Topic: Decrits Proposal: Solution for an unbound, energy-related, stable value currency - page 3. (Read 8210 times)

The initial post is too big to read it.

You also start with something


that is probably hidden somewhere in the overall goals but it does not seem to be a primary goal.


It would be easier for newbies to understand the proposal if it has an abstract with a table where You have a structure like this:
1. what problem of BTC You want to solve
2. how You want to solve it
... preferably ordered by decreasing priority

some other comments

this is probably not a driving force to start a new currency [to low priority to be on the top of the list
here, there are two goals right ? ... reduce work AND give coins freely [the second may scare people so it has to be explained]
how does this relate to BTC?
cool, it makes paying at a physical store easier.
are price shocks (high fluctuations) expected?
coin multiplier sounds scary again :-(
BTC can exist with only very few nodes up, right?
Are so many transmitting nodes needed?

Ignore my post if I ask to many stupid questions. An abstract would help also other though.

Okay, I'll leave your thread alone.

Cunicula, there is no point in acting aggressive and making unsubstantiated statements. I am not going to get in a flame war with you because you think you've solved proof of stake in cryptocurrencies or something. If you want to actually argue something, argue it instead of beating around the bush and leaving me with nothing to actually respond to. I would be absolutely happy to, and it is the reason for posting these ideas.

edit: Since you edited your post give me a moment to respond without looking silly.



This is an appeal fallacy, though to which I am not sure. Appeal to common belief? I suppose.

Anyways, as far as transactional security goes, each share is essentially as powerful as any other. As far as voting power goes, as I mentioned in the voting section, the 75% majority is only for "pre-approved" voting options such as adding specific types of functionality to the network (new signature algorithms, new hashing algorithms for storing scripts, etc.), or changing non-essential functionality from a pre-determined list of options (like, if the value of the coins go down and a 2 coin award causes too much spam from the minting network, it could be increased to 4 coins--but this may end up being automatic anyway).

The 90% majority is required to actually change the code. Now, while changing the code is significant, it also requires that clients accept the change. It requires that the CloudNet accepts the change as well. Since what would be considered a standard bitcoin network peer will actually get paid for their services under this model (and the data storage and bandwidth requirements compared to bitcoin will be significantly less), I expect there to be a lot of network peers. You can't fool all of the people all of the time, and if a change is not universally regarded as a good thing, the network can peaceably split. Or perhaps we should just rely on a dozen or so pools to decide what's best for us? Or people endowed with power from the earliest adoption phases to be benevolent in their decision-making in the case of proof-of-stake?


No, because there are provisions against what you call incumbents from accruing any type of real power over the network. "The probationary period exists so that long-standing shareholders are rewarded for continuing service to the network."


If they are equally prone, then the provisions do not facilitate anything more than greater profitability for the "incumbents" as is designed.

Oh really?



FTFY

Provisions allowing for probationary periods, vesting periods, unequal voting power, unequal returns relative to share ownership, etc. are generally believed to weaken corporate governance (i.e. encourage mismanagement).

However, you feel like these provisions are a good idea. Probably because you believe incumbents are more trustworthy and that the evil entities are new guys.

I think you are wrong about this and instead that incumbents and entrants are equally prone to dishonesty. If so, then your complex provisions will facilitate dishonest behavior.

The complexity argument is one I can't argue against, though in reality it is more about many small ideas adding up to a bigger whole rather than something insanely more complex than say, for example, bitcoin.

Be more specific about which part's beneficence is unclear and I will be happy to explain. I can't do it all in one post because the issues I sought to resolve in bitcoin were discussed across many emails and many threads on these message boards, and I know no one will read a book on a message board.

As far as "strange ideas" there are no incumbents so your analogy is flawed. There is no limit to the amount of people who may purchase shares (it is the third sentence of that section). But, during periods of network expansion, it will be profitable for more people to purchase shares to the detriment of those who already own shares. The reputation system rewards the existing shareholders temporarily with a larger piece of the profit. Anyone interested in the currency's future should be happy to stick around and eventually reap the same reward. Additionally, an "evil entity" trying to weed out existing shareholders by reducing their profitability would have a much easier time of it if there were no probationary period. Unlike bitcoin's reward system, there is no need to be there first or before someone else, only to stay in for the long haul. It encourages the sustainability of the currency, not a pyramidal shape to the currency.

This seems exceptionally complex to me and the benefits are unclear. Not good keep it simple.
It also incorporates some strange ideas (e.g. Incumbents are inherently more trustworthy than new entrants) Really? In most discussions of governance, provisions protecting incumbents are viewed as weaking governance. Doesn't stop megalomaniac founders from adding them though. If you are right, guess we should tell the founding fathers and get that term limit / regular elction crap ripped up so we can get more trustworthy, permanent  leaders.

+1

This could work if it had both demurrage *and* proof-of-stake as well as a third system. If it could be immune from both a 51% attack *and* a stake monopoly, then you will have a Bitcoin killer.  If a stake monopoly expires and block rewards distribute randomly with the hashrate, then you have the best of both worlds.  You would be able to bootstrap adoption with just a few people and more can always join with some hope of getting block rewards through demurrage to create their own stake.

When a proof-of-stake expires through demurrage, it can be replaced with a reputation based system I like to call proof-of-merit. It allows you to maintain your stake for purposes of difficulty as long as your block additions remain consistent with the blocks created by other proof-of-stake and proof-of-work miners.

This creates a sort of rock-scissors-paper game of block verification. OTOH, simple is usually better. I'll put my money on Bitcoin.

TL;DR this for me - is Decrits the pure Proof of Stake coin? (If so, I suggest renaming it StakeCoin).

As far as sabotage goes, shareholders use their signatures to sign their communications. As long as their private key is secure and the DSA is secure, they are secure from sabotage.


As far determining you did something bad, there are only a few possibilities:

1) approving a transaction for an account that has an insufficient balance to make the tx (bad spend): Every cloudnet peer and every shareholder will be able to immediately spot this. What will happen is that anyone honest seeing this transaction block will either see an alert attached to it or add an alert to it if it's missing. Assuming all of the rest of the shareholders are honest, they will continue the transaction block chain as normal but everyone will mark those shares as bad and remove them from the total reputation and all of the other details that go along with cleaning the situation up. It can be continually monitored that everyone agrees on all data by using a hash of the up-to-date consensus block (described in encoin threads).

2) creating two or more transaction blocks for the same 10 second period (double spend): while this one is a little trickier, it still should be no problem. If a man-in-the-middle or similar attack is executed against a merchant to be scammed, a shareholder will have to coordinate and feed them a false transaction block. Considering there are likely to eventually be tens of thousands of shareholders this will already be a daunting task. Not only will they have to use their 10 second window exactly to pay the merchant, the thieves must be able to get away within a few short minutes (seconds?) before the merchant notices that he is not getting a proper tx block chain including this block. When CN peers see a duplicate-but-different block, they will transmit it as normal and shareholders will include the evidence in the tx block chain. This means double spends are theoretically possible, but merchant software could easily identify risk factors (e.g. tx value is greater than this shareholders share) and wait for another confirmation.

3) and excluding perfectly valid transactions: this is a complicated one that I don't have a solution for yet, though I do have some ideas.

All of these factors above assume a mostly honest combination of shareholders and CN peers. If shareholders become mostly dishonest, CN peers must be mostly dishonest as well too. Whenever a portion of the network decides to break away, the honest members of the CN will transmit enough information to prove that the other portion of the network is bad to anyone who will listen. Any shareholder that has been responsible and kept track of all data could never be fooled into signing a tx block on the wrong portion of the network. Regular old clients that do not keep up with the network continuously can retrieve a small amount of data (parts of the consensus block) and compare it to previously known history before sending a tx or believing a confirmed tx to ensure that nothing seems awry.


And as far as "database of shares" this information is kept in the consensus block as described in the encoin thread. It is a local store of all of the information that should agree with what everybody else has. I think I did put some mention of fail-safes and penalties when a shareholder does not create a tx block during the time-frame required in the consciousness stream. It will create some fork-like symptoms that are temporary and merchants will be aware of, but again it comes down to just waiting a few extra seconds for an extra confirm if the tx is of value.

Regarding the share system: If my node does something bad, I'd lose my share(s). How exactly does this work, step by step? Who determines I did something bad, where is the database of shares kept, and how can I be sure noone sabotages me so I lose my shares?

Or, like me, live in a country with slow internet and quotas on bandwidth.