
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